

Stabilization of the Indo-Pacific Region and Japan's Response to a Crisis

FY2022 Maritime Security Study Group Report

-Contents-

Introduction	4
(1) Summary of Research in Fiscal Years 2020 and 2021	4
(2) FY2022 Research.....	4
Section 1: The Course of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, Lessons Learned, and Issues ...	5
(1) The Course of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine.....	5
(i) From 2021 to end of February 2022: Hybrid warfare phase.....	5
(ii) Early March to late March 2022: Military operations as a result of failed hybrid warfare	5
(iii) Early April to late September 2022: Full-scale military operations	6
(iv) From early October 2022: Military operations with a focus on psychological effects	7
(v) There is no indication as to how or when the war will end.....	7
(2) Lessons Learned and Issues in the Invasion of Ukraine	7
(i) Lessons learned and issues of hybrid warfare.....	7
(ii) Lessons learned and issues in the transition from hybrid warfare to full-scale military operations	12
(iii) Lessons learned and issues in full-scale military operations	13
(iv) More comprehensive lessons learned and issues	16
Section 2: The Changing Security Environment and Possible Crises to Prepare for In and Around Japan	18
(1) Trends in Russia	18
(i) Impact of Russia's weakening on Russia's neighboring countries	18
(ii) Russia remains a nuclear power despite weakening	19
(2) Trends in China	19
(i) Heading for the continent, the oceans, or chasing two rabbits?.....	19
(ii) Aim to resolve the Taiwan issue through more sophisticated hybrid warfare	20
(iii) Possibility of an invasion of the Senkaku Islands linked to a Taiwan crisis.....	20
(iv) South China Sea issue.....	20
(3) Trends in North Korea.....	21
(i) Possibility of adventurous behavior.....	21
(ii) Possibility of use of nuclear weapons	21

Section 3: Analysis of Possible Crises In and Around Japan.....	22
(1) Analysis of a Taiwan Crisis.....	22
(i) Strategic importance of Taiwan to Japan	22
(ii) Issues extracted from a Taiwan crisis scenario	23
(2) Analysis of a Korean Peninsula Crisis	26
(i) Strategic positioning of the Korean Peninsula.....	26
(ii) Korean Peninsula crisis scenarios and extracted issues.....	27
(3) Analysis of a Senkaku Islands Crisis	28
(i) Strategic positioning of the Senkaku Islands	28
(ii) Senkaku Islands crisis scenario and extracted issues.....	29
Section 4: Stabilization of the Indo-Pacific Region and Japan’s Response to a Crisis (Recommendations)	30
(1) Strengthening Multilayered Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region and Japan’s Involvement	30
(i) Strengthen cooperation in the Quad.....	31
(ii) AUKUS and the Quad.....	31
(iii) Strengthening of Japan-Taiwan cooperation and recognition of Taiwan’s importance to Japan	31
(iv) Strengthening Japan-U.S.-South Korea cooperation	32
(v) Cooperation with ASEAN countries (sharing of maritime safety information).....	32
(2) From the Perspective of Deepening the Japan-U.S. Alliance	32
(i) Strengthening the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence by the U.S.....	32
(ii) Establishment of a comprehensive security framework for Japan and U.S. governments	33
(3) Significance and Concrete Measures of Japan’s Response to Hybrid Warfare	33
(i) Establishment of a comprehensive command to strengthen countermeasures against hybrid warfare	33
(ii) Establishment of a Hybrid Threat Analysis Center.....	33
(iii) Preparation of information dissemination posture to win the battle in the cognitive domain.....	34
(iv) Establishment of a system to appropriately deal with disguised armed groups.....	35
(4) Response to Advanced Technological Fields such as Cyber, Electromagnetic Waves, UAVs, Space, etc.	35
(i) Strengthen cyber defense capabilities	36
(5) Effectiveness of International Norms and Japan’s Response to Threat of Force.....	37
(i) Strengthen effectiveness of international norms to deter threat of force and establish an international monitoring system	37
(ii) Japan’s response to deter threat of force.....	37
(iii) Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) by Japan and the U.S.....	38

(6) Development of a Comprehensive Defense Capability that can Respond to Cross-domain Operations	38
(i) The importance of force design for cross-domain operations.....	38
(ii) Cyber warfare capabilities in hybrid warfare and cross-domain operations.....	38
(iii) Response to new forms of combat.....	39
(7) Response to Crisis in Surrounding Areas.....	39
(i) Taiwan contingency: Issues regarding recognition of a Survival-Threatening Situation	39
(ii) Taiwan crisis: Response to a simultaneous occurrence of a Survival-Threatening Situation and an Armed Attack Situation.....	40
(iii) Taiwan crisis: What should be done in a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security?	41
(iv) Korean Peninsula crisis: Counterattack on opponent's base in response to ballistic missile attack, etc.	41
(v) Response to a Senkaku Islands crisis.....	41
(vi) Response to the South China Sea issue.....	42
(8) From the Perspective of Further Strengthening Japan-U.S. Collaboration.....	43
(i) Establishment of a permanent Japan-U.S. joint coordination center	43
(ii) Enhancement of a permanent Joint Task Force (JTF) command.....	43
(9) From the Perspective of Protecting the Public.....	43
(i) Consideration of broad civil protection, including the general public and related parties.....	43
Conclusion.....	44

Introduction

(1) Summary of Research in Fiscal Years 2020 and 2021

The Maritime Security Study Group was formed in FY2020 and concluded in FY2022. FY2020 research focused on Japan-U.S. cooperation regarding the Senkaku Islands issue with reference to Russia's invasion of Crimea (2014), considered a typical example of hybrid warfare, and hybrid warfare in a Gray Zone situation (hereinafter referred to as a "GZ" situation). The study group analyzed the issues and made recommendations in the report.¹

In FY2021, in light of the enactment of the Coast Guard Law of the People's Republic of China, the study group analyzed the "territorial security issue," particularly with regard to territorial infringement by warships and "civilian" public vessels that embody state actors, from a legal perspective. The study group pointed out that the core of territorial security is to be legally prepared to respond decisively and appropriately to warships and public vessels not compliant with the principle of innocent passage in territorial waters.

On the other hand, hybrid warfare, including cyberattack, manipulation of public opinion, and all other methods, can disrupt command and control in the field and at the center or can directly prevent or neutralize response actions due to various obstructions in the field.

In addition, various means aimed at effects in the cognitive domain (influence operations, manipulation of public opinion, etc.) may confuse and delay government decision-making. Such action could not only affect territorial security operations but also shake the very foundation of national security. To deal with this problem, the report advocated the necessity of a system in which relevant government agencies work together to assess the hybrid threat and take countermeasures.²

(2) FY2022 Research

As a study group that has conducted successive rounds of research on hybrid warfare, we recognize that there are many lessons and hidden issues in the hybrid warfare in the GZ situation that Russia has conducted against Ukraine since 2021 as well as the full-scale military invasion that has been underway since then.

Based on the above issues, the study group will attempt to analyze, examine, and make recommendations related to the stabilization of the Indo-Pacific region and Japan's response to a crisis.

¹ NPI Maritime Security Study Group FY2020 Research Report (in Japanese), https://www.npi.or.jp/research/data/npi_policy_20210415.pdf

² NPI Maritime Security Study Group FY2021 Research Report (in Japanese), https://www.npi.or.jp/research/data/npi_policy_maritime-security_20220331.pdf

Section 1: The Course of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, Lessons Learned, and Issues

Observing the current situation in which Russia's invasion of Ukraine has turned into a quagmire of 20th century-style warfare, some commentators have concluded that diplomacy and information warfare cannot deter war and that the only way out is to counter force with force.³ However, a careful examination of the course starting from summer 2021 to the present reveals many lessons, from the hybrid warfare phase in a GZ situation before a force against force situation, to military intimidation, and then to full-scale military operations.

(1) The Course of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

(i) From 2021 to end of February 2022: Hybrid warfare phase

It is likely that President Vladimir Putin did not initiate the invasion in an attempt to start a quagmire war, as is currently the situation. According to a special report published by The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) on February 15, 2022, just prior to the military invasion (called a special military operation by Russia), a 200-person department responsible for Ukraine was suddenly created in Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) in July 2021, and the FSB is believed to have launched a political campaign to support a pro-Russian faction in Ukraine.⁴ Following that political campaign, computer hacking was used to locate the addresses of anti-Russian factions and prepare them for detention, and an effort was made to create unrest among the public by raising energy prices.

In the days leading up to the military invasion, several cyberattacks were carried out, disrupting the Ukrainian government, military, and financial institutions, and on the day of the invasion, large-scale disruption of telecommunications and Global Positioning Services (GPS) was also conducted.⁵

(ii) Early March to late March 2022: Military operations as a result of failed hybrid warfare

Against this backdrop, Russian paratroopers who landed at Antonov International Airport near Kyiv are believed to have detained anti-Russian factions in Kyiv, including key figures in the Volodymyr Zelenskyy administration, while simultaneously planning to establish a government by a pro-Russian faction.⁶ Had this operation succeeded, it would have been the "three-day

³ For example, Hirofumi IWATA, 「日本はウクライナ戦争に覚醒せよ」日本国家基本問題研究所、2022年6月7日 [Nihon wa Ukuraina senso ni kakusei seyo Japan should open eyes on Ukraine War] (in Japanese). Japan Institute for National Fundamentals website, 7 June 2022.

⁴ Jack Watling, Nick Reynolds "The Plot to Destroy Ukraine" Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Special Report, 15 February 2022, p.9.

⁵ Mihoko Matsubara, (松原実穂子 「『第五の主戦場』サイバー攻撃応酬の脅威」『外交』Vol.72 (2022年3/4月号) 32~33頁 ["Daigo no shusenjo" saiba kogeki oshu no kyoji The Fifth Main Battle Space—The Threat of Cyber Warfare Stalemate] (in Japanese), *Diplomacy* Vol. 72, March-April 2022, pp. 32-33.

⁶ 「ロシア軍部隊が侵攻当日にキーウに降下、ゼレンスキー氏ら銃を手に暗殺危機しのぐ...米誌」『読売新聞オン

victory” that President Putin was reportedly aiming for.

What role did the Russian invading force, estimated to have numbered up to 190,000 men, play? At the start of the invasion on February 24, 2022, the sight of troops dispersed on all fronts rushing simultaneously across the border by road toward the major cities was hardly a rational military operation. As a result, a large contingent, estimated at 30,000 men, headed for Kyiv from the Belarusian border, was pinned down on the road for more than 60 kilometers and remained motionless for more than 10 days.⁷ This scene could not have happened if the military units had proper operational plans in place beforehand. It is thought that President Putin considered the military’s cross-border rush as a means of military intimidation that would form part of hybrid warfare led by the FSB and other intelligence agencies. If that is the case, it is understandable that he thought the operation would be completed in a short period of about three days. The fact that many of the Russian soldiers on the front line in the initial battle testified that they did not think they would go to war may be a confirmation of this supposition.⁸ Military units actually deployed across the border as a means of intimidation in hybrid warfare have no choice but to continue fighting after the hybrid warfare fails, as long as there are no orders to retreat. The chaotic fighting behavior of the Russian army from the end of February to the end of March 2022 reflected the comments by the soldiers.

It is believed that the initial hybrid warfare was led by the FSB and other intelligence agencies, with the military in a supporting role. The failure of this strategy may have led to the establishment of a general commander within the military to lead the invasion, and reports of the detention of the director of the FSB’s relevant department and the expulsion of 150 employees since mid-March 2022 seem to confirm this.⁹

(iii) Early April to late September 2022: Full-scale military operations

At the end of March 2022, withdrawal from the Kyiv front was ordered, and, on April 9, 2022, Commander of the Southern Military District Aleksandr Dvornikov was appointed commander in charge of the overall Ukrainian operation, and military operations in the form originally

ライン』2022年5月1日, [*Roshia gunbutai ga Shinko tojitsu ni ki-vu ni koka, zerenshiki shira jyu wo teni ansatsukiki shinogu...beishi, Russian Troops landed Kyiv on the Day of Invasion*] (in Japanese), *The Yomiuri Shimbun* newspaper, 1 May 2022 <https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/world/20220430-OYT1T50205/>.

⁷ 「なぜロシア軍の全長 64 kmの車列は動きを止めたのか、ウクライナ首都近郊 2022年3月4日」 [*Naze Roshia gun no zenchou 63km no sharetsu wa ugokiwo tometanoka, Ukuraina shutokinko Why Russian 64-kim Convoy Stopped Advancing*], (in Japanese) BBC News Japan, 4 March 2022 <https://www.bbc.com/japanese/60613307>.

⁸ 「ロシア兵『ママ苦しいよ』動画には『演習と言われ...』情報戦が激化」『朝日新聞デジタル』2022年3月4日) [*Roshia hei “Mama, kurushii yo” douganiwa “enshu to iware” johosen ga gekika Russian Soldiers Were Told to Join Exercise—Mum, it’s so tough- Escalation in Information Warfare*] (in Japanese), *Asahi Shimbun* digital newspaper, <https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASQ343K0PQ32O1PE015.html>.

⁹ Masatoshi Fujitani (藤谷昌敏「ロシア・スパイ帝国の終焉か—連邦保安庁 FSB の凋落」(日本戦略フォーラム 2022年4月22日)[*Roshia, supai teikokuno shuenka—renpo hoancho FSB no choraku The End of Espionage Empire of Russia-Downfall of FSB*] (in Japanese), Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, 22 April 2022 <https://jbpres.ismedia.jp/articles/-/69830>.

conducted by the army began.¹⁰ In other words, the operation was changed to one in which the units worked in coordination with each other to expand the occupied area of southeastern Ukraine.

(iv) From early October 2022: Military operations with a focus on psychological effects Russia, which had been on the defensive militarily due to the Ukrainian military's reversal offensive that began in the south in late August 2022 and in the west in early September 2022, appeared to be using the following measures to psychologically distract Ukraine and the countries supporting it with the aim of preventing an all-out resistance by Ukraine and securing the territory occupied by Russia.

Examples of distractive measures include:

- Missile and unmanned air vehicle (UAV) attacks on civilian targets, including destruction of power infrastructure.
- Dissemination of disinformation on the pretext that Ukraine was plotting to destroy dams and use “dirty bombs,” suggesting similar attacks by Russian forces, knowing that the acts would be called a “false flag” operation.
- Threat of use of nuclear weapons by saying they would not hesitate to launch a nuclear attack and by conducting nuclear exercise.
- Annexation of four southeastern provinces to Russia and the forced displacement and acculturation of the population to Russia would create a sense of resignation among the Ukrainian people to the idea of regaining control of the occupied territories.

(v) There is no indication as to how or when the war will end.

(2) Lessons Learned and Issues in the Invasion of Ukraine

(i) Lessons learned and issues of hybrid warfare

Why did Russia's hybrid warfare fail? The answer lies in the fact that Ukraine, supported by the U.S., the U.K., and other countries, was able to make the first move and effectively deal with Russia's hybrid warfare. In November 2021, the U.S. Joe Biden administration, aware of various Russian moves, established a “Tiger Team” in the White House consisting of officials from the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of the Treasury, and other departments and agencies.¹¹ The team was tasked with studying a wide range of diplomatic, economic, and military measures in cooperation with

¹⁰ 「ロシアが司令官任命 態勢立て直し」『朝日新聞デジタル』, 2022年4月11日 [*Roshia ga shimeikan ninmei jyosei tatenashika Russia Nominated the New Commander in Chief Likely Reorganizing its Invasion Force*] (in Japanese), *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper, 11 April 2022 <https://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S15262877.html>.

¹¹ 「米大統領直轄チーム、対ロ機密を異例開示、侵攻抑止狙う」『日本経済新聞電子版』, 2022年2月16日 [*Bei daitoryo chokkatsu chimu, tairo himitsu wo ireikaishi shinko yokushi nerau, The U.S. Presidential Team Discloses Top Secret Russia-related Intelligence Aiming at Deterrence of Invasion*] (in Japanese), *Nikkei* newspaper, 16 February 2022, <https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOGN100ZS0Q2A210C200000/>.

European countries and others in anticipation of various attacks by Russia on Ukraine. Around this time, the U.S. began an information disclosure operation in response to Russia's various "false flag" operations, in which it disclosed a series of originally classified intelligence in order to stay ahead of Russia.

At the same time, U.S. private-sector technicians were sent to Ukraine along with U.S. Cyber Command units to take countermeasures against anticipated Russian cyberattacks.¹² It was also reported that in December 2022 a combined team of personnel from intelligence agencies and military special forces from the U.S. and U.K. was dispatched to Ukraine and that they began preparations for personal protection of key Ukrainian government officials, for psychological warfare inside Ukraine, and for importation of weapons from abroad.¹³

Originally, the U.S., the U.K., and other Western countries actively supported Ukraine to increase its resilience against hybrid warfare by providing various types of military assistance as well as large-scale assistance to improve its cyber defense capabilities since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The pace of this support was further accelerated with an eye on the moves by Russia after the summer of 2021. The study group believes that this assistance by the West has been successful, and that Ukraine has been able to effectively deal with hybrid warfare with Russia.

Lesson 1: The importance of disabling various methods of hybrid warfare

If Russia, led by President Putin, had succeeded in its intended hybrid warfare in this invasion, a pro-Russian government would have been established in Ukraine three days after the military invasion, and, even if President Zelenskyy had survived, he would have had no choice but to oppose Russia politically from abroad as an exiled government.

Therefore, it is highly significant that, with the support of the U.S., U.K., and other countries, Ukraine was able to effectively respond to hybrid warfare by not allowing this to happen. It is expected that countries that intend to launch hybrid warfare in the future will conduct thorough research on the causes of Russia's failure and Ukraine's success and that they will use more sophisticated means to accomplish their goal. Countries that aim to prevent this attempt need to take preemptive measures to disable the various means of hybrid warfare.

Specifically, the following points can be made.

Implementation of comprehensive countermeasures against various hybrid threats

Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Ukrainian government has anticipated that Russia would exercise various hybrid threats, and, in addition to strengthening its general military

¹² Toshihiro Yamada (山田敏弘「ウクライナ侵攻の裏にある『見えない戦争』サイバー工作」『JIJI.COM』2022年4月21日) [Ukraina Shinko no urani aru "mienai senso" saiba kosaku Invisible War—Cyber Operation behind Ukraine Invasion] (in Japanese), Jiji.com, 21 April 2022 <https://www.jiji.com/jc/v8?id=202204ukrrusyt>.

¹³ (「英米が大統領脱出準備 亡命政権樹立を支援—ウクライナ」『JIJI.COM』2022年3月8日, [Eibei ga daitoryo dasshu junbi bomei seiken juritsu wo shien—Ukraina, Ukraine—The U.S. and U.K. Preparing Evacuation of the President to Support Establishing the Exiled Regime] (in Japanese), Jiji.com, 8 March 2022 <https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2022030701033&g=int>).

capability, with the support of Western countries Ukraine has steadily implemented a system to comprehensively deal with hybrid threats, including drastically strengthening cyber security of critical infrastructure, etc.; expanding Internet literacy education to counter disinformation, etc.; taking measures against pro-Russian penetration operations; and raising public defense awareness.

In Japan, it is necessary not only to promote individual countermeasures in each area, but it is also a requirement to establish a government command and build a system in which ministries and agencies work together to respond to hybrid threats in order to disable them according to a consistent policy, bearing in mind that hybrid threats are conducted in a comprehensive manner.

Column 1: Example of the Importance of Sectoral Collaboration in Cyber Influence Operations

As a cyber influence operation conducted by Russia, a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack was carried out on the websites of two major Ukrainian banks on February 14, 2022. It is known that the attackers used a means to amplify the confusion by making the mere unavailability of the websites appear as if the banking systems had been destroyed, and, at the same time, by disseminating disinformation that ATMs were no longer available. This is an example of how cyberattacks and disinformation are linked in an influence operation that requires cooperation between the cyber and information departments.

Evacuation of government data out of the country prior to the invasion

On February 17, 2022, a few days before Russia’s invasion, Ukraine’s parliament amended the Data Protection Law to allow government agencies to move their data from dedicated servers to the public cloud, allowing the evacuation of critical government data to European countries. As a result, it has been pointed out that this countermeasure protected critical data from missiles and other attacks on data centers in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Securing connection with the international community and the communications infrastructure that guarantees it

Why were President Zelenskyy’s comments able to be transmitted to the international community at all times in the midst of the fierce attack by Russian forces on Kyiv?

Russia appears to have conducted cyberattacks three times between January and February 24, 2022, the date of the launch of the invasion, but, unlike during the 2014 invasion of Crimea, the cyberattacks largely failed. Reasons for this failure are as follows.

- Europe and the U.S. are believed to have provided considerable support for cyber defense.
- The fact that Ukraine is connected to the rest of the world via land lines appears to have provided a relative resilience to cyber threats.

- The early availability of the Starlink low earth orbit satellite network, a satellite link of SpaceX, a private company in the U.S.

However, Japan, as an island nation, and Taiwan are dependent on submarine cables to connect to the rest of the world, and there are limits to how decentralized these cables can be. In addition to securing satellite links, it is also necessary to consider how Japan could secure an Internet connection to the world in the event of a Taiwan contingency.

Securing electric power infrastructure

The connection of Ukraine to the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) has been planned since 2017 following the conflict that broke out in Donbas in 2014-2015, and the original plan was to be implemented during 2023. However, due to increased military tensions with Russia, Ukraine withdrew from the integrated power system of Russia and Belarus on February 24, 2022, just before Russia's invasion began. Ukraine's state-owned power company requested an emergency connection to ENTSO-E on February 27, 2022, and the connection began on March 16, 2022. Thus, with regard to the electric power system, the country has broken away from its dependence on Russia and seems to have secured its resilience in terms of cyberattacks, but there are issues regarding its resilience from physical attacks by missiles and other means.

In the case of Japan, the systems of major power plants are closed systems, which should have a certain degree of resilience to cyberattacks, but solar power generation, etc., which is controlled by open systems due to the deregulation of electricity, may be a vulnerable point. On the other hand, there remain issues in securing power in the event of physical attacks or disasters.

Securing communications and power infrastructure is an important lesson not only in a GZ situation to a full-scale invasion, but also for large-scale disasters.

Proactive information transmission and information support by Europe and the U.S.

Although it was not possible to deter the actions of the dictator Putin before Russia's invasion, the fact that the U.S. led the international community to unite so quickly suggests that the U.S., which traditionally has a policy of keeping as much information as possible out of the public domain, had actively disseminated information and made careful preparations, including the dissemination of information to the countries concerned even before Russia's invasion. It also seems that considerable intelligence support was provided to Ukraine.

In any case, amid calls for further deepening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the importance of Japan-U.S. cooperation in an Article 5 situation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and Japan-U.S. intelligence sharing from a stage before armed conflict as well as determination of the areas in which Japan should seek assistance from the U.S. (a like-minded country) have been clearly highlighted.

Column 2: Definition of Hybrid Warfare in these Recommendations

As the Defense of Japan 2022 (Annual White Paper) describes, “The so-called ‘hybrid warfare’ represents methods intentionally blurring the boundaries between the military and non-military realms,” the term “hybrid warfare”¹⁴ is generally used in a very broad sense as a method of warfare that includes non-military warfare. On the other hand, when hybrid warfare is used as an academic term, it often refers only to methods of warfare used in a so-called GZ situation that do not lead to a full-scale military invasion.¹⁵

For the purpose of these recommendations, hybrid warfare is defined as fighting in a GZ situation that is neither purely peacetime nor contingency situation and that intentionally combines various military and non-military methods so that it does not lead to a full-scale military invasion.

On the other hand, in the case of a full-scale military operation that mainly involves physical military destruction, and where various military and non-military methods, such as cyberattack, are used together, the term “cross-domain operations” is used to clearly distinguish between the two.

A clear distinction between the two is key to understanding the nature of Russia’s current invasion of Ukraine and to drawing precise lessons from it.

What exactly are the various methods used in hybrid warfare?

Social and economic methods

These include psychological methods, such as manipulation of public opinion, influence operations, and media manipulation, which are often referred to as “information warfare,” as well as economic means, such as trade, investment, and energy supply.

Technological methods

Technological methods, both military and non-military, include cutting-edge technologies in the fields of cyber, electromagnetic waves, unmanned vehicles, and space.

Armed methods

Private military companies, volunteer soldiers, and disguised fishermen are used as disguised armed forces to conceal their identities and plans as state organizations, while regular military operations and missile launches are used for psychological intimidation under the guise of exercises and other activities.

The major characteristic of hybrid warfare is that it does not extend to the large-scale physical destruction of enemy forces or large-scale occupation of enemy territory, as in a full-scale military invasion, but rather, through the comprehensive operation of various military and non-military methods, such as those listed above, it influences public opinion

¹⁴ Ministry of Defense, *DEFENSE of JAPAN 2022*, p.1.

¹⁵ The detailed work on this topic includes, Junjiro Shida, 『ハイブリッド戦争の時代—狙われる民主主義 2022 年 4 月 26 日 志田淳二郎 『ハイブリッド戦争の時代—狙われる民主主義』並木書房、2021 年、13～62 頁 [Haiburido senso no jidai—nerawareru minshushugi Hybrid Warfare— Democracy Gets Targeted], Namiki Shobo, 2021, pp. 13-62.

in the target country and international public opinion, and ultimately affects the will of the target country leaders, etc. In other words, the decisive characteristic is that it is a battle in the cognitive domain that makes full use of diverse methods.

Column 3: Hybrid Warfare Concepts in Russia and China

The 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia and the civil war in the Donbas region in Ukraine was a major catalyst for the diffusion of the concept of hybrid warfare around the world. In this war, Russia used covertly disguised armed forces and pro-Russian agents who concealed their identities as regular army troops, as well as cyber and electromagnetic waves, and achieved its goal of annexing Crimea and establishing a pro-Russian “people’s republic” in the Donbas region, without resorting to a full-scale military invasion. It is said that behind this operation was the concept of hybrid warfare proposed by Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov in 2013, which came to be known as the Gerasimov Doctrine by researchers.¹⁶

Prior to the annexation of Crimea, in 1999, two air force colonels in China published a book entitled “Super Limit Warfare” in which they argued that in the modern era, “all means that can be employed in warfare are considered weapons.”¹⁷ These methods include almost every conceivable field, from the economic, such as finance and trade, to the psychological, such as media and ideology. Four years later, in 2003, the Chinese government officially adopted the concept of “Three warfares” (psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare),¹⁸ and in 2016 it created a strategic support unit specializing in space warfare,¹⁹ cyber warfare, and information warfare, and is working to improve its hybrid warfare and cross-domain operations capabilities.

(ii) Lessons learned and issues in the transition from hybrid warfare to full-scale military operations

Although Russia failed in hybrid warfare, it also failed to stop the invasion and regroup. It deployed a large military force along its borders as a means of military intimidation, but why did it allow that force to actually invade beyond its borders? And why was the West unable to deter the invasion?

¹⁶ Yoko Hirose, 廣瀬陽子 『ハイブリッド戦争—ロシアの新しい国家戦略』、講談社現代新書、2021年、35～37頁、*Haiburido senso—Roshia no atarashii kokka sennryaku, Hybrid Warfare—Russia’s New National Strategy*, Kodansha-Gendai Shinsho, 2021, pp. 35-37.

¹⁷ 喬良、王湘穗 著、劉琦 訳、『超限戦—21世紀の「新しい戦争」』角川新書、2020年 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsu, translated by Liu Ki, [*Chogensen—21 seki no “atarashii senso” Unrestricted Warfare*] (in Japanese), Kadokawa Shinsho, 2020,

¹⁸ Ministry of Defense, *DEFENSE of JAPAN 2019*, p.59.

¹⁹ Yoshikazu Watanabe, 渡部悦和 『中国人民解放軍の全貌—習近平 野望実現の切り札』扶桑社新書、2018年、191～213頁、 [*Chugokujinmin kaihogun no zenbo – Shukinpei yabo jitsugen no kirifuda Whole Picture of People’s Liberation Army—the Last Resort of Xi Jinping’s Ambition*], Fusosha Publishing Inc., 2018, pp. 191-213.

Lesson 2: Consequences of the collapse of threat of force and the significance of preventing it from happening

Although the aim may have been to maximize the effect of the threat, the fighting in the resulting chaos was probably a miscalculation on the part of President Putin. If the opposing side does not back down from the threat of force, the threat will lose credibility in the event of a similar incident in the future, and pressure will be exerted to use force, even if it had not been originally intended.

Although it is difficult to determine whether an action is a threat of force or merely a military exercise, it is necessary for the international community to unify at an early stage to send a strong signal that threat of force will not be tolerated. To this end, it is necessary to comprehensively assess trends in other hybrid tools and methods, such as cyberattacks linked to military movements, to detect the intention of threat of force at an early stage, and to share the threat with the international community at the same time.

(iii) Lessons learned and issues in full-scale military operations

A country that intends to invade through hybrid warfare will focus on other methods if threat of force does not work, or, conversely, it will make adequate military preparations to launch an actual invasion to win with an effective, full-scale military operation.

Lesson 3: How to prepare for cross-domain military operations that cannot be ignored in the 21st century

Know your enemy and know yourself

Although Russia is considered to have been insufficiently prepared for a full-scale military operation this time, it is possible that in the future a country learning from this Russian lesson will consider winning a full-scale military operation by incorporating the perspective of a cross-domain operation.

It is extremely important for Japan to firmly analyze and grasp the overall national power of the opponent, including the military power and military strategy, based on highly accurate intelligence. Although it is a difficult path, it is important for Japan to demonstrate the nation's comprehensive capabilities and be prepared.

In addition, as networking and the cross-disciplinary aspect of military operations continue to expand, the targets to which Japan must respond and the methods available are becoming much more complex, and it is becoming increasingly important to analyze and understand Japan's overall response capabilities.

As Sun Tzu said, "If you know your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles." Japan should remember that this is the first step in national defense.

The importance of designing a force that combines various methods across domains

In Ukrainian combat, the use of a mix of highly capable and expensive weapon systems and relatively inexpensive weapons, such as drones, seems to have demonstrated the resilience of the Ukrainian military in a combat situation. Until now, force design has mainly focused on highly capable and expensive weapon systems for land, sea, and air, respectively, but given the development of networking and cross-domain capabilities, it is important to design forces that combine various methods across domains, such as land, sea, air, space, and cyber.

For example, in the recent invasion, both Russia and Ukraine have made extensive use of UAVs, effectively utilizing them for intelligence gathering and long-range attacks. In particular, in intelligence gathering, a new development can be seen in which intelligence collected by a large number of UAVs is aggregated in the cloud in real time, and various types of firearms are used to efficiently attack based on this target intelligence. In the future, as communication methods including unmanned vehicles, space sensors, and space are developed for use on the ground, on the water, and underwater, it will become the norm to share intelligence in real time in a three-dimensional space on land, sea, and air, and then attack using the fastest and most optimal means, including unmanned vehicles. And since such operations are expected to be conducted not only between front-line units but also to attack logistics bases in the rear and to cut off supply routes, the superiority of their capabilities is likely to have a major impact on the war situation.

Japan also recognizes the importance of UAVs and their high potential and is conducting R&D on how to utilize them. In this case, at each stage of the operational cycle, such as target detection, identification, information sharing, attack, and evaluation of results, it is necessary to evaluate various methods across domains without being bound by land, sea, or air systems, with a focus on operational effectiveness, and to design forces to take the most appropriate methods. At this time, it is important to actively incorporate advanced civilian technology for the necessary weapon systems and to promote their development and operation in coordination with the operational concept from the outset.

In addition, since many cross-domain measures can be taken at each stage of the operational cycle, it will be necessary to utilize AI to quickly determine the best combination of measures for each situation.

Importance of command and control

During the recent invasion of Ukraine, a unified commander for the Russian armed forces was not appointed until early April 2022, and, including insufficient coordination between the Army and Air Force throughout the entire operation, disruptions in the command and control of the Russian armed forces, as well as dysfunctional intermediate commands in implementing orders, can be seen everywhere. In conducting large-scale operations, timely and appropriate command and control is of vital importance, so it is important as a matter of caution that Japan and the U.S. carefully coordinate their joint command and control, and, at the same time, build an

organization to support such coordination.

In addition, in order to execute command and control, a robust command and control system with high survivability for this purpose is necessary. Development of a system that can handle full-scale military operations across domains is urgently required.

Further, a smooth transition from a response to hybrid warfare in a GZ situation to a full-scale military operation is required. In particular, cyber warfare response must continue from the GZ situation to a full-scale military operation situation, and it is necessary to examine who and how to control the situation as a national system. In addition, serious discussions are required on how to balance the capability to respond to hybrid warfare and full-scale combat capability as a national defense capability, as well as on the division of roles between Japan and the United States.

Importance of logistics

Vulnerabilities in logistics have been pointed out in the failure of the Russian army to invade Kyiv. Although often overlooked in normal times, logistic support is an extremely important element in the actual execution of a battle. It is important to prepare stockpiles and means to procure ammunition and other materials and supplies, as needed, required for the continuation of the battle as well as the means to transport them to the desired location assuming the aspect of cross-domain combat.

Based on the mode of response to an invasion, it is necessary to set missile and ammunition maintenance and stockpiling targets and invest in resources, as well as secure ammunition depots to stockpile the necessary quantities. It is also necessary to overcome the current difficulty of constructing large ammunition depots in bases adjacent to domestic civilian areas. In addition to the development of new ammunition depots, it is also necessary to consider the utilization of Japan-U.S. joint-use bases.

Moreover, how to secure the capacity for such transport is also an issue. Currently, two civilian vessels support the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) troop transport when needed as part of a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) project. In the future, it will be inefficient to allocate the limited resources of the JSDF to transportation capabilities, and it is necessary to further utilize such civilian capabilities. It is required to consider stockpiling necessary supplies on civilian transport vessels and transporting them quickly to desired locations as the situation evolves. The capacity of such civilian transport vessels could also contribute to the evacuation of residents.

Missile attacks on critical infrastructure

Regarding the Russian military operation against Kyiv, there is a view that the lack of thoroughness in the early attack on air facilities led to Russia's failure in the initial phase of the war. Based on this lesson, a country that attempts to invade Japan would plan a thorough attack with ballistic missiles on air bases in the initial stages, which would certainly include attacks

on U.S. air bases in Japan such as Kadena Air Base, Misawa Air Base, MCAS Iwakuni, Yokota Air Base, and Naval Air Facility Atsugi.

Although a decision to launch an attack on a U.S. military base in Japan would be politically too sensitive to be made as it would trigger U.S. military intervention, acquisition of air superiority is still important from the perspective of military rationality.

Based on concrete discussions on Japan's possession of counterattack capability in the future, it is necessary for Japan and the U.S. to discuss how to respond to missile attacks and maintain air superiority around Japan.

Involvement of civilians in military activities

Google LLC's Traffic Jam Map information seems to have provided some insight into the situation of the Russian invasion forces, but since the movements of the Ukrainian side would also be known, Google suspended disclosure of the information in Ukraine at the request of the Ukrainian government.

In addition, it appears that photographs taken by civilians and information from drones owned by civilians have proven effective in analyzing the war situation. This points out the effectiveness of civilian ISR,²⁰ which enables the use of various types of private sector data in military operations. In Japan, an application (app) was developed to assess the damage after the Great East Japan Earthquake, and another one was developed to identify close contact persons during the Novel Coronavirus pandemic. However, these applications seem to have been transitory and lacking in overall consistency. The study group hopes that the newly established Digital Agency will develop applications that can be used centrally in the event of a disaster or contingency.

On the other hand, involvement of the civilian sector could neutralize the principle of protection of civilians stipulated by international law when such measures are judged as "direct participation of civilian in hostilities." In the future, such activities by civilians and private companies are expected to have a significant impact on combat operations, making it difficult to reconcile such activities with current international law regarding the protection of civilians. It will also be necessary for Japan to consider the issue of "involvement of civilians in military activities."

(iv) More comprehensive lessons learned and issues

Lesson 4: Dysfunction of the United Nations (UN) and the Importance of Strengthening Regional Cooperation

The recent invasion by Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has once again exposed the dysfunction of the UN, and once again there are calls for UN reform and the creation of a new international mechanism.

²⁰ ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.

In addition, in a series of UN General Assembly resolutions calling for Russia's immediate withdrawal, more than 40 countries abstained or were absent. Most of those countries were in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other regions known as the Global South, showing that the world is not united in its refutation of Russia's invasion.

To respond to this partial dysfunction of the UN, a complementary regional security framework should be established in the Indo-Pacific region. There is no collective defense framework like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in this region, and it is not realistic to pursue such a framework all at once. However, it is important to promote a strong network of alliances centered on the U.S., and to combine frameworks such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), and Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. (AUKUS), and others to create a synergistic effect.

Lesson 5: The nuclear “stability-instability paradox”

In response to Russia's invasion, NATO is providing military support, including the provision of a considerable amount of arms, to Ukraine, which is not a member of NATO, while taking great care not to have Russia say that NATO is directly involved in the fighting, because it is said that if this invasion turned into a war between the nuclear powers of the United States and Russia, the escalation to nuclear war could be uncontrollable.

In other words, the strategic stability of mutual nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and Russia based on mutually assured destruction has created a “stability-instability paradox” in which NATO cannot directly intervene in a localized unstable situation such as an invasion of Ukraine by conventional forces.²¹ A similar paradox is thought to apply to military conflicts arising in other regions.

Lesson 6: Issues regarding economic sanctions

Unanimous economic sanctions by the international community are extremely important in demonstrating the strong will of the international community. However, if the war is protracted, it is unknown whether countries, each with different energy dependency on Russia, will be able to keep step over the long term. It is also true that economic sanctions have their limits.

In addition, if China were to launch a military invasion of Taiwan, it is unclear whether effective economic sanctions could be imposed on China, which has strong economic ties with many countries around the world, making an even more difficult situation.

Although the study group does not go into the details of the issue of economic sanctions, it is necessary to promote the public's understanding that security issues will no longer be resolved solely through diplomacy and defense, and that economic issues, especially those related to energy, finance, and high-tech components, will be more and more closely related to security in the future.

²¹ Masayuki Masuda, 増田雅之編著『ウクライナ戦争の衝撃』インターブックス、2022年、138頁 [*Ukraine senso no shogeki, Impact of Ukraine War*], (in Japanese) Interbooks Co., Ltd., 2022, p.138.

Lesson 7: Communicate a strong will to protect one's own country to the international community while protecting displaced persons

Where does the resilience of the Ukrainian people come from? The last line in the lyrics of the Ukrainian national anthem goes, “Cossack blood will raise the nation of the joyous people.” Since Russia’s invasion, although many Ukrainian citizens have fled the country, it is reported that young men are prohibited from leaving the country.

If Japan, an island nation with a small land area, were unfortunately to become caught up in the ravages of war, protection of displaced persons would be extremely difficult in the midst of a mix of displaced persons and combatants.

At the same time, Japan can learn from Ukraine the resilience of the government and people united to withstand domestic battles and to continue to communicate their legitimacy to the international community.

It is necessary to fully recognize that the international community will extend a hand of support only when Japan demonstrates to the international community the will and the practice to protect its own country.

Section 2: The Changing Security Environment and Possible Crises to Prepare for In and Around Japan

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine must be considered a strategic failure. This Section will analyze the possible crises that Japan and its neighbors should be prepared for, based on an overall view of how China will become involved in the continental and maritime group of nations as Russia’s influence declines in the future.

(1) Trends in Russia

(i) Impact of Russia’s weakening on Russia’s neighboring countries

Russia is said to have deployed 65% of its total ground combat forces in the recent invasion of Ukraine, and more than 25% of the deployed troops are said to have suffered heavy losses and to be incapable of combat.²² A partial mobilization order was issued on September 21, 2022, but observers say that it is doubtful that it will decide the outcome of the battle. It is believed that Russia will not have the capacity to commit ground forces to other areas for a long time to come.

Although the economic sanctions appear to be a test of endurance, it is reasonable to assume that Russia’s economy will inevitably weaken over the long term, and its influence on The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and other land-locked countries around Russia will decline.

²² 「ロシア軍の 25%、現時点で『戦闘に耐えられない状態』…露側の誤算続くと英分析」『読売新聞オンライン』2022 年 4 月 26 日, [Roshia gun no 25%, genjitende “sento ni taerarenai jyotai” Rogawano gossan tsuzukuto eibunseki, UK Analyzes 25 Percent of Russian Soldiers Incapable of Combat Suggesting Russia’s Repeated Miscalculation] (in Japanese), *Yomiuri Shimbun* Newspaper, 26 April 2022 <https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/world/20220426-OYT1T50088/>.

As a result, China's influence will increase in relative terms, but it is unclear whether China will actually replace Russia. The Caucasus region and Central Asia may become destabilized in the future, so these regions should be closely monitored.

(ii) Russia remains a nuclear power despite weakening

Although Russia is inevitably weakened in terms of its ground force war potential and economic power, the loss of its naval forces is minimal, and its nuclear power remains intact. It is highly likely that Russia will attempt to make the most effective use of these forces in its efforts to exert international influence in the future.

The ultimate guarantee of mutual nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and Russia is strategic nuclear missiles (SLBMs) aboard strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs), which Russia has deployed in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk areas.²³ If, in the future, a situation arises in which the balance of nuclear forces between the U.S. and Russia were to become an issue, tensions may increase over the Sea of Okhotsk as well, a factor that must not be overlooked in the defense of Japan.

Moreover, depending on China's future moves, it is undeniable that Russia may take advantage of a situation in which Japan, the U.S., or another country is pressed to respond to the situation and take some kind of action to strengthen its influence in the region, so caution is required.

(2) Trends in China

(i) Heading for the continent, the oceans, or chasing two rabbits?

It is expected that China would take advantage of Russia's invasion of Ukraine to build a strategic environment favorable to itself. If a ceasefire is eventually reached, China may attempt to revitalize its lagging economy and the One Belt, One Road initiative by investing in the reconstruction of Ukraine. How NATO and China will engage in Central Asia, which could become unstable in the medium- to long-term, will also be a point of interest. However, there are doubts about the extent to which China will be involved in the region, given the Taiwan issue, and it is unclear to what extent China will become involved militarily in the region while remaining politically involved.

Although the South China Sea issue is overshadowed by the invasion of Ukraine and is currently not attracting the attention of the international community, the study group believes that maritime issues, including the Taiwan issue, will eventually become inevitable and China will direct its military resources to the sea.

²³ Ministry of Defense, *DEFENSE of JAPAN 2019*, p.106.

(ii) Aim to resolve the Taiwan issue through more sophisticated hybrid warfare

It is thought that China has made a detailed analysis on how Russia's hybrid warfare did not work well in its recent invasion of Ukraine, and how Ukraine, with the support of the U.S., U.K., and other countries, effectively dealt with the great risks posed by a direct military invasion. Having learned this lesson, China is likely to launch even more sophisticated hybrid warfare.

First, it is thought that China will try to achieve its objectives by using hybrid warfare methods that include the threat of force. If that fails, it is believed that China will study ways to effectively utilize cross-domain operations to win with full-scale military operations and will strengthen its military power in that direction.

Regarding the relationship between China and Taiwan, in particular, there are similarities between the situation in Ukraine and Taiwan in consideration of the following points: Russia invaded Ukraine by force while declaring Ukraine part of itself; China is wary of an alliance-like proximity between Taiwan and the United States, just as Russia is wary of the proximity between Ukraine and NATO; further, the rise of Taiwanese identity is making it difficult for China to realize its "dream," just as the rise of nationalism in Ukraine is making it difficult for Russia to do the same. From this perspective, Japan needs to pay more attention to what China has learned from Russia's invasion of Ukraine and how the lesson will change China's approach toward Taiwan.

(iii) Possibility of an invasion of the Senkaku Islands linked to a Taiwan crisis

It is unlikely that China, which has the Taiwan issue, would take military action to provoke U.S. intervention in the Senkaku Islands alone, separate from an invasion of Taiwan. However, it is necessary to assume the possibility of Japan being forced to launch a Coast Guard action or similar measure, at least as a means to test the extent to which the U.S. is committed to the region or to cause disengagement between Japan and the U.S.

On the other hand, simultaneous with a Taiwan crisis, provocative military actions against the Senkaku Islands may occur with the intention of dispersing the response of Japan and the U.S. or of Japan's response to Taiwan and a Senkaku Islands incident.

(iv) South China Sea issue

In the event of a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan, the South China Sea could be included in its war zone. In this sense, Japan and many other countries are expected to be affected.

For example, it may be necessary to reroute Japan's resource transportation routes (sea lanes) from the South China Sea and, depending on the situation, to consider escorting merchant vessels.

China also makes its own claim that the "nine-dash line" in the South China Sea is derived from China's historical rights. Such an attitude of imposing its own unilateral claims on other countries and attempting to change the international order to its own advantage is similar to

Russia's claims against Ukraine and can never be accepted. This illegality should be repeatedly and constantly asserted to the international community.

(3) Trends in North Korea

(i) Possibility of adventurous behavior

It is not appropriate to immediately draw a generalization from this case that Ukraine could have prevented the invasion if it had possessed nuclear weapons and that the possession of nuclear weapons by small and medium-sized countries is effective.

However, North Korea is expected to justify its nuclear development by the same reasoning as before and may further strengthen its argument in the future.

In particular, North Korea, led by dictator Kim Jong-un, has been attempting to incite tensions and create a situation in which the possession of nuclear weapons and missiles has an advantageous role in international relations, including national defense. There is no change in this nuclear development path which is likely to be further strengthened.

It is unclear what the future course of military assistance to Russia will be and to what extent China will be able to control North Korea, but it is believed that Kim Jong-un will continue to place importance on North Korea's independence, and, as a result, Japan must continue to be wary of his adventurous behavior.

(ii) Possibility of use of nuclear weapons

North Korea, which appears to have much more confidence in the effectiveness of its nuclear weapons, is expected to further concentrate on nuclear development and the development of missiles as a means of delivery to compensate for the inferiority of its conventional weapons. On the other hand, North Korea's ability to continue fighting with conventional forces is likely to be weakened in the midst of severe economic conditions.

Therefore, although it is unlikely that North Korea would advance southward with conventional forces, if it mistakenly believes that its nuclear capabilities will deter U.S. intervention, it is undeniable that North Korea could play the conventional or nuclear missile attack card against South Korea or Japan in order to survive politically, and caution is required. However, in the event of an actual battle, the overwhelming military power of the U.S. and South Korea is likely to bring the conflict to an end in a short period of time. Of course, to avoid such a situation, it is important to improve the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrence and for Japan, the U.S., and South Korea to cooperate in the response.

Section 3: Analysis of Possible Crises In and Around Japan

Based on the discussions in Sections 1 and 2, the strategic positioning of the three possible crises surrounding Japan, namely, a Taiwan crisis, a Korean Peninsula crisis, and a Senkaku Islands crisis, and the issues to which Japan must respond will be examined based on military scenarios.

(1) Analysis of a Taiwan Crisis

China is probably studying the situation of the Russian military invasion in detail. Although a “Taiwan crisis” can be summed up in a single term, the possible situations range from hybrid warfare in a GZ situation to full-scale military invasion. From Japan’s point of view, the response is complex, depending on whether it involves the defense of Taiwan or if it includes the defense of Japan as well.

(i) Strategic importance of Taiwan to Japan

It is said that a peaceful solution is required for the unification of China and Taiwan. Of course, the decision on unification should be based on the will of the people of Taiwan, but, for Japan, which is adjacent to Taiwan, it is necessary to clarify the strategic importance of Taiwan from the perspectives of security, economics, and shared values.

Security importance

If Taiwan were annexed, Chinese forces would be able to use Taiwan’s airports and harbors to project their forces directly into the Western Pacific region without worrying about the obstacle of the first island chain.

In the past, China suggested that the Pacific Ocean could be divided into two parts, which would have an impact on the positioning of the Marines in Okinawa and the U.S. Air Force. At that point, the role of the United States Forces Korea (USFK), which monitors North Korea, would also change. The regional balance of power among the USFK, U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), Republic of Korea Armed Forces, and the JSDF could undergo a major change, which could lead to a tectonic shift in the security in the region.

The destabilization of the island of Taiwan, which is located at a strategic point on Japan’s maritime and air transportation routes, would also have an important impact on Japan’s economic security.

Importance of economic ties

If Taiwan’s economic resources were to fall into Chinese hands, the balance of economic power in Asia would tilt even more in China’s favor. For example, Taiwan is important in the supply of high-tech products, including semiconductors. Some analysts believe that if China were to annex Taiwan, China would control nearly 80% of the world’s semiconductor production. For Japan, Taiwan is extremely important as a supplier of high-tech products and as a major trading partner.

Column 4: Trade between Taiwan and Japan

According to a survey by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 4.4% of Japanese firms with export expansion policies indicated that Taiwan was the most important export destination, surpassing Thailand and ranking fifth after China, the U.S., Western Europe, and Viet Nam. Taiwan also ranks sixth after the U.S., Viet Nam, China, Thailand, and Western Europe as a destination for future business expansion overseas. In each of these categories, Taiwan ranks higher than India, which has been the focus of attention due to its relationship with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept and the Japan-U.S.-Australia-India framework.

Importance of shared values

The U.S.-China relationship can be viewed from the perspective of systemic competition between a democratic government and despotic regime, respectively. Taiwan, with its well-established democratic government, shares with the U.S. fundamental values of democracy and human rights.

Thus, the survival of Taiwan, which shares fundamental values with Japan and the West, is extremely important. If annexation were to be allowed to take place in a manner contrary to the rule of law and international norms, it would be problematic from the perspective of maintaining international norms in the future.

(ii) Issues extracted from a Taiwan crisis scenario




Figure 1 Taiwan Crisis Scenario

Source: Maritime Security Study Group, NPI

As shown in Figure 1 above, a Taiwan crisis scenario is divided into “China’s response,” “U.S. response,” and “Japan’s response,” and the relationship between China and Taiwan was roughly divided into a “hybrid warfare” phase, “military support for pro-China forces in Taiwan,” phase, and “military invasion” phase, although the details are not covered here.

The U.S. response is simplified in each of these phases as “response to hybrid warfare” against Taiwan phase, “indirect U.S. military support” phase, and “direct U.S. military intervention” phase.

Japan’s response can then be divided into three categories: response to “hybrid warfare,” response to a “Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security,” and response to a “Survival-Threatening Situation” or an “Armed Attack Situation.” Under these circumstances, China will demand “Japan’s neutrality outside the region,” but Japan will consider various options from the standpoint that Japan’s neutrality on this issue is impossible.

Response at a hybrid warfare phase

● Strengthening Japan’s ability to respond to hybrid warfare

The U.S. may indirectly support Taiwan in cyber defense, etc., as it did for Ukraine. Japan, on the other hand, needs to be able to respond to “influence operations” and others from China aimed at provoking Japan-U.S. estrangement. Rather than providing support to Taiwan in hybrid warfare, the most important thing for Japan is to strengthen its own capability to respond to hybrid warfare and to ensure that Japan-U.S. cooperation is not disrupted.

For example, there is a possibility that China would disseminate information to Taiwan that “Japan will not get involved in the Taiwan issue” to psychologically shake up the people of Taiwan. It is necessary to constantly monitor such information and take appropriate measures such as transmitting accurate information to the outside world.

● Economic sanctions

Economic sanctions against China cannot be treated on the same level as those against Russia. For Japan, a mistaken response could conversely divide national opinion and be used as an influence operation by the opponent, so the response requires considerable ingenuity.

It is also necessary to consider what Japan’s economic support should be in response to an economic upheaval in Taiwan.

● Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) by Japan and the U.S.

It is necessary for Japan to actively communicate the situation of China’s military exercises (intimidation) to the world and, at the same time, to consider Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) through Japan-U.S. joint drills and exercises, etc.

Response at an indirect U.S. military support phase

● **Recognition of a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, and timing of various responses, including protection of the public**

At this phase, it is necessary to consider various measures for the protection of the public as listed below. It is conceivable that these measures could be institutionalized so that they are comprehensively initiated at the same time as a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security is recognized. Whether it is appropriate or not is subject to debate, but, in any case, it is necessary to consider the timing and triggers for implementing these measures.

In particular, if it is necessary for the protection of the public, separate from the recognition of a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, a situation such as an Anticipated Armed Attack Situation should be recognized early and residents should be evacuated.

- Protection of citizens (Evacuation of residents)
- Evacuation of Japanese nationals from Taiwan
- Assistance for U.S. military support of arms and ammunition
- Backup support for Taiwan’s telecommunications infrastructure, etc.
- Tightening of economic sanctions

Response at a U.S. military intervention phase

● **For the time being, the situation should be handled as a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security.**

The study group believes that, depending on how the situation develops, it may escalate to a Survival-Threatening Situation and then to an Armed Attack Situation against Japan, but, first, Japan should promptly deal with it as a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security.

Column 5: Ship Inspection in a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security

Although “ship inspection activities” are legally allowed in a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, it is necessary to consider whether or not such activities should be implemented under the current circumstances.

● **Issues surrounding a Survival-Threatening Situation**

In the event of an armed attack by North Korea against South Korea or USFK, it is thought that there is no particular legal problem with the possibility of recognizing a “Survival-Threatening Situation” for South Korea or the U.S.

On the other hand, in the event of an armed attack by China on Taiwan and Japan exercises its right of collective self-defense in response to a request from Taiwan, it is necessary to sort out issues such as whether Taiwan would fall under the category of “other countries in a close relationship with Japan,” which is a requirement for recognition of a “Survival-Threatening Situation.”

● **In a case that Japan has to recognize an Armed Attack Situation**

For Japan, the proximity to Taiwan is of critical importance. The distance between Taiwan and Yonaguni Island is only 110 kilometers. In the event of a Taiwan contingency, Japan, especially the Nansei Shoto Islands, may geographically be included in the war zone, irrespective of intent, and it is necessary to consider a simultaneous occurrence of a Taiwan contingency and a Japan contingency.

On the other hand, as seen in the case of the missile launch drills in August 2022, it is possible that Japan would not be attacked in the event of a Taiwan contingency, but that a missile would be launched into the waters near the Nansei Shoto Islands to threaten Japan, thereby shaking Japan’s neutrality outside the region in both hard and soft situations.

In any case, a Taiwan contingency cannot be dismissed as a fire on the opposite shore. In order for deterrence to be effective, it is necessary to consider a unit operation that can promptly respond to an armed attack on Japan. At the same time, it is important to rethink the conventional mindset that the U.S. military will come to assist Japan in the event of a Japan contingency. It is also important to further strengthen Japan’s own defense capabilities to reduce the burden on the U.S. military to defend Japan and allow the U.S. military to concentrate on the defense of Taiwan.

(2) Analysis of a Korean Peninsula Crisis

(i) Strategic positioning of the Korean Peninsula

Since ancient times, the Korean Peninsula has always occupied an important position in Japan’s security. The unification of the Korean Peninsula is a dream of the Korean people, but, at the same time, its stabilization is important. In order to realize the stability of the Korean Peninsula, it is extremely important for Japan, the United States, and South Korea to cooperate with each other through further information sharing.

(ii) Korean Peninsula crisis scenarios and extracted issues




Figure 2 Korean Peninsula Crisis Scenario

Source: Maritime Security Study Group, NPI

The premise of this scenario is that the Kim Jong-un regime is investing all national resources in ballistic missile and nuclear development, especially, to maintain the current regime, and that the current gap in conventional forces between North Korea and the U.S. and South Korea makes it unlikely that North Korea itself would invade South Korea, as it once did in the Korean War, based on its own estimate of its chances of victory. This scenario is based on the assumption that the Kim regime would launch an attack on South Korea if it were to judge that its regime could not be sustained due to domestic circumstances or pressure from the U.S. or South Korea. This case could potentially escalate to a level that involves a ballistic missile attack using nuclear or conventional warheads on Japan, including U.S. forces in Japan.

Strengthening Japan-U.S.-South Korea cooperation

At present, North Korea is engaged in hybrid warfare, including the threat of a missile launch and illegal acquisition of funds through cyberattacks. While individual responses to North Korea's provocation are important, even though it will be a very difficult path, the more critical issue is to get North Korea to move toward denuclearization. For this purpose, cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and South Korea is essential. It is also necessary to send a signal that, for example, information is being shared in real time in order to prevent the perception of any gaps in cooperation among the three countries.

Prompt recognition of a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security

In the event of an attack on the U.S. or South Korea, a prompt counterattack by the U.S. or South Korea through conventional warfare is important. In this sense, Japan needs to promptly recognize the situation as a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security and, in particular, to promptly enable logistic support for U.S. forces.

Survival-Threatening Situation and Armed Attack Situation

Considering that fighting in a Korean Peninsula crisis is expected to be of relatively short duration due to the overwhelming military power of the U.S. and South Korea, and, that depending on the course of the fighting, it may immediately develop into an Armed Attack Situation for Japan, recognition of a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security is more crucial than recognition of a Survival-Threatening Situation. In addition, the ability to intercept ballistic missiles and counterattack in case an Armed Attack Situation develops is considered to be of great importance.

Counterattack against a ballistic missile attack

Traditionally, it has been held that even if an Armed Attack Situation is recognized and a defense mobilization is issued, JSDF units would invoke the right of self-defense and use force only if there is an actual use of force by the other party.

However, even if a defense mobilization has been issued and the use of force has been authorized, a counterattack against a target in the territory of the other country would have a significant political and diplomatic impact and would not be appropriate to conduct at the discretion of the unit commander. On the other hand, since it is anticipated that there would not be much time between the detection of signs of a missile attack against Japan and the launch, the decision to launch a counterattack must also be made quickly. Therefore, it is necessary to establish procedures in advance so that appropriate decision-making can be made at the appropriate level and to clarify where the authority to launch a counterattack lies.

Protection of the public from ballistic missile attack

Of course, Japan must rely on the U.S. for nuclear deterrence; however, at the very least, it must consider development of ballistic missile defense shelters and infrastructure such as underground facilities which are currently being developed in various locations.

(3) Analysis of a Senkaku Islands Crisis

(i) Strategic positioning of the Senkaku Islands

China may use the Senkaku Islands issue as a litmus test to evaluate the solidarity of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and it may use a hybrid threat to shake things up. It is essential that Japan and the U.S. share information on this issue even before a GZ situation, for example, forces the launch of a Coast Guard action.

(ii) Senkaku Islands crisis scenario and extracted issues




Figure 3 Senkaku Islands Crisis Scenario
 Source: Maritime Security Study Group, NPI

In order to deflect Japan’s power away from Taiwan in the event of a Taiwan crisis, there is a possibility of threat with ballistic missiles in the Senkaku Islands and area around Taiwan, or small-scale illegal occupation of the Senkaku Islands using China Coast Guard ships and other boats.

In this section, the study group analyzed a Senkaku Islands crisis as an independent subject; however, Japan cannot rule out the possibility that the Xi Jinping regime would exert strong pressure on the Senkaku Islands for domestic reasons if it fails to find a solution to the Taiwan issue.

Response to a GZ situation that should be urgently addressed

The United States has declared that the Senkaku Islands are included in the scope of application of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and it is highly likely that an Armed Attack Situation as an independent incident will be deterred. The issue that needs to be urgently addressed is hybrid warfare in a GZ situation.

For example, it is conceivable that cyberattacks, etc. could be used to disrupt command and communication between the field and the central government and then take advantage of this disruption to disseminate a unilateral legitimacy to the international community and make it a *fait accompli* or established fact. It is necessary to strengthen Japan’s ability to respond to cyberattacks on command and communication systems and its ability to transmit information in real time both domestically and internationally.

It is also necessary to delve deeper into the cooperation procedures between the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) at the law enforcement level.

Section 4: Stabilization of the Indo-Pacific Region and Japan's Response to a Crisis (Recommendations)

In this Section, the study group attempts to summarize the results of the three-year study starting in FY2020 and present them as recommendations:

(1) Strengthening Multilayered Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Region and Japan's Involvement

When considering the security framework for the international community, the limitations of the UN, which have been highlighted once again by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, should be fully taken into account. On the other hand, it would be unrealistic to establish an entirely new framework. As such, it is necessary to combine various existing bilateral and regional security frameworks to create a synergistic effect.

The bilateral alliances that the United States has established in the region will continue to play an important role in stabilizing the region. The U.S. alliance structure in the region has been called a "hub and spoke" relationship, but now these relationships are becoming a network, and Japan should first accelerate development to strengthen cohesion among the countries involved. The fact that the U.S. is placing the highest priority on the Indo-Pacific region regardless of Russia's invasion of Ukraine is favorable to Japan's national interests. However, the U.S. may continue to be hamstrung by domestic factors, and allies, especially Japan, should take the initiative to strengthen relationship and firmly keep the U.S. in the region.

However, this strategy alone will not be enough to adequately respond to future developments in the region, which is becoming more complex and unstable. While continuing to attach importance to U.S. involvement, Japan should be more actively involved in building multilayered partnerships.

(i) Strengthen cooperation in the Quad

The Quad is an important security framework in the Indo-Pacific region. It should be more clearly recognized that it is not a framework for security alone, but it is also a framework for security. It should also be fully recognized that the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan have their own domestic circumstances. On that basis, it is necessary to carefully nurture the relationships. India, in particular, is an autonomous country with a policy of non-alignment, and it is important for Japan to evolve a cooperative relationship after fully assessing the points of agreement and disagreement in national interest between the two countries. In addition, the study group believes that Japan should encourage the strengthening of cooperation with France, the U.K., South Korea, and other countries within this framework.

(ii) AUKUS and the Quad

The objectives of AUKUS differ from those of the Quad, but it has important implications in that AUKUS makes clear that the United Kingdom will be involved in the region as the international community focuses its attention on Europe. It is also meant to link NATO with the alliance network in the region led by the U.S. as mentioned above. Japan should deepen its involvement in AUKUS in the future, including joint development in the field of advanced technology.

(iii) Strengthening Japan-Taiwan cooperation and recognition of Taiwan's importance to Japan

Regardless of whether or not Japan and Taiwan conduct joint operations in the event of a Taiwan contingency, mutual security cooperation between Japan and Taiwan is necessary. Currently, the framework for this purpose is inadequate, and this situation needs to be resolved as soon as possible.

The United States and Taiwan established the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) in 2015, a framework for human resources development, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan and the American Association in Taiwan strengthen cooperation by hosting workshops on common regional issues.²⁴ Currently, security-related topics such as media literacy and network security are also being addressed. Recently, the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association has also co-sponsored a workshop in conjunction with these organizations.²⁵ Through these efforts, Japan and Taiwan will strengthen various forms of non-military ties, and, within the framework of regional cooperation in East Asia centered on the U.S., they will strengthen ties, especially with regard to hybrid warfare.

It is also necessary to promote understanding of the importance of Taiwan's geopolitical and economic ties in Japan.

²⁴ "Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF)," American Institute in Taiwan, <https://www.ait.org.tw/global-cooperation-and-training-framework-gctf/> (Accessed on 13 September 2022)

²⁵ Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, "GCTF: Global Cooperation and Training Framework," <https://www.koryu.or.jp/business/gctf/> (Accessed on 13 September 2022).

(iv) Strengthening Japan-U.S.-South Korea cooperation

North Korea is engaged in hybrid warfare including threats such as missile launches and the acquisition of illicit funds through cyberattacks. While individual responses to these actions by North Korea are important, the more essential issue is to move North Korea toward denuclearization and to strongly deter North Korea's military provocations, even though it is a very difficult path. Cooperation between Japan, the United States, and South Korea, including joint exercises and real-time intelligence sharing, is extremely important in order to prevent the perception of any gaps in cooperation among the three countries.

(v) Cooperation with ASEAN countries (sharing of maritime safety information)

Incidents such as collisions between Chinese naval vessels, China Coast Guard, and Chinese militia and ASEAN military vessels, law enforcement vessels, and fishing vessels in the South China Sea, as well as tracking and obstruction, often go unreported in Japan.

There is also some friction regarding fishing vessels within the ASEAN region. Although the U.S. research organization the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has prepared and released useful information about these issues, international information sharing has been lacking. To promote information sharing and disclosure among related countries, one idea is to establish a South China Sea maritime security information sharing center. To support this information sharing, the Quad should jointly build a maritime surveillance system using commercial satellites or UAVs and provide this information as a service.

(2) From the Perspective of Deepening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

(i) Strengthening the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence by the U.S.

A stability-instability paradox has been pointed out in the issue of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and a similar situation could arise in the event of a military crisis in and around Japan. In order to ensure Japan's security in such a situation, it is essential to enhance the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence by the United States. For that purpose, it is necessary to make greater efforts to raise U.S. awareness of the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as to enhance information sharing, exercises, and planning work between the two countries regarding the use of nuclear weapons. In this connection, the study group believes that Japan's recognition of the "exercise of the right of collective self-defense," albeit on a limited basis, is a step in this direction.

Although it is not necessarily assumed that Japan will dispatch the JSDF to use force for the defense of Taiwan or South Korea (priority should be placed on the defense of Japan itself), support for U.S. military actions should be addressed in a realistic manner, which in turn will indirectly lead to an extended deterrence by the United States.

(ii) Establishment of a comprehensive security framework for Japan and U.S. governments

The current 2+2 framework centered on diplomacy and military is not sufficient to effectively deal with a security environment in which all means, military and non-military are interrelated. It is necessary to establish a new coordination mechanism through which Japan and the United States can discuss and coordinate the security of the two countries as a whole-of-government approach.

(3) Significance and Concrete Measures of Japan's Response to Hybrid Warfare

The Senkaku Islands issue is an example of hybrid warfare that could be launched directly against Japan. In East Asia, China may launch (or is currently in the process of launching) hybrid warfare against Taiwan while North Korea may launch (or be in the process of launching) hybrid warfare against South Korea, aiming at Japan-U.S.-South Korea estrangement.

For example, the U.S. is indirectly supporting Ukraine in cyber defense, etc., and may do the same in a Taiwan crisis. On the other hand, for Japan, rather than providing direct support to Taiwan in hybrid warfare, it is important for Japan to strengthen its own ability to respond to hybrid warfare and to ensure that the Japan-U.S. partnership and the Japan-South Korea partnership are not disrupted.

(i) Establishment of a comprehensive command to strengthen countermeasures against hybrid warfare

It is necessary to detect the use of various hybrid methods at an early stage and disable each of them under a consistent policy. Although the National Security Secretariat has been created, Japan still lacks a command function to detect and respond to hybrid threats in real time.

The lack of a command function will hinder the response in cooperation with the U.S. and other countries. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a command organization that can consolidate the latest relevant information and immediately issue instructions to relevant ministries and agencies, as well as a command center that can monitor the situation at all times.

(ii) Establishment of a Hybrid Threat Analysis Center

There is a wide variety of hybrid methods, and new methods are expected to emerge one after another with time. There is a limit to what can be done by administrative organizations alone to implement the measures that have been established. In Europe, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, jointly established by NATO, the EU, and their member governments, exchanges and consolidates intelligence on hybrid threats between governments, conducts research by public and private researchers, and provides a training

environment for government agencies and others.²⁶ Japan should follow this model by establishing a Hybrid Threat Analysis Center and set up a system to analyze and evaluate hybrid threats in the region in cooperation with neighboring countries and others.

(iii) Preparation of an information dissemination posture to win the battle in the cognitive domain. In hybrid warfare, methods such as manipulation of public opinion using the dissemination of disinformation and various influence operations are often used. Further, the use of these methods contributes to the effects of other methods such as cyberattacks, social disruption through economic means, and psychological intimidation through military means, and ultimately victory in the cognitive domain is pursued by influencing the will of the leaders of the other country, etc.

In order to win this battle, the United States established a Global Engagement Center within the U.S. Department of State to monitor the dissemination of disinformation by foreign countries and to take countermeasures in cooperation with various departments in the federal government.²⁷ In the United Kingdom, a National Security Communications Team has been established within the Cabinet Office for the same purpose, and, in Taiwan, each ministry and agency has set up a meme engineering team to immediately respond to disinformation after it is discovered.²⁸

Japan has not yet taken such measures and is defenseless against attacks using disinformation, etc. It is necessary to take systematic countermeasures such as promptly establishing a countermeasures department within the National Security Secretariat to enable the timely dissemination of information domestically and internationally.

In addition, the following details should be considered to support this posture.

Strengthening the dissemination of information to the international community

Ukraine was able to keep the international community informed even as the Russian military invasion began and the Ukrainian capital was under attack. This is an example of how important it is to provide accurate information to the international community in times of national crisis.

To make this possible, it is important to maintain the ability to recover from communication failures caused by cyberattacks or physical destruction and to ensure the continuous dissemination of information so that it can be connected to the world's Internet lines.

²⁶ The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/> (Accessed on 28 February 2023).

²⁷ Global Engagement Center, <https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-public-diplomacy-and-public-affairs/global-engagement-center/> (Accessed on 13 September 2022).

²⁸ Sasagawa Peace Foundation Security Studies Group, 笹川平和財団安全保障研究グループ『我が国のサイバー安全保障の確保』政策提言“外国からのディスインフォメーションに備えを！～サイバー空間の情報操作の脅威～” 笹川平和財団、2022年、19、33頁 [Waga Kuni no saiba anzen hoshō, Policy Proposal: Securing Cyber Security of Japan], (in Japanese) 2022, p.19, p.33.

Responding to propaganda based on a unilateral historical perspective and legal interpretation

To analyze a hybrid threat, the usual approach is to bring together experts in diplomacy, intelligence, defense, and economics, but the fields of international law, domestic law, and historical perspectives are also important. In particular, in its invasion, Russia has developed one-sided claims based on its unilateral view of history and disseminated them to the international community. In order to be able to properly refute such issues, Japan must examine them from historical and legal perspectives and analyze and respond to them comprehensively in conjunction with other fields.

Development of analytical tools for SNS social media, etc.

Once again, the world has become aware of how social networking service (SNS) social media (both real and false) can influence international public opinion. To analyze that data, it is necessary to develop AI-based tools that can at least organize and analyze big data from social media and other sources.

(iv) Establishment of a system to appropriately deal with disguised armed groups

Hybrid warfare often uses disguised armed groups to obscure state involvement and create a *fait accompli* or established fact and change the status quo.

To take advantage of the confusion caused by a response to armed fishermen in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands or the evacuation of Japanese nationals and the influx of refugees during a Taiwan crisis or a Korean Peninsula crisis, it is conceivable that armed groups could infiltrate Japan and sabotage U.S. military bases and critical infrastructure in Japan.

It is imperative for Japan to establish a system in which law enforcement agencies, such as the police, the JCG, and the JSDF can respond in close cooperation and establish a mechanism for close cooperation between Japan and the United States in the event of such a situation on an ongoing basis.

(4) Response to Advanced Technological Fields such as Cyber, Electromagnetic Waves, UAVs, Space, etc.

Cyber, electromagnetic waves, unmanned vehicles, space, and other advanced technological methods are used not only for military purposes but also as a method to directly affect various infrastructures that support people's lives. In Japan, although the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) was established in the Cabinet Secretariat, it remains an organization that provides comprehensive coordination for cyber defense between the public and private sectors. From a security perspective, a drastic review of its posture is necessary.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) are the main ministries responsible for regulatory

coordination for electromagnetic waves and unmanned vehicles, respectively, while the Strategic Headquarters for National Space Policy, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, is responsible for space activities. In the future, it will be necessary to establish a framework that can contribute to hybrid warfare measures in each of these areas from a security perspective. In order to effectively promote cooperation with allied and friendly countries in each of these fields, both military and non-military, it is necessary to establish a system for the promotion of advanced technologies with a view to security.

(i) Strengthening cyber defense capabilities

Strengthening cyber defense capabilities is a particularly urgent issue, and the following points should be considered.

Clarification of the position of active cyber defense

With regard to cyber defense, attack sources should be actively monitored and effective countermeasures should be taken accordingly. To this end, the legal status of active cyber defense should be clarified as soon as possible.

Strengthening cyberspace surveillance capability

In addition, it is necessary to strengthen cyberspace surveillance capability as a nation and to clarify the division of roles, including the posture of the surveillance capability.

Cyber response from a GZ situation to an Armed Attack Situation

Cyber defense posture must be established to seamlessly respond to all situations, from normal times to a GZ situation and to an Armed Attack Situation.

Connection with the electromagnetic field

The cyber and electromagnetic domains are inseparable, and it is necessary to establish a system of coping that integrates both domains.

Cooperation with the intelligence agencies

Cooperation with intelligence agencies is especially important in dealing with cyber-based influence operations.

Clarification of the contact point for cooperation with the U.S.

Japan and the U.S. need to clarify the division of roles and the contact point for cooperation regarding cyber defense.

Human resource development to strengthen cyber defense capabilities

Currently, full-scale training of cyber personnel for the JSDF is underway, but there are limits

to what the JSDF alone can do to train highly skilled cyber defense personnel. It is necessary to establish an education and research institute in cooperation with the private sector.

(5) Effectiveness of International Norms and Japan's Response to Threat of Force

In the case of the invasion of Ukraine, a large-scale threat of force led to an actual armed invasion. In East Asia as well, there is always the danger that a large-scale threat of force in the Taiwan Strait or on the Korean Peninsula could develop into an armed invasion. It is important to establish a framework to prevent this kind of situation from happening.

(i) Strengthen effectiveness of international norms to deter threat of force and establish an international monitoring system

It is important for Japan to enhance the effectiveness of international norms that restrain acts that constitute threat of force and establish an international monitoring system that detects and warns of developments that constitute threat at an early stage. Japan should build a diplomatic framework that can exert effective pressure on the country in question in such a situation and to strongly encourage the U.S. and other countries in the region to work together to develop such a framework.

The following concrete measures could be considered as part of strengthening of monitoring and warning capabilities.

- Establish a joint Quad maritime surveillance system using commercial satellites or UAVs and provide the information to Indo-Pacific countries as a service.
- Since it is also important to have a resilient communications infrastructure capable of transmitting and sharing monitoring information (facts) in real time, a framework should be established to supplement communications in the Pacific region with a high-capacity satellite communications network in the event of a failure of submarine cables, etc. in the region.

(ii) Japan's response to deter threat of force

To deter threat of force and prevent the use of force, it is important to coordinate all of the nation's capabilities to act as a deterrent. Therefore, it is essential to develop a military deterrence posture. However, it is important to have not only a static deterrence posture, in terms of the balance of military power, but also to have a dynamic deterrence posture that prevents the threat of force from leading to armed invasion by coordinating diplomatic and military power in critical situations. To this end, it is important to strike a balance between securing military superiority by Japan and the U.S. and prudent military force management to avoid escalation. Specifically, it is important to conduct simulations in advance regarding the flexible implementation of Japan-U.S. joint drills that take into consideration the deterrence of escalation in response to a threat situation and to discuss in advance a common scale for Japan-U.S. assessment of the situation in response to the intensity of the threat of force.

(iii) Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) by Japan and the U.S.

FDOs through Japan-U.S. joint drills and exercises should be considered in response to various situations. The concept of FDOs has not yet taken root in Japan. It should be clarified that FDOs are to be conducted mainly by the JSDF, but that they are to be controlled by the government command to respond to hybrid warfare and to calm, rather than escalate, the situation.

(6) Development of a Comprehensive Defense Capability that can Respond to Cross-domain Operations

It is believed that the forces planning to change the status quo are closely observing the recent invasion of Ukraine and considering ways to conduct effective operations even if hybrid warfare develops into a full-scale military invasion. It is important to design the force in terms of how cross-domain operations, which Russia is not necessarily able to effectively conduct at present, can be combined with conventional military operations to demonstrate their effectiveness. In addition, in preparation for such a situation, it is necessary to build a posture that enables a seamless transition from a response to hybrid warfare to a cross-domain operation.

(i) The importance of force design for cross-domain operations

It is important to conduct a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of various national security-related capabilities, such as diplomatic, military, and technological capabilities of the opponent and of Japan itself. It is necessary to establish and strengthen a system that enables the National Security Secretariat to take the lead in conducting a comprehensive analysis and assessment through the cooperation of related organizations, including the private sector.

In particular, with regard to cross-domain force design, because all domains are interconnected by networks, combinations of sensors, command and control, attacks (destructive and non-destructive means), and other means can be freely selected across equipment and domains and combined with the use of AI, with the result that it has become difficult to accurately grasp and evaluate the capabilities of each weapon system based on performance and number alone. In light of the above, it is becoming increasingly important to objectively evaluate and analyze the capabilities of the opponent and Japan's own forces, including how to fight, based on evidence and data. It is necessary to clarify the process that enables accurate evaluation and analysis of war potential through the adoption of new analytical methods that actively utilize modeling and simulation to support this process, and to establish a system that enables the implementation of this process.

(ii) Cyber warfare capabilities in hybrid warfare and cross-domain operations

Cyber defense, in particular, plays an important role in all situations, from information theft and influence operations in a GZ situation to an attack on critical infrastructure and destruction of command and communications systems in full-scale military operations, and must be available for seamless response to these situations.

For example, it is clear that the JSDF can counterattack an opponent's base against a ballistic missile attack in an Armed Attack Situation. However, the scope of cyber defense may vary, ranging from law enforcement action in normal times to defense response in an Armed Attack Situation, so it is necessary to devise a framework for the relationship between the police and JSDF to ensure a seamless response.

(iii) Response to new forms of combat

The Ukrainian military has, for example, drawn attention to the effectiveness of UAVs in creating new combat tactics, techniques and procedures such as the immediate sharing of information obtained by reconnaissance drones in the cloud on the "ARTA" automated fire control system, which greatly improves the efficiency of firepower exertion.²⁹ The effectiveness of civilian ISR, in which mobile terminal data taken by civilians can be used for military operations, has also been recognized. New ideas, as well as R&D, are required for the development of a comprehensive defense capability that can respond to cross-domain operations.

(7) Response to Crisis in Surrounding Areas

Japan's 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security established a legal mechanism for Japan's use of force in a Survival-Threatening Situation, but there are many unclear points regarding the kind of crisis in the surrounding region for which this situation would be recognized and what activity the JSDF would engage in if the situation is recognized.

In particular, there is a possibility that action for the defense of Taiwan (ranging from providing logistic support to U.S. forces to participation in combat operations) and action for the defense of Japan may coexist, and it is necessary to immediately begin considering how Japan-U.S. cooperation should be organized. The following issues are raised.

(i) Taiwan contingency: Issues regarding recognition of a Survival-Threatening Situation *Exercise of the right of collective self-defense over Taiwan*

The term "other states with which Japan has a close relationship" generally refers to "states that have a common interest in dealing with an external armed attack as a common danger and express a willingness to cooperate with Japan to deal with it," and may include states with which Japan does not have diplomatic relations.³⁰ Specific countries that are considered "other states with which Japan has a close relationship" is not something that can be clarified in advance but is something that is determined on a case-by-case basis at the time an armed attack

²⁹ 「ウクライナの教訓 侵略半年」 < 2 > ドローン 戦場変えた 『読売新聞オンライン』 2022年8月24日
[Ukraine no Kyokun Shinryaku hantoshi 2 duron Senjo kaeta, Lessons Learned from Ukraine- Half A Year of Invasion], (in Japanese) The Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper, 24 August 2022
<https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/20220824-OYT1T50006/>.

³⁰ Written answer to a question on a Survival-Threatening Situation submitted by Mizuno Kenichi, a member of the House of Councilors of the 189th National Diet.

occurs.³¹ However, the Japanese government has not clarified whether “other states” includes areas that do not have diplomatic relations with Japan but are in fact considered states (e.g., Taiwan and the Palestinian Authority), which could lead to domestic controversy and affect the prompt recognition of the situation.

Regarding claims of interference in internal affairs from China

If Japan recognizes a Survival-Threatening Situation, it is expected that China would assert to the Japanese government and the international community that “Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China and that this is interference in the internal affairs of China.” Therefore, it is necessary to prepare a counterargument to China according to the situation and the justification of Japan’s position to the international community.

Moreover, the recognition of a Survival-Threatening Situation in the event of a Taiwan contingency has elements that are highly controversial under international and domestic law, and it is anticipated that information warfare by China would develop activities that impede the Japanese government’s rapid response. It is necessary to have a thorough discussion at this point in time to avoid a split in national opinion.

Column 6: Example of an approach to refuting claims of interference in internal affairs from China

The Government of Japan has fully understood and respected China’s position that “Taiwan is an inseparable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China” from the standpoint of hoping for “a peaceful resolution through direct discussions between the parties concerned.” However, an armed attack by China on Taiwan is contrary to this position of the Government of Japan, and this situation would no longer be one in which the Chinese position can be respected. For Japan, Taiwan, an extremely important partner with which Japan shares fundamental values including democracy and has close economic relations and people-to-people exchange, can be evaluated as a de facto partner and can be included in “other states with which Japan has a close relationship” in such a situation.

(ii) Taiwan crisis: Response to a simultaneous occurrence of a Survival-Threatening Situation and an Armed Attack Situation

In the case of a Taiwan crisis, in particular, it is conceivable that Japan could provide logistic support or direct combat support for U.S. forces conducting operations for the defense of Taiwan or that joint operations could be conducted by Japan and the U.S. for the defense of Japan.

However, in providing direct combat support to U.S. forces, it is necessary to consider the complex operational coordination among the U.S., Taiwan, and Japan. Japan needs to break

³¹ Shigenobu Tamura (ed.), [*Shin Boei Hosei, New Defense Legislation*] (in Japanese) (Naigai Publishing Co., Ltd., 2018), p. 318.

away from the conventional concept of “U.S. forces coming to the aid of Japan” as an Article 5 situation in Japan’s sole defense so that U.S. forces can concentrate on the defense of Taiwan.

In other words, while it is assumed that Japan and the U.S. should coordinate overall operations for the defense of the Sakishima Islands and other islands that may be included in a Taiwan contingency battle zone, Japan needs to be able to take the initiative in dealing with direct combat operations in the defense of Japan.

(iii) Taiwan crisis: What should be done in a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security?

At a stage in a Taiwan crisis in which the situation has to be recognized as a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, it is necessary to consider increasing the number of troops on the Sakishima Islands, which could be caught in the war zone of China’s invasion of Taiwan.

The debate is divided as to whether the various responses that should be implemented in such a situation should be carried out individually or treated comprehensively as a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security.

However, the activities are likely to be linked to logistic support for U.S. forces, and it is time to reorganize whether a Situation that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security can no longer be viewed as an insignificant extension of the peripheral situation that existed before the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was enacted.

(iv) Korean Peninsula crisis: Counterattack on opponent’s base in response to ballistic missile attack, etc.

As a general rule, a counterattack cannot be launched against an opponent base, etc. until an Armed Attack Situation is recognized. However, even when an Armed Attack Situation is conventionally recognized, JSDF units are permitted to invoke the right of self-defense and use of force only in a specific situation in which it is clear that the opponent has launched an actual armed attack.

It is necessary to establish procedures in advance and clarify where the counterattack authority lies so that prompt and appropriate decision-making can be made when using force to counterattack an opponent missile launch or initiation of an attack.

(v) Response to a Senkaku Islands crisis

Scenario linked to a Taiwan crisis

A Taiwan crisis could be linked to a threat of ballistic missiles to the Senkaku Islands and the vicinity of Taiwan, or illegal occupation of the Senkaku Islands by China Coast Guard ships, etc., with the aim of deflecting Japan’s power away from Taiwan. A strategy that looks at a Taiwan crisis as a whole, without being caught up in an individual case, is required.

Independent case scenario

It is unlikely that China would take military measures lightly, given the U.S. commitment to invoke Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in the event of a military invasion of the Senkaku Islands by China. However, a skirmish between a China Coast Guard ship and a JCG vessel, for example, could escalate to a situation in which Coast Guard action must be invoked. While the Defense Minister's control of JCG in times of contingency is an issue that should be sorted out, at the same time, it is an urgent issue for the Minister of Defense to examine more specifically the joint procedures between the JCG and JMSDF in law enforcement.

(vi) Response to the South China Sea issue

Response to a South China Sea crisis stemming from the Taiwan issue

A full-scale military intervention by the U.S. military in Taiwan could expand the war zone to the South China Sea. If this were to happen, Japan would need to consider diverting transportation routes or escorting vessels from the perspective of protecting maritime traffic.

Reinforcement of surveillance of Chinese navy, China Coast Guard, and maritime militia

Japan transferred TC90 training aircraft to the Philippine Navy (PN) in 2017 and 2018. The JMSDF has conducted pilot training for the pilots of the PN, and, since 2017, Japan-Philippines joint search and rescue drills in the South China Sea, Sulu Sea, and other areas have been conducted. In 2020, joint training between destroyers and TC90 training aircraft of the PN has also been conducted. In addition, with the transfer of warning and control radar to the Philippine Air Force in 2022, training of its personnel on use of radar in Japan has begun. These efforts should be extended to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Viet Nam to monitor China's presence in the South China Sea from the sea and the air.

Deployment of destroyers from the South China Sea to the Indo-Pacific and the importance of the Djibouti base

In response to China's maritime offensive in the South China Sea, the JMSDF has dispatched destroyers for a long period of time and has conducted joint exercises with destroyers and the U.S. Navy during counter-piracy round trips off the coast of Somalia, demonstrating Japan's presence in an effort to deter China. Even if there is no longer a need for anti-piracy measures in the future, the dispatch of destroyers from the South China Sea to the Indo-Pacific region should continue. In this sense, the base at Djibouti is important and should be maintained.

(8) From the Perspective of Further Strengthening Japan-U.S. Collaboration

(i) Establishment of a permanent Japan-U.S. joint coordination center

Japan-U.S. intelligence sharing is extremely important. Currently, there is an Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM), but in order to respond flexibly to complex and changing war situations, establishment of a permanent coordination center to support the ACM is necessary.

This coordination center will serve as a core for in-depth intelligence sharing in a situation less than an Armed Attack Situation, such as a situation where maritime security operations or security mobilization must be ordered in a so-called GZ situation.

(ii) Enhancement of a permanent Joint Task Force (JTF) command

Establishment of a Joint Command that can command the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces in a unified manner has been advocated. Although the division of roles between the Joint Task Force (JTF) and the Joint Command will be organized for interagency coordination to deal with hybrid warfare (cyber warfare) or as a contact point for coordination with the Indo-Pacific Command, the first urgent task is to establish and develop a permanent JTF command that is appropriate for operations in a war zone (situation). In particular, under the current security environment, it is of paramount importance to establish a permanent JTF command to deal with the situation around the Nansei Shoto Islands on a routine basis, to prepare plans and conduct training including Japan-U.S. joint planning and training, and to establish a system that can respond immediately when a situation arises. In addition to JTF defense of the southwestern area it is also desirable to establish a permanent JTF command capable of conducting counterattack operations, including missile defense, and permanent JTF for cyber countermeasures. Japan has experience with JTFs that can be flexibly organized according to the situation as in the case of the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake and other disasters, but an important and urgent issue is to establish a permanent JTF command and enhance operational planning and training.

(9) From the Perspective of Protecting the Public

(i) Consideration of broad civil protection, including the general public and related parties

In Ukraine, large-scale casualties among the civilian population have become a major problem. In Japan, since the enactment of the Civil Protection Law in 2004, local governments have prepared plans and conducted drills in cooperation with the JSDF and other agencies for the protection of citizens in an Armed Attack Situation, but the content of these plans does not necessarily reflect the reality of war in the modern era.

The JSDF has accumulated experience in international peace cooperation activities, such as humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq and the construction of facilities to accommodate displaced persons in South Sudan. On the other hand, the JSDF learned a lesson when the steel mill in Mariupol, Ukraine became a target of attack due to the mixing of

displaced residents and Ukrainian combatants with the result that many residents were harmed. Based on this lesson, how to set up evacuation sites in a country with limited land area is an important issue.

So far, the experiences of domestic and international activities have been compiled separately. However, just as NATO has prepared a “Protection of Civilians Handbook” to formulate a doctrine for civilian protection both within and outside the region,³² Japan needs to systematically grasp the actual situation of civilian protection in wars occurring around the world and formulate more effective measures for the protection of its citizens.

In particular, civil protection measures in the early stage before an Armed Attack Situation or a Survival-Threatening Situation are an urgent issue.

The following issues also need to be considered.

- Establishment of evacuation sites to avoid mixing civilians with combatants
- Development of shelters for evacuation in case of attack by a nuclear weapon or missile
- Transportation and accommodation of Japanese nationals and citizens of friendly countries from conflict zones
- Response to mass displacement of civilians from conflict zones
- Exchange of knowledge on civil protection with other countries and reflection in capacity building support

Conclusion

In the 77 years since the end of World War II, Japan’s security policy has taken a major turn. The revised National Security Strategy has provided a menu of options for the direction of Japan’s security strategy. It has also been backed by a budget to support it.

The study group recognizes that there are many areas in which the policy directions discussed and recommended by this study group are in line with those presented in the National Security Strategy. What is required from now on is to deepen the study of each of the proposed policies so that they can be realized. The study group will continue its activities in order to contribute to the deepening of discussion of these policies.

³² NATO, Protection of Civilians ACO Handbook, 2021, <https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2021/the-protection-of-civilians-allied-command-operations-handbook> (Accessed on 13 September 2022).

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