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Paths Diverging?

The Next Decade in the US–Japan Security Alliance

WILLIAM E. RAPP

INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY STUDIES

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Contents

Abstract	Page 4
Coming Change in Japanese Security Policy	Page 10
Overcoming Domestic Resistance to Change	Page 18
Japan's Security Policy Dilemma	Page 26
Impact on the US-Japan Security Alliance	Page 30
American Interests and Options	Page 35
Optimizing the Alliance for the Future	Page 41
Conclusion	Page 48

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Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the US–Japan Security Alliance

WILLIAM E. RAPP

Although the United States is the sole superpower in the world, it increasingly faces an objectives-means shortfall in attaining its global interests unilaterally. Sustaining its engagement in the far reaches of the world requires the partnership of capable, willing and like-minded states. In the Asia-Pacific region, the US-Japan Security Alliance will remain vital to achieving both countries' national interests in the next two decades because of a lack of strategic options, though the commitment of both partners it is likely to be sorely tested. Should conditions arise that give either the United States or Japan a viable alternative to advance stability and national interests, the alliance could be in doubt.

Having depended on the United States for security for over fifty years, Japan is now actively trying to chart its new path for the future. Japan is in the midst of a fundamental reexamination of its security policy and its role in international relations that will have a dramatic impact on East Asia and the Pacific. Within Japan, many see the traditional means of security policy as being out of balance and vulnerable in the post Cold War environment. The triad of economic diplomacy, engagement with international organizations, and a minimalist military posture predicated on a capable self-defense force with American guarantees of protection, heavily weighted toward economic diplomacy, is not seen by the Japanese to be adequately achieving the national interests and influence she seeks.

Regardless of the more realist imperatives, Japan remains deeply ambivalent toward security expansion. However, despite domestic restraints, Japan will continue to slowly and incrementally remove the shackles on its military security policy. Attitudinal barriers, such as pacifism, anti-militarism, security insulation, and desire for consensus combine with institutional barriers, like coalition politics, lack of budget space, and entrenched bureaucracy, to confound rapid shifts in security policy, though those changes will eventually occur.

The ambivalence Japan feels clouds the ideal path to the future for the nation in trying to find a way forward among competing goals of preventing either entrapment or abandonment by the US and pursuing self-interest. Because Japan is risk-averse, but increasingly self-aware, dramatic (in Japanese terms) security policy changes will continue to be made in small, but cumulative steps. These changes in security policy and public acquiescence to them will create pressure on the alliance to reduce asymmetries and offensive burdens since the ideal, long-term security future for Japan does not rely on the current role vis-à-vis the US. Both Japan and the US must move out of their comfort zones to create a more balanced relationship that involves substantial consultation and policy accommodation, a greater risk-taking Japanese role in the maintenance of peace and stability of the region, and coordinated action to resolve conflicts and promote prosperity in the region.

Because neither country has a viable alternative to the alliance for the promotion of security and national interests in the region, especially given the uncertainties of the future trends in China and the Korean Peninsula, for the next couple of decades the alliance will remain central to achieving the interests of both Japan and the US. A more symmetrical alliance can be a positive force for regional stability and prosperity in areas of engagement of China, proactive shaping of the security environment, the protection of maritime commerce routes, and the countering of weapons proliferation, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Without substantive change, however, the centrality of the alliance will diminish as strategic alternatives develop for either the United States or Japan.

Optimism reigns among observers of the Japanese and American alliance. The partnership is currently reveling in the strongest bilateral atmosphere it has ever seen and the Junichiro-George relationship appears to eclipse even that purported to Ron and Yasu in the mid-1980s. A convergence of strategic interests over Korea, China, and counter-terrorism combines with American's relief that Japan is taking a more militarily assertive role in its own defense and outside its borders. However, the tightening of the alliance and increased Japanese role in the partnership today does not portend an even closer alliance two decades from now. While the security paths that both countries are currently following appear to be converging now, those vectors are more likely to begin diverging once the Korean crisis is resolved and Japanese military abilities to deal with terrorism and ballistic missile threats are more robust. Within the next decade, several watershed decisions will be made by both countries that will provide a glimpse of the future of the alliance. The ballistic missile defense decision appears to have been made in the obvious favor of the alliance. However, the Japanese have not yet accepted the home porting of the *USS Carl Vinson*—a nuclear aircraft carrier—at Yokosuka Naval Base near Tokyo, though alliance managers remain confident. On the other side of the Pacific, the Americans have not yet made a decision on the grand transformational issue of whether to emphasize access to bases in East Asia in lieu of the current forward presence. These and other strategic decisions are highly interrelated and the ramifications for the partnership will be profound. Although the alliance is arguably in the best shape in decades following the Japanese support for the United States in the second Gulf War, the euphoria potentially masks an underlying divergence of interests over the next several decades and demands that hard choices be faced and compromises made.

For the past 52 years, the security alliance between the United States and Japan has served the interests of both countries well. For myriad reasons, including basing rights for American forces in this important region, the provision of security so that Japan can rebuild into a strong democratic bulwark against totalitarian forces in Asia, and reassurances to Asian nations about Japan's commitment not to revisit its policies of the 1930s and 1940s, the alliance has remained an important component of both countries' security policy. This importance is likely to be tested in the coming years as both the United States and Japan review their strategic options and reconsider the shape and character of this special relationship necessary to achieve their respective national interests in the increasingly troubled region of Northeast Asia.

Currently in Northeast Asia there is considerable uncertainty about the future course of security grand strategy for all countries involved in the region. The nuclear ambitions of an increasingly desperate North Korea have led to serious ruptures in the US-Republic of Korea alliance and greatly enhanced security fears in Japan. The global war on terrorism and widely perceived unilateralism on the part of the United States has, ironically, enhanced the confidence of China to portray itself as a multi-dimensional leader in Asia. The growing strength of the *Kuomintang* in Taiwanese politics and its agenda to build a closer relationship or even confederation with mainland China after the presidential elections of March 2004 may upend the security assumptions of the region.¹ Finally, the mixed success of the American military campaign to seize Iraq has reinforced the concepts of transformation and power projection from a more limited number of forward bases advocated so strongly by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, while at the same time highlighting America's need for allies in the war on terror. It is a region awash in uncertainty, but one in which the United States must remain firmly engaged to protect its vital interests.

In the breadth of its reach and influence, the United States is often described by others as hegemonic and by itself as the sole superpower. This is a very clumsy caricature, however. Colin Powell recently quipped, “We are so multilateral it keeps me up 24 hours a day checking on everybody.”² The extent of that reach and the means necessary for achieving American interests around the world depend greatly on cooperative efforts with other like-minded nations, if only in “coalitions of the willing” built by the US for *ad hoc* purposes.

In Northeast Asia, the United States has two vital alliances—those with Japan and with South Korea—already in place. Although the American relationship with the Republic of Korea is undeniably critical to security on this strategically important peninsula, the relationship is very narrow in its scope and its future in some doubt.³ The relationship with Japan, however, offers greater potential to achieve American interests in the long run in Asia, beyond simply the defense of Japan. Being off the shores of mainland Asia and combining the two biggest economies in the world,⁴ this alliance offers significant long-term opportunities to more actively promote peace, prosperity, and liberal values in the region.

Japan and the United States share many important long-term interests, and it is the convergence of these interests that highlights the continued need for their relationship. Concern about the growth and character of Chinese power, fears about the future of North Korea, prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, maintenance of secure sea lines of communication, concern about the absence of alternative security institutions in East Asia, and a shared desire for democracy, human rights, and increased trade all strongly reinforce the need for the alliance.

At the same time, the US and Japan have some strong diverging interests as well that, given impetus by world events, could outweigh the mutual ones and lead to a decrease in the centrality of the alliance to both countries. These include differing conceptions about the role of international institutions, about what is meant by “pulling one’s weight” in the upkeep of international peace, about the role of military force, and about the future trajectory of China.

Times are changing, however, and the alliance must find a way to continue to mature or eventually face competition from alternative security means both countries find to be more effective at achieving their own national interests. The current security environment is very different from that of 1951, when the security treaty was first established. While the alliance can still, in all likelihood, accomplish its original mission—the narrowly focused defense of Japan—if called upon, the alliance can be much more to both countries. In fact, it needs to be—and sooner, rather than later. After the resolution of the Korean situation—either through reunification or some process to ensure removal of weapons of mass destruction from the north—(whether that will be in two years or ten) the probability of a conventional attack on Japan is too remote to warrant maintaining such a narrow conception of the alliance.

The purpose of this paper is to argue that Japan, through incremental steps over a number of years, will significantly transform its security policy, and that such change will necessitate appreciable alterations in the structural balance of the security alliance between the United States and Japan. The collective impact of Japan’s security policy changes, desire to be an active and effective power player in Asia, recognition of the congruence of interests between Japan and the United States, and the growing understanding of the US that unilateralism will

ultimately prove untenable, in all likelihood, will create strong demands from both sides of the Pacific to carefully but significantly alter the current character of the alliance. It is in neither country's interests to lose the other as a partner in security, but the character of that partnership will likely change.

How and where can the alliance change? Substantive alteration in the way both countries approach their long-term security posture in Asia is required. This can be accomplished without formal negotiation of a new treaty. The United States needs to accept a relative loss from time to time in policy leadership and trust that Japan, while it may make different tactical choices along the way, strongly shares long term strategic interests with the US. America will increasingly find that, to achieve its interests in Asia in the long-term, it needs to share power with its most important ally in Asia. For Japan, substantive legal change, concerning how the country can react to crises and the manner and geographical regions in which its Self-Defense Force can be employed, has begun but significantly more is required to accept this sharing of power with the United States and to gain the voice in international relations it is increasingly seeking. In a partial reverse of the fundamental arrangement of the alliance, the US will likely need to trade some bases, force structure, and policy voice in exchange for greater Japanese acceptance of new roles, missions, and risks in the alliance. Working together, Japan and the US can proactively shape the security environment of East Asia so as to facilitate the growth of peace and prosperity throughout the region.

Would these changes in the alliance be beneficial to both the United States and Japan? As discussed in detail later, both countries would gain in the long term from a more balanced partnership in Northeast Asia. For Japan, a more symmetrical alliance would bring the country a greater voice in the shaping of security writ large in the region, a responsible outlet for its enhanced sense of national purpose and pride, and a way to achieve the goals it seeks in the twenty-first century.⁵ As for America, relinquishing some measure of control within the alliance will result in a more sustainable grand strategy for maintaining positive influence within the region. Especially after the reunification of Korea and the re-emergence of China, the United States' interests in East Asia will continue to be best served by a stronger and more viable alliance with Japan.

The countries of East Asia will not automatically welcome such a development, however. Memories of brutal Japanese colonialism and military conquest in the first half of the twentieth century remain vivid (especially to the Chinese and Koreans) and make such a strengthening of Japan's role in the alliance with America a worrisome prospect for many. State-imposed history texts perpetuate feelings of resentment among the youth of both of these countries. However, decades of growing economic interdependence, deepening multilateral regimes and discussion forums, two generations of demonstrated Japanese self-restraint, continued ties with the United States, and the slowly increasing transparency of policymaking in Japan will help to mitigate the fears which have long been a staple in the region.

That said, it is still necessary to take a measured approach to the analysis of international relations in Asia, and to the analysis of the culture and politics of Japan in particular. Japanese preferences, values, and institutions have strongly dictated—and will continue to strongly

dictate—the range and shape of its security policy options. Regardless of how stark western analysts may deem the security imperatives facing Japan, it will be the Japanese themselves, in a manner uniquely Japanese, who will determine their responses to the outside world. Tokyo is not, however, on its own timeline. The United States is not infinitely patient and is squarely focused on advancing its national interests in the region by the most effective means possible. It is with these important considerations in mind that the changing security environment, the future of Japanese security policy, and their combined impact on the structure of the US-Japan security alliance should be discussed.

Making the case for the coming change

More than fifty years have passed since the United States and Japan first formed their security alliance, and the world has changed much during that time. Change in the character of the security alliance between the US and Japan will, by necessity, need to follow from a revision in the way Japan thinks and acts upon its national security in the changing security environment of the twenty-first century. Through these changes, Japan will increasingly demand a greater voice and a more active role in using the alliance to *humanely* shape the security environment of East Asia and the Pacific, and thereby help to create the sense of international community it so highly prizes.⁶ The United States, facing a long-term shortfall in the means necessary to achieve its many international objectives, will then need to recognize the need for greater symmetry in the alliance and take a more collegial approach to Northeast Asia security, thereby achieving its interests in a much more cost-effective and sustainable manner.

In order to make the argument summarized above, this paper will present a discussion of the following points. First, Japanese security policy will continue, inexorably, to change in incremental steps in the near future, and the character of Japan's policy will increasingly mirror many important features of the security policies of other powerful nations. The international security environment of the first decade of this century presents Japan, and the alliance, with challenges that both are currently ill-equipped to handle. Second, the pace of that change will be relatively slow as Japan must overcome significant domestic inertia and resistance to such changes in security policy. The angst of such security policy debate and change in the coming years will be a gut-wrenching experience for most Japanese. Third, as Japan incrementally alters its security policy, the pressure to modify the structure of the alliance will intensify. The short- and long-term impact of these pressures and changes within the alliance will be explored. Finally, this essay will explore why it is in the best interests of Japan and the United States to change the basic character of the alliance, and how the alliance can develop over the next decade in light of the tensions found in Northeast Asia. The discussion begins with current Japanese security policy and the pressing external demands for change.

Coming change in Japanese security policy

In its most basic terms, Japanese security policy rests on a triad of military capability, economic diplomacy, and participation in international institutions. Japan maintains a capable military force for narrowly defined self-defense, the alliance with the United States as a nuclear umbrella and guarantee of protection, and a foreign policy that attempts to preventively shape situations in areas vital to Japan in ways that are favorable to the country and its economy. From a military point of view, this highly restrictive defense policy is manifestly hopeful in nature. It relies on extended American deterrence and the projection of an extremely benign, non-threatening (yet capable) posture towards would-be adversaries. The restrictions on the use of military force—rooted in the 1946 Constitution and cemented by years of the “Yoshida doctrine”—are grounded both in a realist appreciation of the economic advantages of military dependence and in a fundamental idealism that has been ingrained in the Japanese culture since 1945. Those roots are deep and strong, but are not immutable. The current era of North Korean nuclear brinkmanship and the global war on terrorism are likely to provide the impetus for Japan to take major steps towards “normal nation,”⁷ and then towards significant maturation of, and greater power sharing within the US-Japan alliance. As shown in Figure 1, the codification of Japanese pacifism and the restriction on military capabilities in the years following World War II reflects the strength of the cultural bias that restrains military utility.

Codification of pacifism/low military stance

1946	Peace Constitution (Article 9)
1949	Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law
1954	Self-Defense Force Law
1954	First govt interpretation of Art 9 against collective defense
1956	Basic Atomic Energy Law
1957	Basic Policy for National Defense
1967	Three principles of arms exports (Sato Govt)
1968	Three non-nuclear principles (Sato Govt)
1969	Prohibition against military uses of space
1976	Establishment of the 1% GDP defense budget cap
1981	Government reaffirmation of collective defense prohibition

Figure 1 Codification of pacifism/low military stance

There are two primary reasons why significant cumulative change in Japanese security policy and consequent major revision in the roles and missions, implementation mechanisms, and character of the security alliance will be seen over the next one or two decades. The first reason, from the realist perspective, is that the security environment in which Japan now finds itself has changed dramatically, such that Japan cannot maintain the safety of its people and interests without substantive change in the way it conceives of self-defense. An exploration of the mismatch between current security threats and the capabilities both of the Japanese and of the US-Japan alliance to counter these threats helps illustrate this point. The second reason is from the institutional perspective; Japan desires to shape the future in ways that are manifestly liberal and multinational, yet finds that in order to have a real voice among the major powers in the discussions and decisions regarding the pathway to that future, it must participate more actively and substantively in international peace efforts. For a variety of reasons, it is becoming clearer to Japan that it cannot simply buy a seat at those tables, but must earn a voice by sharing the risks as well as the costs of multilateral peace support ventures.¹ Because Japan has become extraordinarily risk-averse over the past fifty years, a prudent hedging strategy to counter both these two shortfalls and other less clear contingencies—such as the future of the Korean peninsula and China’s regional aspirations—would be to slowly and carefully continue its process of lifting or re-interpreting the constitutional, regulatory, and attitudinal restrictions on its security means and posture.

Threat-capability mismatch in the twenty-first century

The security environment of the first decade of the twenty-first century is very different from that of 1951, when the United States and Japan first signed the Security Treaty in San Francisco.² Instead of the bipolar clarity, linearly defined battlespaces, ongoing war in Korea with Communism, and relative predictability of the threats to Japan that made the US eager to embrace the asymmetry of what would become known as the Yoshida Doctrine, the world today is very different in terms of security. The end of the Cold War has brought a security environment far less predictable and far more immediate. There has been little in the way of a strategic “peace dividend” for the Japanese. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery technology, the weakening of the monopoly on military power enjoyed by established nation-states, and the need for multilateral cooperation are just three facets of the new security paradigm. Ambassador Howard Baker well outlined the new challenges in a letter to the *Asahi Shimbun* in January 2003. “A failed state in Central Asia; a curriculum in an obscure Pakistani school; or political repression and poverty half a world away can have a direct and devastating effect on our own national security.”³ The global reach of terrorism, of which Baker speaks, and its distinct lack of appreciation for established national boundaries and geographical distance, is a vivid example of this new threat paradigm.

More conventionally, the growing threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program, known ballistic missile capability, apparent desperation of Kim Jong Il’s regime, and long-term effects of renewed anti-Americanism by some within the Republic of Korea present security threats that cannot be ignored in Japan. The potential mating of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to any of the 175-200 *Nodong (Rodong)* missiles currently fielded in North Korea puts every major city on the four main Japanese islands at risk. In late January 2003, Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director General Shigeru Ishiba gave a stark and uncharacteristically belligerent message to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) when he told reporters that, if North Korea “expresses the intention of turning Tokyo into a sea of fire and if it begins preparations to attack [Japan], for instance by fueling its missiles, we will consider North Korea is initiating a

military attack,” and pre-emptively strike those missile bases in DPRK.⁴ A month later, however, Ishiba noted that Japan itself has no effective means of countering such missile attacks, when he made another call for further Japanese participation in the development of ballistic missile defenses.⁵

North Korea has added an emotional component to Japanese security concerns not seen since the Second World War and has thus come to dominate the public security debate in Japan. It is virtually impossible to overestimate the sense of public outrage at the abduction of its citizens over the past three decades. Similarly, the direct threat that Korean missiles now pose to Japan has galvanized debate on previously taboo issues relating to security. Diet member and former Foreign Koji Kakizawa states that North Korean actions “have stepped up security consciousness in Japan.”⁶

Both the Japanese political elite and the Japanese public recognize the security threat posed by North Korea and more importantly in the longer term by China. Although the economic interaction with China is of immense importance to Japan, discomfort with continued double-digit military budget increases, Chinese provocations such as the surveillance ship sailings in Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ) waters, and strident demands for historical atonement have driven down public and elite trust of China.⁷ Although many Japanese dismiss the idea that China can be contained, they have an increasing sense of wariness toward the traditional Middle Kingdom.⁸ Hisahiko Okazaki bluntly warns that the potential for the Chinese to interdict the vital sea lines of communication near Taiwan poses one of the largest security risks for Japan in the coming decades.⁹ Yasuhisa Shiozaki of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) summed up the growing recognition of security threats when he said that Japan is gaining a more realistic understanding of security and that “security can no longer be thought of as simply a domestic issue but must be considered in external terms as well.”¹⁰

The cumulative impact of eight key events over the past thirty years has heightened public awareness of the shortfalls in Japanese security. The oil shocks of 1973, which set off panic buying of consumables in Japan, underlined Japan’s dependence on sea lines of communication from the other side of the world.¹¹ In 1976, a defecting Soviet MIG-25 landed unopposed at the Hakodate Airport in Hokkaido, thus highlighting the serious air defense deficiencies of the Self Defense Forces (SDF). In 1991, the first Gulf War demonstrated Japanese paralysis in international military contributions—all the more so since the region is so vital to Japan’s economy. North Korea’s firing of the first *Rodong* missile into Japanese waters off the Noto peninsula in 1993 exposed a security posture ill-suited to this new threat environment. The sarin gas attack by the *Aum Shinrikyo* cult in Tokyo in 1995 raised the specter of terrorism on the home islands. The Chinese military exercises and maneuvers in the Taiwan Straits of 1996 and the North Korean *Taepodong* missile firing in 1998 further highlighted the regional threats facing Japan. Finally, the events of 2002-03 in which North Korea withdrew from the 1994 Agreed Framework and announced that it possesses nuclear weapons made the lack of viable countermeasures even more salient. In summary, these events have shocked an increasing number of Japanese into thinking seriously about security matters.

The *2003 Defense White Paper*, prepared by the Japan Defense Agency and approved by the Cabinet in August 2003, clearly indicates the changing nature of the security threat faced by Japan and the inadequacy of its current security posture.¹² The report notes that the threat of conventional attack on the Japanese home islands is very low and thus the force structure designed to combat such a scenario is out of date. However, the White Paper highlights the very real threat of ballistic missiles and terrorism and advocates strongly for weapon system, force structure, organizational, and intelligence changes to meet these new threats. Defense Agency

Director-General Shigeru Ishiba, in rolling out the White Paper at a press conference in early August 2003, said, “The danger and possibility of a land invasion have become extremely low. While taking into account the demands of the people and limited fiscal resources, we must consider how to preserve the independence and security of the state.”¹³

As shown in Figures 2 and 3 below, the current military and contingency capabilities of Japan (either unilaterally or in concert with the United States under the alliance) are not fully capable of dealing effectively with twenty-first century threats to its national interests in the region. Capabilities such as rapid contingency decision-making structures, intelligence collection and analysis assets that feed those structures, and trained and equipped consequence management teams are woefully inadequate.¹⁴ For example, the JDA intelligence arm did not inform the Prime Minister of the Silkworm missile test by North Korea on 24 February 2003 until the following day, resulting in heightened concern about crisis effectiveness and intra-governmental communication.¹⁵ Although the US is making great strides in many of these areas after September 11th, the rules under which the alliance must operate at the present time preclude timely and effective cooperation outside the immediate area of Japan, if any is allowed at all.¹⁶ The current debate about the constitutionality of intelligence sharing and joint counter-response during the precious few minutes of the incoming flight of a ballistic missile simply highlight some of these failings.¹⁷ The 1960 security structures and norms—even as modified as late as 1997 in the Revised Guidelines—leave Japan and American interests in East Asia vulnerable to those seeking to aggressively upset the status quo.¹⁸

Japan: shortfalls in coping with threats in the twenty-first century

- Legal/political restrictions:
 - Authority to fight terrorism or military threats outside of borders
 - Prohibitions against collective self defense
- Integration with the use of force
 - Institutional decision-making process
 - Political/coalition inertia
- Attitudinal restrictions
 - Reluctance to increase defense budget
 - Use of SDF beyond borders
 - Engrained dependency on US
- Crisis management shortcomings
- Intelligence
 - Lack of assets for collection
 - Insufficient legal protection of classified info
 - Poor institutional mechanisms for coordination and timely government-wide analysis
- Ballistic missile defenses
 - No shield- BMD
 - Limited swords- long range attack
- Rapid response capability
 - Beyond established counter-terror units
- Consequence management shortcomings

Figure 2 Japanese shortfalls

Alliance: shortfalls in coping with threats in the twenty-first century

- Political restrictions on collective self-defense hinder combined operations outside of borders
 - Authority for Japanese units to prosecute terrorism outside of borders
 - Inability to conduct timely combined responses
 - Integration of SDF elements in non-treaty instances of use of force
- Lack of combined integrated command and control center
 - No standing, staffed and trained combined crisis action center
- Intelligence Coordination
 - Control of official secrets
 - Coordination and intel sharing
 - Institutional mechanisms for coordination and timely combined analysis
- Lack of ballistic missile defenses
- Capability gap increasing
 - RMA technology integration shortfalls
- Limited means of leveraging combined consequence management capabilities

Figure 3 Alliance shortfalls

The shortfalls identified above clearly indicate the serious vulnerabilities left by the combination of the dramatic change in the post-Cold War security environment and the lack of a corresponding change in Japanese and alliance security postures. Political commentator Minoru Morita notes that “Japanese people have started to realize that the [security] posture that has prevailed up to today will be unable to defend the country.”¹ This mismatch may be a compelling argument for a realist; however, Japanese perspectives have never been limited to such a single viewpoint. While realist motivations will continue to grow in Japanese policy considerations, they do not tell the full story. A keen observer of East Asia, Michael Green astutely labels Japan “the reluctant realist.”² He notes that the reluctance of Japan continues to be a passion that most Japanese hold as part of their more idealist, or at least pacifist, goals in their country’s international dealings and the angst with which most approach security issues, however salient. In polls taken among Japanese citizens in 1997, only 4% of the respondents thought that the SDF should be used to support military action under United Nations auspices. Less than 1% thought that the SDF should ever actively partner in a conflict with the US military.³ This pacifist passion serves as a powerful inertia, resisting even the most modest of security policy changes, and will be discussed in detail later. However foreign to Western observers, it is important to appreciate that this anti-militarism is the lens through which most Japanese view peace and security in the world.

Japan’s search for an active international role

Japan had been pursuing a multifaceted approach to grand strategy since well before the term “comprehensive security” was officially adopted in 1980 by Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira. This broad view of security was based on three pillars—military security, economic diplomacy, and engagement of multilateral institutions.⁴

This security policy triad has long been seen by the Japanese as the most effective way of achieving Japan's international interests. To sum up its most basic national objectives, Japan wants to prosper, live in peace, and mold the international environment in vital regions so that threats to this peace and prosperity do not materialize and Japan's deeply held values of humanity and pacifism can flourish.⁵ For over forty years, Japan has recognized that continuing to shape the future strategic environment in ways favorable to Japan's peace, prosperity, and sense of humanity is an active process, not a passive one.⁶ Yet for the past few decades, these efforts to shape the international environment in ways conducive to Japanese interests have been dominated by economic, social, and diplomatic efforts. Until the tentative forays by logistic and engineer troops into non-combat participation in United Nations' peacekeeping efforts of the last decade, these international shaping efforts were pointedly (and as a point of pride) non-military in character.

During the heady economic times of the 1970-1980s, the vast majority of Japanese believed that such strategic shaping could be best accomplished through Japanese-led and Japanese-fueled economic progress in Asia. The balance within the triad of comprehensive security leaned even further toward economic diplomacy. Official Development Assistance (ODA) monies became the policy tool of choice for fueling this economic development.

The Japanese elite and public opinion are slowly recognizing the value inherent in a more balanced approach toward achieving foreign policy objectives.⁷ This recognition is due to the now decade-old economic stagnation, distrust of the scandal-plagued Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and the poignant failures of money-based foreign policy, such as the \$13 billion instead of troops that Japan gave to the international effort against Iraq in 1991 and the inability of ODA threats to affect Chinese nuclear testing in the mid-1990s. Even the ardent "civilian power" proponent, Yoichi Funabashi, notes that "many Japanese now feel the need for a 'whole Japan,' one not restricted to the economic realm."⁸

While the majority of Japanese would strongly prefer to make use of predominately soft power tools (such as economic assistance) to achieve their foreign policy goals, the recessionary woes of the last decade and dramatic changes in countries such as Indonesia and China have rendered those tools both less available and less effective.⁹ Diet member and former Foreign Minister Koji Kakizawa states that "the power of ODA is declining because the economies of China and the countries of SE Asia are developing successfully" and thus the ability of Japan to use ODA as a tool to shape development is less effective.¹⁰ Japan continues to pursue, in a limited way, alternatives to ODA in the form of human security assistance (e.g., law enforcement assistance) and technical/legal assistance (e.g., monitoring of elections, non-vital technology sharing, and the drafting of legal codes), but the overall impact of these foreign policy tools so far has been minimal.¹¹

A potentially fruitful alternative for a Japanese contribution to world peace might lie in active work to reconstruct war-torn lands. Such nation-building partially bridges the gap between traditional economic diplomacy and full military participation overseas and is of increasing interest to the Japanese. In Afghanistan, Japan has taken the lead in organizing the "consolidation of peace" with money (over \$450 million since *Operation Enduring Freedom* began in October 2001), active diplomacy, and military logistics.¹² Although no Japanese troops have yet to deploy into Afghanistan, three Maritime Self Defense Force vessels provide support to the American-led coalition there and an MSDF transport ship brought Thai construction

troops and equipment to the region. Similarly, the Foreign Ministry is attempting to radically change the character of ODA in the “consolidation of peace” in Sri Lanka. Instead of focusing solely on economic development, the \$280 million in yen loans authorized in 2003 for this strife-torn country are now characterized as a “catalyst for building and consolidating peace.”¹³ The changing character of Japanese overseas “investment”—now in nation-building rather than traditional economic development—represents a recognition of the decreased utility of traditional ODA diplomacy.

Just as Japan has been disappointed with the rewards of economic diplomacy, the Japanese emphasis on international cooperative regimes to solve problems has also not been adequately rewarded in terms of national goal fulfillment. Although respect for the United Nations is far higher in Japan than in the United States, some members of the Diet express their disenchantment with that international organization. They feel that the failure to reform the Security Council structure so as to give Japan greater voice does not recognize the financial backing Japan has given that body in past decades.¹⁴ The Japanese contribution of nearly \$1 billion per year is more than the combined contributions of France, Britain, Russia, and China.¹⁵ The fear that a Chinese or Russian veto would prevent substantive action in the United Nations against North Korea similarly disheartens Japanese leaders. Seizaburo Sato noted that “[Japan] can only rely on the UN within the limits of what is agreeable to China.”¹⁶ Because Japan does not hold a permanent UNSC seat, the Japanese have been left out of some important decision making forums dealing with such matters as Middle Eastern and former Yugoslavian peace efforts.¹⁷ Likewise, after reaching a high-water mark in 1994 with the Bogor Declaration on trade liberalization, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum floundered in the Asian economic crisis of the mid-1990s and its resulting mercantilism. The inability of Koizumi to move forward on any Japanese initiatives at the October 2003 APEC forum in Bangkok further highlighted the Japanese failure to gain a distinct leadership role through trade and economics in East Asia.¹⁸ The Kyoto Accords represent a similar disappointment as Japan became increasingly disillusioned with its ability to achieve desired results through these fora.¹⁹ Although the Japanese strongly desire multinational solutions to international problems and in October 2003 issued a tripartite declaration with Seoul and Beijing on security dialogue, they have come away from many such endeavors feeling unfulfilled.

The leg of the security triad stressing engagement with international institutions has not been as effective as Japan had hoped it would be in shaping its future and providing for its safety. At the same time, the new security environment—best clarified by Washington’s declaration of war on terrorism²⁰—has pushed more traditional tools of power, namely the limited use of military force, back into the limelight after a fifty-year hiatus in Japan.²¹ Given the external demands on Japan to be assertive in foreign policy to achieve national goals, military means offer viable and visible (although domestically distrusted) opportunities for Tokyo to balance out somewhat the more traditional foreign policy legs of the comprehensive security triad.

In all likelihood, the movement toward this balance—through increases in the capability and use of its military forces in non-combat support of United Nations resolutions—would have proceeded in a practiced, thoughtful, and extremely pedestrian manner throughout the 1990s. Had North Korea not test fired its *Taepodong-1* intermediate range ballistic missile over Japan

in August 1998, had China not continued its double-digit, yearly increases in defense spending, had the *Aum Shinrikyo* and the Bali bombings not made the threat of terrorism salient to the Japanese, and had the North Koreans not resumed their nuclear brinkmanship, the shift toward a more active role for the military would not have accelerated at the pace we have witnessed in the last several years. In summary, the speed of change in Japanese security policy can be attributed most strongly to the perceived failings of economic diplomacy,²² the increased saliency of the North Korean and terrorist threats, and a grudging recognition by Japanese politicians that, in order to gain a seat at the table where truly important international shaping decisions are made, Japan needed to be more active in international security undertakings.

Japan's political elites have reluctantly acknowledged that active, risk-taking participation in international shaping events—such as peacemaking operations or non-proliferation regimes—confers rights of participation upon Japan in the international decision-making processes.²³ Stung by the exclusion of Japan from the full-page listing in the *New York Times*, paid for by a thankful Kuwait in the late spring of 1991, Japan has been diligent in taking the steps necessary to be acknowledged as an active player in international undertakings. When Japan was again excluded (albeit inadvertently) from a US Defense Department fact sheet listing the participants in the war in Afghanistan, released by the Pentagon on 26 February 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs barraged the Department of Defense with protests until the omission was rectified.

It appears clear to Japan (and even to a reluctant American hegemon) that, in the future, multinational efforts, if only in the form of “coalitions of the willing,” will be the only viable means of effecting sustained change among the nations of the world. Gaining a voice in those highest of deliberations, therefore, becomes critical to Japan, whether this means a permanent seat on the UN Security Council or substantive power at G-8 conferences on security issues.²⁴ Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi recently expressed Japan's frustration at not having a UNSC permanent seat. “It is neither desirable nor fair that countries that have been contributing to world peace and to UN finances have not been given a sufficient chance to participate in the decision-making processes of the Security Council.”²⁵ If Japan wishes to shape the future strategic environment in ways that support her national objectives, and not simply submit to the course of international relations set out by those truly wielding such voice, then it must gain entry to the forums where those decisions are made. If the currency of power today has military might and substantive military participation among the primary denominations, then Japan may be wise to choose to enter these circles.

It appears that the lessons learned by the Japanese elite in the past decade are three-fold: (1) the force posture of the SDF is a product of the Cold War and is not well-suited for current threats; (2) risk-taking international participation is an increasingly important requirement for global leadership; and (3) the effectiveness of traditional economic diplomacy is decreasing. Students in an American seminar in Realism 101 would thus conclude that Japan can and must change its fundamental approach to security policy. Hopeful pacifism, “civilian power,” and the use of soft-power tools such as ODA are not getting the job done, and thus it would be irrational for Japan not to take even more substantive change than the three *yuji hosei* (contingency legislation) bills on emergency situations passed in the June 2003 Diet parliamentary session.

However, it is easy to make such predictions when viewing the situation through a prism of cultural misinterpretation. Security policy change in Japan must still surmount significant domestic hurdles, and, even then will not reflect what most Westerners think of as “normal” for such a powerful nation. The majority of Japanese do not seek the status of *futsu no kuni* (normal nation) and that powerful domestic consensus colors Japan’s prospects for security policy change.

Overcoming domestic resistance to change

Regardless of external imperatives, present day Japanese culture does not readily support such a dramatic and rapid shift away from soft-power means. For example, Major General Noburu Yamaguchi points out that debate on the need for contingency legislation began immediately after the shock of a Soviet defector landing his MIG-25 fighter in Hokkaido in 1975 and is only partially resolved through legislation in mid-2003.²⁶ There are many reasons for this resistance to change. Some of the most powerful are attitudinal, based on memories of the past century, deep feelings of Confucian obligations, conceptions of consensus and harmony, and even a cultural lack of a sense of insecurity. Some reasons are institutional and reflect the inertia of a fragmented Diet, the lack of funds necessary for change due to economic stagnation, or the turf protection practiced by the entrenched bureaucracy. In combination, these factors strongly impede change and ensure that, save for a catastrophic event, any such policy modifications will be incremental and deliberate. It is useful to look in more detail at these inertial forces in Japan because significant security policy change must overcome their collective pull.

Attitudinal resistance

The Japanese public remains highly distrustful of a powerful military establishment and the government’s ability to exercise control over it and deeply prizes the pacifist underpinnings of the 1946 Constitution, regardless of the source or intent of such pacifism.²⁷ This distrust represents the legacy of a sense of dual victimization during World War II—that is, that they were victims of the military establishment and then the world’s first and only victims of atomic attack. In a 1997 poll, 72% of Japanese respondents indicated that the renunciation of war in their Constitution has contributed to peace in the Asia-Pacific region, and 73% felt that continued renunciation of war by Japan will contribute to the future peace of the world.²⁸

The barrage of Chinese and Korean assertions that the loosening of the restrictions on Japan’s military forces forecasts a desire to be militarily assertive, especially when reinforced by the left leaning segments of the media and small, but well organized political parties such as *Komeito*, continues to hold sway with the Japanese public—despite the fact that public opinion toward those two countries continues to decline. The pacifist and highly influential *Asahi Shimbun* has a daily circulation of over 12.6 million copies, more than eight times the circulation of the seemingly ubiquitous *USA Today*.²⁹ Although the political elite, such as Junichiro Koizumi, Ichiro Ozawa, and former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, recognizes the need to develop a more balanced approach to the security of Japan, there is a genuine fear among many Japanese that the military, once released from containment, cannot be controlled and will lead Japan back into the depths of war.³⁰ Additionally, public alarm at the thought of a nuclear powered aircraft carrier permanently stationed in Tokyo Bay drives the debate over the future homebasing of the *USS Carl Vinson* in Yokosuka. Another prominent fear echoed

by the pacifist left is that increased military capability within the alliance with America could entangle Japan in a major conflict.³¹ It is this reluctance to expand the power of the SDF—so as to avoid any possibility of having to relive the horrors of war—that colors potential security policy change and continues to restrict even debate on the subject.

The debate and compromises made over *yuji hosei* (contingency) legislation dealing with “military attack situations” provides a salient example of the undercurrent of distrust felt by a majority of Japanese when thinking about use of military force—even in an invasion of Japan.³² The far left in Japanese politics, given voice in the influential *Asahi Shimbun*, steadfastly opposes any increase in authority of the SDF on the grounds that these bills would open the doors to the use of force by and toward Japan in the future. Taking advantage of these sentiments and knowing that the government would have to build a broad consensus, *Minshuto*, the main opposition party, was successful in obtaining a number of compromises on the set of contingency bills. Declared protection of human and property rights, specified Diet capability to end military operations, and protection of local governments from Cabinet war orders were some of these added measures to ensure civilian control of the military and protection of the public from the potential excesses of the SDF. The Diet, reflecting a large majority opinion among the people, does not want to grant the military free reign or the prime minister the equivalent of the American president’s war powers.³³ Furthermore, because the line of demarcation was difficult to draw, response to acts of terrorism or foreign spy ship incursions were not included in these contingency bills. In sum, the passage of these bills in June 2003 reflects well the agonizing debate in Japan over pacifism, fear of a strong military, and how best to provide for the country’s security future.

Less concrete to most Japanese (yet always lingering beneath the surface) are the multi-layered conceptions of Confucianism about obligations, loyalty, and duty. It is important not to overstate this point; however, these feelings bring about an almost sub-conscious resistance to changing established power relationships and challenging the status quo. In this regard, they serve as an underlying brake on change in security policy and the relationship with the United States, unless the US asks for such change.³⁴ *Filial piety* is a basic obligation taught within the household to most Japanese from early childhood and involves the reciprocal duties found in the family. The father’s duty is to the son as the son’s duty is to the father. However, this does not mean that the father and son are equal.³⁵ Similarly strongly felt among the Japanese is the *sempai-kohai* (senior-junior) relationship in which deference and respect are prized. These Confucian beliefs may not appear to be widely held by Japanese teenagers on the neon-lit streets of Shibuya, but they are practiced extensively in companies and offices throughout Japan. Although not openly associated with defense policy arguments, discussions with Japanese academics and businessmen indicate that moral obligations to the “older brother” in America give pause when policy options are considered that could lead to a more autonomous security or foreign policy posture.³⁶

In addition, as the post-war social observer Shichihei Yamamoto points out (under the pen name Isaiah Ben-Dasan), Japan’s culture is based on the relative safety of the community, the isolation of an archipelago surrounded by water, and a lack of any history of foreign invasion and subjugation.³⁷ Consideration of matters of security does not come as naturally to the Japanese as they do to Americans, whose history (although much shorter) has been marked by contentious settling of the frontier, by a regular string of minor and major wars, and by a much higher crime

rate. Yukio Ozaki, an early twentieth-century Japanese social critic, once remarked that having “military forces in peacetime are as useful as an umbrella on a sunny day.”³⁸ Others argue that Japan’s lack of a sense for security is a result of a deliberate mindset imposed by MacArthur and GHQ following the war and reinforced by decades of left-leaning teachers.³⁹

In a superb essay published after his death, Seizaburo Sato lamented the post-WWII Japanese tendency to expand the scope of *anzen hoshō* (national security) to cover a wide range of human needs.⁴⁰ Discussions of military security (already disadvantaged by the conflation of pacifism with anti-militarism) compete in Japan with other fields of “security.” Sato discussed the concept of global security, which includes protection from environmental hazards, drugs, and terrorism. There is also economic security, which aims to keep market and resource availability to maintain means of prosperity. Social security involves the protection of minorities, social unity, and national identity. Finally, Sato describes the particularly dangerous focus on human security and the need to protect the life and livelihood of every individual.⁴¹ For example, in January 2001, the Japanese initiated the multinational “Commission on Human Security,” whose work was intended to complement the process of formulating traditional national security policy.⁴² Reliance on a security guarantee from the United States has tended to cause the discussion of national security in Japan to stray to areas which, logically, can only follow from the physical safety of the Japanese people.

It is only recently—in the wake of the rise of China, erratic militancy of North Korea, and incidents of homegrown terrorism—that the Japanese people have begun to think more seriously about traditional security matters. When asked if they thought any countries in Northeast Asia posed a short-term military threat to Japan, 33% of those polled in 1993 and 71% in 1999 answered in the affirmative.⁴³ Although slowly changing, this cultural lack of a sense of immediacy in security matters means that other issues (such as economic stimulus packages or personal privacy laws) compete with debates about basic security issues in the Diet and in the minds of the public.

Accompanying the distrust of a potentially uncontrollable military, a sense of *filial piety*, and an undeveloped sense of insecurity comes a culturally ingrained predilection not to be hasty in decision making on important matters. One criticism of Japan that is commonly expressed in Western texts is of the extremely slow pace of policy change.⁴⁴ More often than not, this incrementalism is seen as a severe vice—one that results in a string of tardy and sub-optimal responses to external conditions and pressures. From a different angle, however, this decision-making style has considerable merit. As Chie Nakane and others have been trying to tell foreigners for the past thirty years, the Japanese conception of democracy and majority rule is different from that which predominates in the United States.⁴⁵ Simple majority rule, for example a 55–45 vote in the US Senate, appears to most Japanese as supremely undemocratic in its denial of such a substantial part of the voting community. It does not create *wa* (harmony)—so prized by the Japanese—but rather perpetuates the divisions between people.

The Japanese practice, however, can be less than optimal in terms of timeliness and quality of policy. The Japanese would prefer to “agree to disagree” or approve a solution based on the lowest common denominator of interests (resulting in dissatisfaction among all parties) rather than force a decision without supra-majority support.⁴⁶ Compromise and consensus take time to achieve, if they can be achieved at all, but, to the Japanese, such are the workings of truly fair decision-making. While American political decisions can be made

relatively quickly, the rights and motivation of the minority find the means to subvert or cripple the implementation of policy at many points. In Japan, a decision may take a while to achieve, but the policy is far more likely to be implemented immediately and faithfully carried out down the line. This preferred style of decision making dovetails well with the institutional structure of Japanese politics to confound rapid, substantive change in most instances and results in a pace of change described often in America as “glacial.”⁴⁷

Institutional resistance

A fragmented Diet that is dependent on coalition politics for policy passage, tight fiscal policy, and an entrenched bureaucracy are just three of the institutionalized inertial forces that confound significant policy change in Japan. Bureaucratic politics and factionalism result in rigid incrementalism in policy. Authors such as Gerald L. Curtis and W. Lee Howell have described in detail some of these factors and thus they will only be briefly reviewed here.⁴⁸ Combined with the attitudinal factors mentioned above, these structural constraints represent considerable inertia and severely limit the degree and pace of Japanese security policy change.

Achieving the degree of consensus the public expects—especially on critical issues—is increasingly difficult in today’s fragmented political scene in Japan. For a number of reasons, which include realignment and reduction in monies available for public works projects, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has lost its monopoly on political power in Japan. Prime Minister Koizumi now rules with a coalition government that includes both the right (LDP and Conservative Parties) and center-left (*New Komeito*) of Japanese politics. The ability of the Buddhists to mobilize their voter base and control the votes of their members makes *New Komeito* a small but critical part of the Koizumi Government.⁴⁹ Their presence keeps current government policy from straying too far right. The virtual collapse of the Liberal Party, low popularity of the Democratic Party (*Minshuto*), and the talk of a new conservative party led by the outspoken Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, further confound party control of politicians in the center and right and, thus, the ability to form supra-majorities. As demonstrated by the debate on privacy laws in the winter of 2003, legislation must increasingly be written to a very low common denominator in order to be viable on the Diet floor.

Other factors provide additional structural obstacles to substantive change in Diet policy making. Traditionally, policy debates are debated only within the very tight, sector-specific communities that have very little horizontal interaction between them. The grip of the LDP, business interests, and associated bureaucracies in these narrow policy fields does not encourage the painful tradeoffs needed to make anything other than incremental policy change at the margins.⁵⁰ Additionally, the Prime Minister faces considerable pressure within the party itself from the “old guard” of powerful faction leaders who tend to anchor the status quo of entrenched interests. As shown by the wavering in Prime Minister Koizumi’s public approval rating ever since its highpoint at the time of the summit in Pyongyang in September 2002, a leader requires considerable political courage to maintain latitude in policy. Although Koizumi’s reelection as head of the LDP in September 2003 gives him more time in national leadership, his ability to affect change is always limited. The bottom line of this fragmented political scene is that constitutional and regulatory restrictions on security policy empower opposition parties and factions. These restrictions form lightning rods for public opinion and media coverage of security policy debate, thus creating a powerful inertia resisting change. In

Western terms, radical changes in policy are simply too difficult to achieve in the absence of a national emergency that mobilizes opinion and supercedes normal party politics. One Diet member remarked privately that he almost wished “that North Korea would hit Japan with a missile so that we can get needed security policy change through the Diet.”⁵¹

A further hindrance to security policy change is the lack of budget leeway to fund the new systems and training necessary to take on larger roles and missions. With an economy stagnated now for over a decade and facing staggering budget deficits of over 45%, the money to buy less reliance on the United States, as well as assuming a greater military role, is extremely limited.⁵² In 2003, even while facing the dual crises of the war on terrorism (including the rebuilding of Iraq) and the specter of a nuclear armed North Korea, the budget for JDA, though nominally requesting a 1.3% hike over 2002, is projected to decrease, in real money terms, over the previous years.⁵³ The announcements in late summer 2003 of upwards of \$1.33 billion for missile defense and \$1.5 billion for Iraqi reconstruction (in 2004 alone) will further constrain defense spending in all other areas.⁵⁴ In the long term, the rapidly aging Japanese population, conditioned for decades by the assumption of a generous social safety net, will create a fiscal challenge of immense proportions for Japan. From a purely fiscal perspective, it makes sense for Japan to take it slow on military matters and continue to leverage the bulk of its security from the US.

For example, the Japanese defense budget has very little room for a significant increase in the procurement program. For the past five years, spending on personnel (including pensions) averaged 45% of the entire defense budget.⁵⁵ Compare this with the 25% average spent on personnel by the United States military. This leaves just over \$20 billion each year for all other expenditures of JDA. Two examples highlight the restrictive nature of available defense funds. First, the Japanese share of the research and initial development of ballistic missile defense around Japan is projected to be nearly ¥4-6 billion (\$35-52 million) annually, with actual fielding of the baseline systems estimated at 1.5-3 trillion yen (up to \$25 billion).⁵⁶ Second, the proposed relocation of MCAS Futenma to an off-shore reef site is projected by the General Accounting Office to cost Japan over \$4.5 billion.⁵⁷ Both commitments pose daunting prospects for defense planners and finance budgeteers. This budget shortfall is further exacerbated by the Japanese procurement system itself. Although the Japanese allocate about 18% of the defense budget for procurement of new systems, the extremely high cost of limited, domestic production and the resultant high per item costs results in severe constraints on the ability to buy significantly new military capabilities.⁵⁸

As if a lack of political cohesion and funding were not enough of a brake on security policy liberation, the role and power of the bureaucracy in Japan will continue to be a major factor in the substance and pace of change. Lacking an extensive professional staff, the Japanese Diet relies heavily on the ministries themselves to research and draft legislation. Especially in foreign policy—under which security policy has long been placed—the ability of an entrenched bureaucracy to control change is strong. The inability of the Prime Minister and his government to create dynamic policy change is compounded by the fact that, in all the ministries combined, fewer than 100 political appointees occupy senior positions, and by the fact that more than half of these be serving Diet members, who are naturally fully engaged in their own duties.⁵⁹

Not only do the bureaucracies confound political efforts to change policies, but disagreement on the future course of security policy is rampant among the ministries themselves. Although riddled with recent scandal and public doubt, MoFA is fighting a stubborn rearguard action against the up and coming Defense Agency to determine future security policy in Japan.⁶⁰ ODA makes up two-thirds of the MoFA budget, and a shift away from economic diplomacy to a more

balanced approach, in the current fiscal environment, becomes a relative sums game among the bureaucracies, especially MoFA, METI, and the Defense Agency.⁶¹ The continued practice of MoFA, the Ministry of Finance, and other ministries to place their own specialists in rotating billets near the top of JDA further limits military policy change. Recently, however, the balance of power between MoFA and JDA is shifting and, combined with an increasingly professional and home grown defense bureaucracy, this trend indicates that the bureaucratic brake on security policy change is weakening.⁶² The balance will further weaken if JDA is granted full ministry status—a legislative move waiting in the wings of the political center and right in Tokyo. It is important to note, however, that budget increases have not mirrored the apparent security policy balance shift. In the 1990s, the MoFA budget increased 34%, compared to a JDA increase of 28% over the same period.⁶³

Additionally, there is considerable ambivalence within both MoFA and JDA over the future of the use of military force by Japan. Unlike those in the Foreign Ministry charged with economic diplomacy, the North American Affairs Bureau of MoFA is a staunch supporter of the alliance with the United States, and thus tends to support American requests for greater Japanese military role. Likewise, the Multilateral Cooperation Department of MoFA is a strong supporter of Japanese participation in United Nation's Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) missions. Conversely, many in JDA oppose the use of force in peacekeeping operations due to increased difficulties in recruiting among the generally pacifist public should casualties occur and the highly restrictive nature of troop employment in PKO under current Japanese law.⁶⁴ Even within the bureaucracies themselves, expanded use of military force is highly controversial. Therefore, this clash of bureaucratic and budgetary interests will continue to play a major retarding role in policy change.

In summary, both attitudinal and institutional factors in Japan combine to render substantive change in security policy both difficult and time-consuming. However, the cumulative effect of the events of the last decade have managed to partially overcome this inertia and have enabled law makers to significantly (albeit slowly) change the character of Japanese security policy since the Gulf War. The heightened public concern over North Korea's threat to Japanese security will continue—or even speed up—this trend in defense policy.

Eroding the constancy of security policy

It is highly ironic that Japan—the safest of the major powers in terms of crime and lawlessness—is much less culturally tied to hard and fast rules than most of its peers. This may not be intuitively obvious, given the very strong legalistic bent found in Japan. However, Ben Dasan notes that the Japanese value pragmatism over immutable edicts and will obey or disobey laws as circumstances and the human condition dictate.⁶⁵ As journalist Sam Jameson points out, a look at the strength of the SDF today clearly rebuts Article IX of the Constitution, which clearly specifies that “land, sea, and air forces . . . will never be maintained.”⁶⁶ Many who attempt to gain business entry into Japan or who seek additional roles for the SDF, and are rebuffed by legalities, may take offense to Ben Dasan's characterization. For years, Japanese officials have used existing law or policy to hold off external attempts to force them to do something they do not want and then, in shrewd ways, used *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure) or their own arguments to overcome domestic opposition as a means to make changes felt to be in their best interests. Apart from the political capital needed domestically, Japanese laws and established policies restrain Japan only when it is in its best interest to be so restrained.⁶⁷

One of the most guarded of these policy fortresses has been the government's interpretation of Article IX of the constitution as it relates to "collective self defense." The government's policy is that all nations have a right under international law to collective self defense, but, in Japan the exercise of that right is prohibited by the constitution.⁶⁸ Changing public opinion, the dire impact of the war on terrorism, and North Korean nuclear intransigence have had a dramatic affect on this extremely important stronghold of security policy constancy.

Although the Japanese government continues to go through dramatic legal and rhetorical contortions when discussing increased use of the SDF, recent deployments show that this constitutional barrier against collective self defense already has been breached. The MSDF Aegis destroyer stationed in the Indian Ocean and the use of ASDF airborne radar and control aircraft (AWACS) to protect American RC-135 reconnaissance flights in the Sea of Japan are two such examples of this breach. Similarly, in a reversal of its own relatively recent interpretations, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), in the space of one week in late January 2003, announced that preemptive strikes against DPRK missile bases by the Japanese military would be legal and that the refueling of American warplanes, as they prepared to attack Iraqi targets, would not be "integration with the use of force" or "collective defense."⁶⁹ If the Japanese government decides to significantly deepen the military cooperation within the alliance, it will likely use the event of a North Korean provocation to make the announcement of a new interpretation on collective self-defense. As long as the security dilemma for Japan remains vague, the Japanese will continue to rely on these legal barriers to maintain freedom of action. However, the political pragmatists in Tokyo will overcome these barriers when it is in their best interest to do so.

Pace of change

Although considered pedestrian by many in the West, in Japanese terms the pace of security change in Japan since 1991 has been exceedingly rapid. For the Japanese, the pace since September 11th has been almost breathtaking. Even though several fundamental concepts grounded in the 1946 Constitution have not changed, the fact that, in mid-2003, a Japanese Aegis destroyer was protecting the MSDF vessels refueling American, British, German, French, and other allied warships near the Persian Gulf, as they fight a war against terrorism in Afghanistan, would have been beyond conception fifteen years ago. Likewise, the ongoing collaboration with the United States on ballistic missile defense (BMD) research and the decision in August 2003 to go forward with mid-course and terminal BMD in the face of ardent Chinese opposition would have been a shocking revelation to the Japanese public and elite of the early 1990s. The changes in Japanese security policy since the end of the Cold War truly have been dramatic, given the dearth of substantive change in the last fifty years. Figure 4 illustrates the executive and legislative decisions taken over the last decade that have freed the Japanese military from many of the legal constraints of the previous four decades.

This rapid pace of change in security policy (at least as far as those in Northeast Asia are concerned) over the last decade is due to many factors. A younger generation of Japanese politicians, less bound by memories of the Second World War, is coming into power.¹ For example, Shigeru Ishiba, the Minister of State for Defense and the Director General of the Defense Agency, was born six years after the alliance was originally created. Likewise, following the LDP elections of September 2003, Koizumi appointed the 49-year old Shinzo Abe to the powerful post of LDP Secretary General. The ideological split in Japanese politics is now more a factor of generation than of party. In a recent poll, over 90% of Diet members under the age

Japanese Policy: Loosening the Restrictions on the Military

- 1992 International Peace Cooperation Law
- 1994 Amendment to Peace Cooperation Law
(Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) by SDF aircraft)
- 1995 National Defense Program Outline (+ Mid-term Defense Buildup Plan)
- 1997 U.S.-Japan Alliance Revised Guidelines
- 1998 Agreement on Joint BMD research with U.S.
- 1998 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement with U.S.
- 1998 Surveillance satellite development and deployment decision
- 1999 Amendment to Article 100-8 of the SDF Law (NEO by MSDF)
- 1999 Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in
Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.
- 1999 Amendment to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (SIASJ)
- 2000 Mid-Term Defense Buildup Plan 2001-2005
- 2001 Antiterrorism Special Measures Law
- 2001 Ship Inspection Law
- 2001 Amendment to the Self Defense Forces Law (Security of bases)
- 2001 Amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Law (defreezing)
- 2002 Decision to deploy Aegis destroyer to Indian Ocean
- 2003 Decision to extend MSDF refueling to non-US vessels (Operation EF)
- 2003 Launching of indigenous surveillance satellites
- 2003 *Yuji Hoseni*- Contingency Legislation

Figure 4 Recent changes in security policy

of 50 supported revision of the Constitution.² This new generation of politicians tends to be more assertive, more concerned with the future than the past, and more focused on advancing Japan's interests than are their older political mentors.³ These relatively young politicians, now beginning to come to power, find themselves faced with a deep economic recession that has decreased Japan's ability to lead through economic means.

Next, a sense of urgency imposed by the war on terrorism, by the erratic militancy of DPRK, and by its abductions of Japanese civilians has made it more difficult for the political left to rally public support to block changes in security policy. As noted above, in a *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll in 1999, 71% of respondents thought that at least one country in Northeast Asia posed a near-term military threat to the security of Japan. In early 2003, 74% of those polled felt that North Korea by itself posed an imminent security threat.⁴ Former LDP Secretary General Taku Yamasaki noted that, following September 11th, there was a definite shift in public opinion toward Japanese military participation in international peace missions. "People began to think that Japan needs to gradually upgrade its contribution, both in quality and quantity, within the


framework of international cooperation.”⁵ This growing sense of public vulnerability and need for action come at a time when the political left in Japanese politics (with the exception of *New Komeito*) is increasingly fragmented and incapable of mounting sustained challenges to the more conservative LDP coalition governments.

Additionally, opinions expressed by the political elite indicate a growing recognition of the mismatch between the security environment and Japan’s current defense posture—both in terms of equipment and legal capabilities.⁶ Keizo Nabeshima, former chief editorial writer for *Kyodo News*, bluntly stated that the government has been too slow in strengthening Japan’s deterrent capability by failing to recognize the major changes in the global security environment and formulate strategies to promote Japan’s national interest.⁷ Two prime ministerial commissions, one focused on peacekeeping operations led by former United Nations Under-Secretary General Yasushi Akashi and the other on Japan’s foreign policy strategies led by Yukio Okamoto, came to a similar conclusion in late 2002 about the lack of fit between needs and capabilities.⁸ The overall result is a grudging public and elite acquiescence, though certainly not an affinity, to the use of non-combat, military means in conjunction with soft power means to progress Japanese national interests.⁹

Concrete evidence of this change in policy can be seen in the weapon systems fielded (or bought and not yet delivered) to the SDF over the past twenty years. Figure 5 shows the recent changes in patterns of procurement, which indicate a significant departure from past, purely defensive, military strategies.¹⁰ The procurement of multi-purpose systems, especially those designed to project Japanese military presence well beyond the home islands, demonstrates not only a recognition of a changing security environment, but also the increasing emphasis on the military pillar of the comprehensive security triad and the greater willingness to participate internationally with military forces. The planned acquisition of upgraded Aegis-equipped destroyers, Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3¹¹ missiles, large ballistic missile radar facilities¹², F-2 attack aircraft armed with precision strike weapons like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), and enhanced rescue aircraft is recognition of the changing security environment faced by Japan.¹³ These kinds of systems will improve Japan’s ability to defend itself against twenty-first century threats as recognized in the *2003 Defense White Paper*. The new through-deck aircraft carrier designated the *16DDH* class¹⁴, large tender and supply ships of the *Uraga* and *Towanda* classes, helicopter-capable transport ships of the *Osumi* class, long-range transport aircraft, air-cushion landing craft (LCAC), and cargo helicopters are key examples of the shift to a more internationally mobile and capable force. These latter systems are designed to project power beyond Japan’s own territory. Together, these procurement choices reflect a fundamental shift away from purely home island defense to a more responsive, assertive, and flexible military.

Japan’s security policy dilemma

The changes noted above, toward a more substantial military presence and use, have come at the expense of significant angst within Japanese society. Japan faces a gut-wrenching dilemma over the future of its security policy and the increase in reliance on the military leg of the security policy triad. For the Japanese, three competing interests tend to cloud the desired route forward into the twenty-first century. On the one hand, the Japanese desire to avoid entrapment in a war that may come about if they drift too far toward an active military role in the alliance with the United States or take on too much international leadership. On the other



PKO—Peacekeeping Operations / SIASJ— Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

Figure 5 Procurement trends

hand, the Japanese want to prevent abandonment by the US, especially with respect to North Korea, if they are seen as not supportive enough of the US. Finally, the Japanese are increasingly concerned with the pursuit of self-interest and advancing their own specific goals, although, as a society, such national interests continue to elude broad-based articulation and acceptance. Trying to determine a path forward in security policy amid these often competing imperatives continues to pose difficulties for Tokyo.

The fear exists that, should policy decisions that authorize combat roles for the SDF be made, and should the Japanese subsequently develop more concrete war plans with the United States, “American adventurism” may embroil Japan in a war counter to its interests. Likewise, there is a fear that permanent membership in the Security Council may obligate Japan to provide troops for U.N. peace operations worldwide. These fears of putting troops into combat can be seen most concretely in the restrictive nature of legislation recently passed by the Diet. In 1999, the Diet passed a watered down set of implementing legislation that failed to mirror the full intent of the 1997 Revised Guidelines agreement with the United States.¹ Similarly, even the unprecedented anti-terrorism legislation of 2001 came with short time lines and requirements for periodic reappraisal and government action.

Conversely, the support of Prime Minister Koizumi for the Iraqi War in March 2003—despite strong opposition from the majority of citizens—was strongly influenced by the fear of losing American allegiance and protection in the coming confrontation with North Korea. Koizumi acknowledged this concern over abandonment when he stated that Japan “must be realistic” about its security. “It would run counter to the national interest to ruin confidence in the US-Japan relationship,” he said, immediately after the United States had given Saddam Hussein its ultimatum prior to the war.²

Finally, as former Prime Minister Nakasone has been advocating for years, Japan is trying to come to grips with the need for a strategic vision for the future. Nakasone uses naval metaphors to emphasize that the ship of state must know its exact position and where it is heading, a clarion call for Japan to build a strategic plan for the future.³ Many other politicians speak of the need to advance Japan's "self-interest," but the concrete details of such a concept are poorly articulated and not broadly understood. What may or may not be in Japan's self-interest is reminiscent of the famous 1964 US Supreme Court opinion on pornography⁴—the Japanese people may not be able to define it, but they know it when they see it.

Japanese national interests

As noted earlier, various commissions, politicians, and bureaucrats have attempted to address the future of Japan and draw up a list of its national interests. Due to a lack of public debate on the topic, it is unlikely that any two such lists would be the same. As demonstrated in the commission chaired by Hayao Kawai in 2000 on "Japan's Goals in the twenty-first century," many confuse "national interests" with the desired *means* to achieve these interests.⁵ Although the exact wording is different, these national interests tend to coalesce around conceptions of economic and social well being, peace, and stability achieved through multinational efforts and respect for basic human rights and Japanese values.⁶ A representative listing of Japan's national interests might be as follows:

1. Economic prosperity at home and leadership abroad
2. Peace and stability in Asia
3. Maintenance of Japanese traditions and culture

There is considerable ambivalence among the Japanese as to how best each of these interests can be achieved. While a vague conception of the end state may be shared by many, the choices of and hazards inherent in the ways and means continue to create significant angst. For example, while many in this extremely monolithic culture seek to maintain Japanese cultural mores and traditions, promoting this interest in textbooks or at shrines is often derided as promotion of unhealthy nationalism.⁷ Because of these deep-seated, yet simultaneous and contradictory sentiments, there are very few clear routes forward, especially at a time when confidence about the economic health and future of Japan are so lagging among the people.

Finding common ground among competing interests

Figure 6 is a Venn diagram of potential security policy choices for Japan in the coming decade. Each of the three major interests (pursuit of self-interest, prevention of war entrapment, and prevention of American abandonment) presents strategic options for Japan. The most likely route forward for the Japanese is to pursue those actions in the intersection of all three, where the means tend to broadly support all major concerns. However, should fears of entrapment, caused by deepening concerns about America's predilection for the use of force overseas, begin to overshadow fears of abandonment, we may see increases in substantive ties to China and Asia. Conversely, should the North Koreans further increase their bellicosity and nuclear posture, such action may increase the fear of abandonment and lead to even greater increase in military capabilities and cooperation with the US military. We should expect that Japan will pursue the security options that maintain its flexibility, deterrent capability, and freedom of maneuver, without jeopardizing its economic interests in the coming decades. Given the domestic constraints and international challenges currently faced by Japan, such a hedging grand strategy is eminently rational.

Likely short-term changes in security policy

The near-term changes in Japanese security policy will likely be focused in three directions: (1) policies that expand the missions and use of military force, (2) policies aimed at improving efficiency and contingency effectiveness, and (3) policies authorizing procurement of heretofore




Figure 6: Japan's dilemma

controversial military equipment and capabilities. The first category most likely would contain a revision of the central missions of the SDF to include international peacekeeping duties, a revision to the "five principles" for PKO participation, a new comprehensive authority for anti-terrorism action, a reinterpretation of the "collective self defense" provisions of Article IX, and a decision to develop and field some form of ballistic missile defense. The second category would probably include continued passage of basic emergency legislation enhancing the government's decision-making structures and roles and missions of the SDF in crises in and around Japan, the unification of SDF high-level command structures, and the upgrade of the Defense Agency to ministry status. Additionally, legislation in the next five or so years may reinforce the procedural and operational effectiveness of the Japanese intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting systems.

Some of the policy changes passed the Diet in June 2003. However, lingering concerns about protection of human and property rights, unwillingness to include acts of terror and spy ship incursions in the purview of such contingency legislation, and demands for Diet retention of control in military operations demonstrate the continued uneasiness of the national security debate in Tokyo. Within a year, the Diet will likely debate legislation on specific coordination between the SDF and US Forces Japan during the military crises envisaged by *yuji hosei* (contingency legislation.)¹ The Cabinet will also likely present a bill in 2003-2004 aimed at

establishing a permanent authority for Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations.² Unification of the command structure of the SDF, through the creation of a Joints Chiefs of Staff by the end of fiscal year 2005, will enhance the coordination of SDF operations.³ Other changes, such as the use of the SDF in combat roles as part of a United Nations' flagged operation, possible revision of the Constitution, or even acquisition of nuclear weapons⁴ remain many years away since until recently there has been no discussion—let alone debate—on such taboo topics.

Some of the new military capabilities to be added will likely be made public in the new National Defense Program Outline and revised Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan originally due out in 2004 but now delayed for a year or two following the dramatic changes in the *Defense of Japan White Paper* approved in August 2003. In the next five years, the SDF will continue to gain significant capabilities for action beyond the narrow confines of the home islands. Boeing is already under contract for four B-767 refueling aircraft that will extend the range of those F-15 and F-2 aircraft already on hand and being built.⁵ The procurement of at least two more Aegis warships has begun, the design and procurement request for the new aircraft carrier (*16DDH*) is underway, and the ASDF is stepping up the design and manufacture of the next generation of long-range transport aircraft. Two more *Osumi* class helicopter carriers (called “Landing Ship Tank” for political reasons) will join the two already in the fleet.⁶ Importantly, as previously stated, joint production and fielding of ballistic missile defenses, in all likelihood, will pick up in pace. The PAC-2 GEM upgrade for the Patriot missile system fielding began in summer 2003, and the Japanese have decided to build and field PAC-3 interceptors in 2005 if not sooner.⁷ In a move already creating considerable stir in surrounding countries, the JDA announced the plan for Japan to rapidly procure independent strike capability, in the form of cruise missiles or precision air-to-surface munitions (JDAM) to further deter the North Koreans. This move has considerable support in the Diet.⁸ These are just some of the capabilities likely to enhance Japan's military options and force projection capabilities in the near future.

In summary, the liberation of security policy (in terms of expanded missions and geographical limits placed on the exercise of Japanese troops and assets) will continue to grow slowly but inexorably in the coming decade. The irony is that the pace of change will likely be frighteningly fast for many Japanese (and Chinese), but frustratingly slow for American security specialists. Unless a dramatic event or situation brings a significantly heightened sense of imminent insecurity to the majority of Japanese, steady and incremental loosening of the restrictive nature of security policy will be the rule. As these changes occur, as its society and politicians debate how best to close the gap between what role Japan *should* play and what role *can* it play, and as Japan becomes more capable of taking an active role in the security environment outside its territorial possessions, the pressure will increase to modify the basic relationships within the US-Japan security alliance.⁹

Impact on the US-Japan security alliance

The coming changes in Japanese security policy and desire for a more active voice in foreign policy will increasingly demand substantial changes in the structural balance of the security alliance between the United States and Japan. The US will no longer be able to dominate the security agenda developed between the two nations. However, both nations must take steps

out of their traditional comfort zones to accommodate the new partnership. It is definitely not in either country's interest to lose the other as a security partner; however, the character of that partnership and the two countries' respective roles within it will probably change over the next ten to twenty years. If, for various reasons, the alliance character and roles do not substantively change, then both the United States and Japan will likely hedge and find alternative means to supplement their security interests.

Understanding the Security Alliance

Now is a good time to try and answer a basic question (a question whose answer is, however, often mischaracterized by the public in both countries). What is the current configuration of the US-Japan Security Alliance? The pact was first signed in San Francisco in 1951, significantly revised in 1960, and subsequently enhanced with implementation measures most recently in 1997 with the Revised Guidelines. The terms of the alliance basically require the United States to defend Japan, if it were to be attacked, and for Japan to provide bases and logistical support to the United States for both that purpose and for American efforts to provide peace and security in East Asia.¹⁰ Fundamental to the challenges facing alliance managers are the different national priorities on the two main articles of the pact. The Japanese have always prioritized Article 5 (the defense of Japan) while the Americans—especially since the evaporation of the threat of Soviet invasion—put more emphasis on Article 6 (security in the areas surrounding Japan). Although the vagueness of the pact has served the interests of both countries for decades for different reasons, the operational shortfalls in this minimalist structure have been well publicized and increasingly may, in the new threat environment, prove a hindrance to the effective protection of both countries' national interests.

The security pact itself is minimalist in nature. Legally, the alliance consists primarily of the 1960 Treaty, the 1997 update to the guidelines for the implementation of the treaty, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and the recently added Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement with amendments.¹¹ Geographically, the treaty is highly constrained. Although the 1997 Revised Guidelines expanded the geographical envelope of the treaty to include "situations in areas surrounding Japan," the actual limits of that area are vague, particularly after the Diet in 1999 modified the wording to commit Japan to "situations in which the peace and safety of Japan are gravely threatened."¹² Finally, in operational terms, the treaty is not as "combat ready" as is seen in the combined nature of the actual warfighting headquarters in Korea or the exceedingly tight intelligence cooperation between the United States and Britain. However, a comprehensive plan for Japanese logistics and infrastructure support to the United States in a conflict in Northeast Asia, down to the details of ramp space for American aircraft on Japanese airstrips, for example, was completed in 2002, but has yet to be publicly announced.¹³ Although steps such as this comprehensive support planning have begun, the alliance remains purposefully vague and asymmetrical.

Surprisingly (given that the US and Japan are two of the most technologically advanced nations in the world), one of the most difficult challenges the alliance faces is in the intelligence coordination necessary to respond quickly and to fight an attacker effectively. The Japanese face continued challenges in the legal protection of classified information,¹⁴ in the internal coordination and analysis of intelligence data, and in the means, especially from space, to collect timely data. The ban on collective self-defense also seriously hinders the sharing of defense intelligence between the US and Japan. Although the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO) is designed to be the hub for intelligence processing for the Prime Minister, the

data and analysis links into that body from the intelligence services in the various ministries are guarded and inconsistent. Interagency intelligence cooperation is still in a nascent stage in Japan. Further, the intelligence community in Japan is not practiced at recognizing who needs what intelligence as it comes in to various intelligence branches. The links to higher coordinating bodies such as CIRO, to lateral agencies in other ministries, or down to the operational level on the ground are not well institutionalized or practiced.¹⁵ Compounding these institutional challenges is a shortage of hardware connectivity and restrictive intelligence sharing norms that prevent the kind of intelligence partnership found between the U.S and Britain.¹⁶ Although improving post September 11th, tight intelligence sharing between the two countries (although most effective between the Defense Intelligence Agency and the JDA) has been the exception rather than the rule.¹⁷

In short, the alliance commits the United States to defend Japan, but does not initially allow for tightly coordinated conduct of that defense. Bilateral operations centers exist in each service branch, and are exercised annually, but are not immediately ready to coordinate the defense against a surprise attack. Likewise, the alliance does not commit the Japanese to actively support the United States in conflicts, in which America might find herself in East Asia, that fall outside the “defense of Japan” or the gray region of “situations in the areas surrounding Japan,” even if those actions directly affect Japanese interests. However, most agree that Japan would likely do so unless its interests were diametrically opposed to those of the United States. Finally, as stated above, the limited intelligence cooperation between the two countries and the way in which intelligence is processed within Japan detracts from the alliance’s effectiveness. If the alliance is to remain viable, these shortfalls will need to be addressed in coming years.

The joint research on ballistic missile defense (BMD), for example, will have a tremendous impact on the character of the alliance if such a system is fielded by both countries in Japan or in the neighboring seas. Provided that the Japanese and American components of such a fielded system are integrated (as they would have to be since Japan will have no satellite detection capability for over a decade, if ever) the operational deployment of BMD by default is an exercise in collective defense—a relationship which is currently interpreted as prohibited by the Constitution. The command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) systems that link detection assets to control centers to firing batteries would have to be able to detect and assess an enemy missile launch within seconds and automatically choose the appropriate interceptor platform for firing. Such rapid information sharing and decision making must be built into the C4I and firing systems, thereby forcing a policy changes on collective defense and initiation of combat operations before the system could be fielded. Professor Masahiro Matsumura correctly notes that “how a Theater Missile Defense command is architected will shape the power structure of US-Japan military relations.”¹⁸ Japan likely will attempt to minimize the combined nature of BMD through the construction of an autonomous system utilizing land and sea-based radars for acquisition of launches, but until Japan can field reliable launch detection satellites, it must rely on American systems and thus face the collective defense question. Like BMD, the coordination necessary for successful execution of non-combatant evacuation operations—especially from Korea—can only result from significant stretching (if not revision) of Japanese security policies.

Short- and long-term impacts of Japanese security policy change

Japan's strengthening of the military pillar of the comprehensive security triad that, in all likelihood, it will continue to favor, does not mean that Japan has decided to be a "normal" nation in the Western sense of the word. Japan will maintain its predilection for peaceful, humanist, and multilateral solutions to regional and global challenges. It simply will have additional means at its disposal through which to pursue its interests and the desire to have more say in the agenda for resolving international problems. Greater capacity for Japanese military action will probably be matched by greater assertiveness on the part of Japan in pressing for multinational and peaceful conflict resolution strategies worldwide. Japan's recent attempts to mediate the Aceh conflict in Sumatra and Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflect this desire.

As Japan liberates its defense policy and loosens the restrictions on the SDF's ability to conduct joint intelligence and military operations with American forces, the impact will be felt nearly immediately—both within the circles of those managing the alliance and in the East Asian region. In the near term, the increased flexibility and authority of the SDF will make for a stronger alliance and one not to be underestimated by potential regional opponents. A renewed sense of purpose and cooperation between the militaries of both countries will be pervasive and will likely result in a strong upsurge in the quality and integration of joint military exercises. Therefore, the deterrent value of the alliance will be markedly greater. Likewise, these legal changes—especially the recognition of Japan's right to exercise collective defense—will make the alliance markedly more capable of coordinated and timely combined action in a crisis. The Bilateral Coordination Center, created in name by the 1997 Revised Guidelines, will likely play a much more important and institutionalized role in the management of the alliance. Finally, the cooperative efforts between the services of the SDF and the US military—long eager to push the boundaries of legal restraint—will flourish in terms of coordinated operational and training activities in the region.

However, unless the alliance changes to make the strategic decision making more symmetric, the Japanese role more active, policy announcements more coordinated, the legal jurisdiction components of the SOFA less publicly offensive, and the basing of US troops and capabilities in Japan less burdensome, however, the long-term health and centrality of the alliance could be in jeopardy. As Japan slowly achieves a renewed sense of international responsibility and capability, it will increasingly see the current asymmetry of the alliance as a hindrance to its own foreign policy objectives and its stature as a major sovereign power. Yoshinori Suematsu, a *Minshuto* member of the Diet, stated that the "United States is always trying to control Japan and this is a frustration for the Japanese."¹⁹

The perception of American unilateralism (heightened by the war on terrorism and rogue states which has followed September 11th), serves to aggravate the lack of comfort many Japanese have in being the junior partner of the United States.²⁰ The *Asahi Shimbun*, citing opinion polls showing 78% opposition to a war in Iraq in February 2003, declared that "voters are clearly opposed to [government actions] that merely follow the US line."²¹ "The US is too focused on its own interests," states Katsuei Hirasawa (LDP Diet member). "It acts unilaterally and then is always asking other countries to follow its lead."²² Pointedly recognizing these concerns, a March 2003 Tokyo TV-Asahi poll found that 70% of the respondents thought that the Bush

Administration's strategy of preemption of threats either was "arrogant" or "would destabilize the world."²³ Former Ambassador to the United States, Yoshio Okawara notes that, in the eyes of the Japanese public, the continuing viability of the alliance requires a greater Japanese voice in important policy decisions made by the United States in the region.²⁴

In an interesting argument in favor of increased autonomous security capability, the secretary general of the DPJ, Katsuya Okada, argued that if Japan had a stronger self-defense capability, it would not have to support the United States in future wars in which the Japanese people are opposed.²⁵ Okada argues that Japan was forced to support the US in the Iraqi War in 2003 because it had no credible autonomous capability against the possibility of a North Korean missile attack. His statements echo the results of public opinion polls that show the United States ranking second in the list of countries most likely countries to embroil Japan in a war.²⁶

A public opinion poll taken by *Kyodo News* in late March 2003, as the United States and Britain moved in on Saddam's regime in Iraq, found most Japanese looking toward the United Nations, rather than the United States, for Japan's future. Of the respondents, 61.7% thought that Japan should place priority on the UN, while only 30.4% declared that the alliance with the United States should come first.²⁷

Thus, Tokyo's passivity of the past, in regard to policy issues on which the United States has taken a firm stance, may not continue to be seen as always advancing Japanese vital interests. *Minshuto* Secretary General Katsuya Okada recently lamented that "Japan is more like a vassal than an ally of the United States."²⁸ Prime Minister Koizumi's decision to directly engage North Korea in September 2002, without prior consultation with the United States, is indicative of Japan making its own evaluations of foreign policy and national interest.²⁹ The outspoken Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, criticized the Japanese people recently for relying on the United States to defend Japan. "A country that fails to decide its own fate will eventually collapse."³⁰ This resurgence of desire to start taking a more active stance in pursuing Japan's own interests was echoed by Katsuei Hirasawa who said that the long-term health of the alliance "depends on whether or not the US supports Japan on policies important to Japan or whether it continues to focus unilaterally on American interests."³¹ Among the younger Japanese politicians especially, there is a growing sense of need for Japan to strategically pursue its own interests.

The indigenous surveillance satellite program offers a salient example of this increasing desire to pursue self-interest and achieve limited security autonomy. For years, the Japanese have relied on satellite imagery obtained from the United States or purchased in Europe from commercial vendors. At times, the Japanese have chafed at the delays and lack of availability of desired imagery. General Tetsuya Nishimoto, former head of the Joint Staff Council, lamented that "around 1993 and 1994, Japan could not obtain spy satellite information or any direct information from the US concerning nuclear facilities in North Korea." The *Yomiuri Shimbun* reported that, in fall 2001, the United States bought up all of the commercially available imagery of the Middle East necessary to keep troop and ship movements toward Afghanistan a secret from other nations. Japan was unable to obtain images of areas in which it had interest at that time.³² Following what some Japanese perceived as an intelligence failure, on the part of the United States, to give timely warnings of the August 1998 *Taepodong I* missile firing (but many now recognize as a Japanese bureaucratic failing combined with commercial pressure from Japanese electronics firms), Japan quickly decided to develop its own satellite capability.³³

From the Japanese point of view, the perceived lack of trust by the United States toward Japan continued. Over the next year, the US attempted to convince Japan to buy American satellites with better capabilities than the first four indigenous satellites Japan that decided to develop and launch, but would not relinquish full control of the satellite's ability to take pictures of certain areas. Japan chose to build satellites with inferior image resolution capability in order to maintain unhindered control of the collection of needed data (and in order to service domestic industrial needs) and launched one set of optical and radar imaging satellites in 2003.³⁴

On the grand scale, the confluence of vital interests between the two nations will keep the alliance alive, but the pressure for power sharing and for the accommodation of both countries' interests will be intense. Shinzo Abe, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for the Koizumi Government and Secretary General of the LDP, noted, "The US-Japan alliance is necessary for our security. But, the defense relationship between our countries should be complementary and not dependent."³⁵ In the long run (that is 15-30 years from now) only a more mature partnership between regional equals will be able to reap the benefits of the growing assertiveness and independence of Japanese foreign policy.³⁶

American Interests and Options

The United States' national interests in Asia

Due to the coming security policy changes in Japan and the increased desire for international voice that those changes will bring, the United States is faced with the challenge of how best to retain influence in Asia, prevent the rise of a revisionist superpower, and achieve its national interests in this vital region in the coming decades. American national interests are tied inextricably to East Asia, and this tie is likely to increase in coming decades. Figure 7 presents the national interests as outlined in the *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review*.

US National Interests:

- Ensuring US security and freedom of action
 - U.S. sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom
 - Safety of U.S. citizens at home and abroad
 - Protection of critical U.S. infrastructure
- Honoring international commitments
 - Security and well-being of allies and friends
 - Precluding hostile domination of critical regions
 - Peace and stability in the Western Hemisphere
- Contributing to economic well-being
 - Vitality and productivity of the global economy
 - Security of international lines of communication
 - Access to key markets and strategic resources

Figure 7 American interests

In East Asia, the US Government has further refined these national interests into five primary objectives.¹ These are: (1) enhancing regional relationships, (2) promoting democracy, (3) preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (4) leading a comprehensive security effort, and (5) maintaining American forward engagement in the region. Although scholars such as Robyn Lim may state that defending Japan is not a vital interest of the United States,² the pursuit of the interests and objectives listed above, in the current geo-strategic environment of East Asia, demand that the Japan remain secure and the United States maintain its bases there. Isolationism is definitely not a method for achieving these interests; however, is the current bilateral web of alliances with the United States as the dominant partner in each the optimal way to advance American interests in the long run? Could a substantive shift to multilateralism in East Asian security affairs be a better option for the US?

Why not multilateralism?

As recently noted by scholars like Philip Zelikow and Stephen Walt, the United States by necessity must rely on multilateralism to get anything of substance done in the world.³ However, the cooperation currently favored by the US is far less institutionalized than that favored most other advanced nations. A prominent option discussed today for keeping the peace is the creation of a multilateral, cooperative security regime in East Asia.⁴ While popular with many Asian academics and Western liberal institutionalists, such security cooperation and collective action is beyond the current reach of Asian nations. Henry Kissinger notes that “Wilsonianism has few disciples in Asia . . . There is no pretense of collective security, . . . the emphasis is all on equilibrium and national interest.”⁵ A brief look at the reasons why a collective security regime is not a viable option for the United States or Japan reinforces Kissinger’s pessimism.

There are four primary reasons why the United States should not be enthusiastic about multilateral, collective security as the primary policy option in Northeast Asia. First, the region has no history of such practices. On the contrary, its history, for most of the past two millennia, has been one of subordination to cultural, economic, and political (though rarely military) influence of the Middle Kingdom in China.⁶ In more modern times, Amitav Acharya notes that the extreme diversity of the region, combined with the geopolitical situation following WWII, has prevented the establishment of effective multilateral regimes in Asia as compared to Europe.⁷ Second, a collective security arrangement requires a baseline of consensus and the shelving of standing disputes among its members as entry into the forum. Michael Armacost notes that “the prerequisites for collective security—a common perception of threats, general agreement about the territorial status quo, and a sense of community underpinned by widely accepted political and philosophical principles—have not taken root in Asia.”⁸ For both domestic and future energy policy reasons, it is not likely for territorial disputes such as those in the Senkakus, Northern Islands (Southern Kuriles), Takeshima, the Paracels, and the Spratlys to be put aside so readily.⁹

Third, a cooperative security regime requires a sanction capability that is widely perceived as legitimate to punish transgressions. Since a multilateral regime that did not include China would likely create a security dilemma for Beijing and thus lead to an arms spiral that would be highly counter-productive, the inclusion of China would exacerbate the problems of sanctioning behavior seen by the United States and Japan as illegal. This same tendency is seen on a lesser scale in the current security forum of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF is hamstrung by the “ASEAN way,” which involves pervasive norms of non-confrontation, consensus, and respect for each other’s sovereignty.¹⁰ Finally, the United States, especially

under the G.W. Bush administration, is wary of multilateral security arrangements that could become institutionalized in coming years and reduce American policy options in Asia.¹¹ In summary, reducing the salience of the US-Japan alliance in favor of a multilateral cooperative security arrangement is not a viable near-term option for the United States.

Nonetheless, multilateralism must continue to play a major (although not primary) role in American policy toward East Asia. The United States should pursue multilateral regimes as mechanisms to help ease tensions through confidence-building measures, further integrate economies, prevent proliferation of weapons and missiles, and facilitate the peaceful entry of China into the community of democratic and prosperous nations. Such regimes have considerable merit in a number of areas for advancing many American interests. Not least of all, Japan remains a stronger proponent of multilateralism than does the US, as seen in the building of ARF and the Koizumi initiative toward stronger economic integration in Southeast and East Asia, presented in Singapore in January 2002. The tripartite declaration in Bali in October 2003 in which Japan, China, and South Korea committed to the peaceful resolution of the DPRK nuclear crisis also reflects this bias toward multilateralism. However, in East Asia in particular, such institutions do not have the deterrent value necessary to maintain the peace. Even more so than the alliance with the Republic of Korea, the alliance between the United States and Japan represents the single best course for maintaining American interests in the Pacific. Given the coming changes in Japanese security policy, the US must stay the course with Japan and decide how best to make the alliance work.

American options in the alliance

With regard to the alliance, America has three real options in the years ahead. The first option is to strive to maintain the current asymmetrical power structure with Japan for as long as possible by purposely maintaining Japanese dependencies and begrudgingly compromising on peripheral issues to protect the core relationship. The second option is to rapidly cede substantive power to Japan, most likely through a dramatic reduction in forward based military capabilities, transform the alliance into a balanced partnership in the near term (5-10 years) before any Asian neighbor has the power or presence to prevent such a change, and build alternative basing options in the Western Pacific. Sharing power can be defined as a combination of greater accommodation on policy objectives and means, more frequent and substantive consultation, and achieving greater balance in military roles and missions within the alliance. The third option is the middle road and, therefore, the one most likely to be followed. Here, the United States, in consultation with Japan, would slowly change the character of the relationship to reduce asymmetries as Japanese security policy changes and diplomatic power increases, while simultaneously, but carefully, exploring alternative basing options.

The first option may favor American interests in the short run, but, in the long run, the status quo will likely prove too brittle and would eventually collapse, given the trends in Japanese security policy change and its increasing sense of self-interest. The second option is too abrupt and would cause as many problems as it would solve, especially given the dynamics and memories of East Asian nations and the current uncertainties in the region. Although American power projection advocates, emboldened by the initial military success of *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, may support this aggressive restructuring in the alliance, grand political strategy supports continued engagement and forward positioning of forces in the region. The third option

matches the incrementalism of Japanese policy change with alliance change, eventually reaching the same outcome of the second option while hedging for the future. This option appears, on the surface, to be the way of prudence, but why should America choose to follow such a course of divesting substantive power to an ally?

History teaches that hegemonic states do not retain such overwhelming power forever. As the United States focuses on democratization, free trade, security, and human rights, the provision of such collective goods worldwide will increasingly take a toll on America's material, human, and psychological resources. Free riders (willing to enjoy the benefits of such a system, but unwilling to pay their share for its maintenance) abound among rational nations; as a result the costs to America of maintaining these transnational goods will eventually become prohibitive.¹² The need for allies to continue the consolidation of peace and the rebuilding of Afghanistan and Iraq are but two current examples of the limits to American resources in the far corners of the world. Additionally, the negative perceptions of hegemony foster anti-American sentiment which tends to compound these problems—a specter that is increasingly vivid in Iraq. The concern for the United States becomes one of determining how best to maintain its influence worldwide and ensure the rooting of its values for the long run.

In the American interest

Focusing narrowly on East Asia, for a number of reasons it is in the best interests of the United States to share power with Japan in a well defined security partnership. First, the United States will find a growing objectives—means shortfall in the future pursuit of national security interests. The US may increasingly find that it does not have the resources to maintain a dominant hegemonic position worldwide and will need to find like-minded partners to maintain its interests in various regions and share the burdens of maintaining peace.

Second, sharing power with Japan in exchange for long-term basing guarantees maintains the American presence in Northeast Asia—all the more important since the election of President Roh and the resulting uncertainties about American force structure and bases on the Korean peninsula. Already, concrete plans are being made to move American troops further south in Korea, or even to bring some of them home.¹³ These bases in Japan (especially ports for the Seventh Fleet and airfields for PACAF fighter and transport wings) are critical to the continued forward presence of the US in East Asia.

Third, it is vital to maintain bilateral Japanese allegiance to the United States. As of 2002, China surpassed the US as the largest importer of goods into Japan, at over 18% of the import market into Japan. Likewise, Japanese exports to China grew 32% from 2001, a harbinger of the growing importance of this bilateral economic relationship.¹⁴ As Japanese energy needs increase in the future, the potential for oil, coal, and natural gas imports from China will demand policy accommodation. Some have argued that Japan may tire of the alliance asymmetry, recognize the markets of China, and hedge strategically by seeking a multilateral comprehensive security structure that includes China to supplement the purely defensive guarantees of the existing alliance.¹⁵ Although it is not in the Japanese interest to bandwagon with China, such a multilateral institution would likely become dominated by the Middle Kingdom and thus reduce American influence in the region.

Next, an enhanced relationship within the alliance may allay some of the Japanese fears of insecurity that may lead to a decision to “go nuclear.” Although the vast majority of Japanese citizens oppose the introduction of nuclear weapons to Japan, the topic is increasingly broached in the press and academic circles due to nuclear uncertainties in North Korea. The past four

years have seen considerable change in the ability to discuss nuclear weapons. In October 1999, then Vice Minister of State for Defense Shingo Nishimura was forced to resign after suggesting in an interview that Japan should scrap its ban on nuclear weapons. Contrast this with the relatively benign February 2003 publishing by *Asahi Shimbun* of a previously classified 1995 Defense Agency study on nuclear feasibility.¹⁶ This highlights the increasing demise of the taboo on debates on nuclear weapons and the dependence on the American nuclear umbrella. The best way for the United States to maintain Japan as a non-nuclear power is to remain firmly engaged with Japan in the region and jointly enforce non-proliferation regimes so that Japan is not faced with a security dilemma seemingly solved only by a resort to nuclear weapons.

Finally, an enhanced partnership with Japan provides the United States with the most effective means to simultaneously balance and engage China. Although great care and transparency during the transformation of the alliance would be required to prevent an overtly hostile posture toward China, such a partnership would provide the deterrent and incentives necessary to shape Chinese entrance into the superpower ranks in the most favorable and responsible manner.

Impact of alliance change in Northeast Asia

As is apparent from the above discussion, it is vital to consider the reactions of China (and to a lesser extent that of the Koreas and Russia) to a more balanced Japanese-American alliance. In an outstanding study of the power politics of the last 160 years of Northeast Asian history, Robyn Lim points out the highly interconnected nature of the “great game” in the region.¹⁷ Although Japan has developed extremely wide economic ties within the region, especially in China and South Korea, considerable distrust toward Japanese motives still exists. If the alliance is to strengthen, mitigation of the reactions in these countries to a larger Japanese role must be a primary focus of diplomacy. Actions to broaden and deepen nascent security communities in East Asia must be pursued hand-in-hand with the deepening of the alliance.

In particular, China, for a number of reasons (both historical and political) is deeply wary of an enhanced role of Japan in a military alliance with the United States.¹⁸ Not the least of these reasons concern the potential role of the alliance in the resolution of the Taiwan situation. The geographical ambiguity of the Revised Guidelines (whether or not Taiwan falls within the “Areas Surrounding Japan”) already provokes Chinese ire. A revitalized alliance poses a perceived security threat to China and, unless managed very carefully and openly, might force that nation into a new cold war of confrontation in Asia.¹⁹ Fears about the decreased utility of its strategic missiles, if theater missile defense systems come online, fears about increased support to Taiwan independence, and fears about the strangulation of sea lines of communication at a time when energy needs are multiplying could drive China to actively counter the alliance. The Japanese public is increasingly suspicious of China as well, and this may lead to a more confrontational posture. An August 2002 poll by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* found that over 55% of respondents distrusted China, over twice the number who felt the same in 1988.²⁰

The trends in Chinese relations with both the United States and Japan are certainly not uni-directional. Bilateral trade relations with China, for both Japan and the US are increasingly strong. Sino-Japanese trade in particular is skyrocketing- up 33.6% in the first six months of 2003 over the same period in 2002.²¹ Similarly, both US-Chinese relations, as highlighted by President Bush’s speech in Australia in October 2003²², and Sino-Japanese relations, following the Koizumi-Hu talks in Bali, appear to be on the upswing. On the other hand, Japanese entreaties toward Russian energy supplies, growing competition for leadership and

trade relations in Southeast Asia, and concerns over ballistic missile defenses and arms races signal potential confrontational trends. Exceedingly careful management of alliance change must be matched with comprehensive engagement of China to mitigate these suspicions and emphasize the mutual gains.

In a similar vein, fears among Koreans of Japanese “remilitarization” cannot be simply dismissed. Considerable care must be given to alliance modifications, given the uncertainties surrounding the pursuit of nuclear weapons by DPRK, the impact of reunification on the status of American forces on the peninsula, and whether a reunified Korea will return to the historical pattern of paying tribute to China.²³ Notwithstanding the vibrant level of Korean economic interdependence with Japan, the Koreans have long memories of prior Japanese colonization of the peninsula and harbor strong fears about the Japanese. A trip to the Korean war museum in Yongsan will testify to this visceral remembrance of the past Japanese conquests of the Korean homeland. Given these uncertainties, an incremental and transparent approach to alliance balance with Japan, if married to bilateral or even multilateral engagement with Korea, is a prudent hedge for both the United States and Japan.

Both China and, to a lesser extent, the two Koreas have been vocal in recent years in denouncing what they see as a Japanese rush to militarize. A look at security budget statistics in Japan shows that such fears are not grounded. The budget submission for 2003 includes only a ¥56 billion (\$470 million) increase over that of 1997. This 1% growth over six years pales when compared to the last decade of double digit annual increases in Chinese military expenditures. China’s openly stated military budget is expected to grow between 9 and 17% annually between 2001 and 2005. It rose 17.6% in 2002, but Beijing does not reveal anywhere near all of its defense expenditures in the published budget.²⁴ South Korean military expenditures have risen sharply in the last decade, though not on the scale of the Chinese. In 1991, the ROK defense budget was US\$5.37 billion and rose to US\$10.44 billion in 1998, a 94% increase.²⁵ Due to concerns about potential American withdrawals from the DMZ, the South Koreans are contemplating an even more significant military buildup, in the near term reflecting an increase to about 3% of GDP in the defense budget.²⁶ Regardless of the budgetary facts, the fears of a remilitarized Japan continue to resonate in China and Korea and must be mitigated carefully as the alliance deepens.

Finally, Russia seems determined, under President Putin, to regain influence in the Far East, but he is playing from a fairly weak hand. Putin’s strongest cards are arms, energy resources, and history of balancing behavior across the Eurasian continent.²⁷ Although for the next twenty years, the Russian response to the alliance poses the least concern to the United States in regard to the major players in Northeast Asia, care must be taken to assuage the fears of this proud country. Russian remains a veto-capable member of the UNSC, with many ongoing international initiatives. Regardless of its participation in the “Shanghai Five”, vastly increased Sino-Russian security cooperation is not likely, given Russia’s strong desire to be accepted in European circles. However, increasingly important energy and trade cooperation between the two—as well as a shared desire to oppose American hegemony—could be used by China to leverage Russian acquiescence (or at least silence) on important regional matters. Similarly, the potential for increased Russian energy cooperation with Japan will play a significant role in Japanese strategic policymaking decisions and could cause some hedging behavior on the part of Tokyo.

The bottom line is that none of the major players in continental Northeast Asia is eager for an increased Japanese military role in the alliance and all have some amount of leverage over Japanese policy. Much of the distrust is historical and can be eased through openness, American guarantees of continued engagement in East Asia, and substantive interaction in this and other issue areas. The use of multilateral institutions is the ideal vehicle to temper regional fears of a greater Japanese military role.

Optimizing the alliance for the future

It appears clear that Japan will continue to slowly and incrementally loosen the restrictions on the use of military force and the ability to participate in collective and cooperative defense schemes. Due to the changing security environment and the resulting mismatch between the threats of that environment and Japan's capabilities to respond, the domestic resistance to change in security policy is slowly eroding. Such liberation of policy is in Japan's long-term self interest, as it seeks to shape the world around itself in ways that enable peace and prosperity to flourish. Finding that economic and diplomatic tools alone are not sufficient for the task of achieving its national interests, the Japanese are slowly emerging from nearly 60 years of military isolation and are incrementally gaining more of a balance in their foreign policy mechanisms.

It is vital to note that Japan, while increasing its capability to participate in more traditional military exercise of power, is not wholeheartedly transitioning into a *realpolitik*, balance of power nation. Rather, Japan is choosing to become more assertive as a means to bring about its own conception of "civilian power" (application of predominately non-military national means) and strong desire for harmonious, community-based relations between nations. Interestingly, the Japanese support for the United States in the showdown on Iraq in early 2003 in the U.N. Security Council was motivated as much by support to an ally (in return for continued protection from DPRK) as it was by a desire to prevent a fatal rift from destroying that highly valued institution.²⁸

In the near future, the Japanese do not have a viable security alternative to the alliance with the United States. With the distinct threat of North Korea and the future uncertainties of China and a potentially unified Korean Peninsula, Japan continues to need the alliance. In general, however, the Japanese people increasingly dislike the unilateralism and penchant for the use of military force that they see in the United States. Therefore, to many, being the junior partner in an alliance with the US (especially as currently configured) is not part of the ideal, long-term future of Japan. This point is vital—the alliance with the Americans is a *means* to security for the Japanese, not an *end* desired in and of itself.

In order to maintain the strength of the alliance, it is exceedingly important that both countries recognize and act on this increased Japanese desire and capacity for bilateral and international voice. The United States eventually will have to share power with the Japanese, who will, in turn, need to embrace a more active, risk-taking role or hazard a brittle failure of the increasingly artificial asymmetries of the alliance. However, these changes in capability and structure, both in Japan and within the alliance, will have a secondary impact on the Chinese and Koreans that must be mitigated through forthright, transparent, and confidence-building measures taken by the Japanese and American governments. It is in this important, but secondary, role that multilateral diplomatic, economic, social, and military institutions have their place in both countries' foreign policies. The primary mechanism for long-term achievement of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia will be an enhanced and deepened US-Japan security alliance.

The road ahead for the United States in the alliance

As Japan's security policy changes and becomes more ready to assume a larger role in determining the course of international relations in East Asia, the alliance will need to be modified--both to accommodate the Japanese and to leverage their increased contributions to regional security. It is not likely that formal modifications to the Mutual Security Treaty can be (or will need to be) negotiated and ratified.²⁹ Rather, change in the alliance will likely come through modifications to administrative agreements (such as the SOFA), change in the scope of participation of Japanese forces (following passage of new security legislation), or simply changes in the way alliance business is conducted.

Over the next decade, the United States should continue to develop and field ballistic missile defenses in Northeast Asia, even though it may have to pay the bulk of the cost. Not only is this the best way to protect its forces and allies in the region, but it also provides a powerful vehicle by which the Japanese can overcome many of the most stubborn domestic impediments to an enhanced international security role. The good thing is that the Japanese want protection from ballistic missiles as well. The inherently integrated features of such a system necessitate collective defense, enhanced crisis management capabilities, and vastly deepened bilateral military relations. BMD fielding might be the ultimate exercise of *gaiatsu* that the U.S. has pressed on Japan and, if North Korea continues on its current path, one of the more successful. The combination of the North Korean nuclear threat and the success of the improved Patriot (PAC-3) as a terminal phase defense system in *Operation Iraqi Freedom* will greatly enhance the ability of Japan to sell their fearful, but dubious, public on the merits of such systems.

Other changes that the United States should make in the alliance over the next ten to fifteen years can be categorized under the following three objectives: increased military effectiveness, increased policy partnership, and decreased alliance irritations. A brief look at American options in all three areas is useful.

As discussed earlier, many of the changes in Japanese security policy are focused on improving their own military utility and ability to manage a crisis in a timely manner. Changes in American alliance policies can mirror some of these improvements. The full-time staffing, equipping, and training of bilateral coordination centers is an important step, following a closer integration of intelligence communities in both countries. Such a center is relatively useless without extensive and timely intelligence and analysis feeds. Such intelligence deepening, predicated on Japanese steps to further secure classified information and reorganize the jumble of intelligence centers of gravity, is a critical step forward for the alliance. Additionally, Pacific Command and even the Department of Defense in the Pentagon should create bilateral coordination cells that go beyond the current practice of liaison officer exchange. Although the armed services have such relationships established, they need to be institutionalized at higher commands to concretely demonstrate American commitment to a true partnership. Helping the Japanese create a state-of-the-art simulations center in Japan would benefit the alliance by increasing the capability of SDF commanders and staffs, as well as providing opportunities to practice the operational command and control of joint forces in a military contingency.³⁰

The United States Department of Defense has announced a plan to review how it conceives the defense of Japan in 2003-2004, in hopes of influencing the Japanese reformulation of the National Defense Program Outline scheduled for fiscal year 2004.³¹ While this internal review of American strategy can greatly increase awareness of interoperability, intelligence sharing, and

complementarity of capability issues, the United States must be keenly attuned to the sensitivities inherent in such a review of wary Japanese domestic opinion. If handled without overtones of *gaiatsu* (pressure), this may be an outstanding opportunity for the US to deepen the partnership with the Japanese and explore increased roles and mission opportunities for Japan.

This sense of partnership should continue to be enhanced in policy circles as well as military ones. Surprising each other with diplomatic initiatives should not happen if both allies share multi-level forums for frequent and substantive strategy formulation and review. The August 2002 visit of US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to Tokyo for comprehensive strategy talks with Vice Foreign Minister Yukio Takeuchi is hoped to be the first in a tradition of such exchanges. Similarly, the stops in Tokyo by President George Bush in October 2003 and by Secretary of State Colin Powell in February 2003, before each headed into Asia for other talks, reaffirmed the importance of the US-Japan relationship. US leaders and envoys to East Asia should continue to make it a practice to stop in Tokyo during important trips to the region. The symbolic value alone of such gestures is difficult to overestimate.³² Likewise, both governments need to be more active in educating the public about the value of the relationship.³³ It is too easy for politicians to focus on irritants for short-run political gain, instead of the long-term strategic benefits of the alliance to both countries' interests.

Strengthening the alliance will require this heightened sense of policy coordination and accommodation—all the more so because of the widespread public sense that the Bush Administration tends toward unilateralism. Armitage, in his confirmation hearings in the Senate in March 2001, spoke clearly of the long-term need to take into account the interests of Japan and other key allies. “Close and constant consultation with allies is not optional. It is the precondition for sustaining American leadership. . . . To the extent that our behavior reflects arrogance and heightened sense of position, our claim to leadership will become, in spite of our military prowess, the thinnest of pretenses.”³⁴ The joint Security Consultative Committee structure must be expanded and deepened to provide forums for substantive, bilateral strategic policy coordination.³⁵ Strategic policy discussions must be routinized and deepened on multiple levels to achieve this sense of true partnership. Two critical areas for such policy coordination should be North Korea and Taiwan.

Two examples serve to underscore the sensitivity that the United States has shown recently toward Japanese national interests. Such policy accommodation has a great impact on Japanese opinion toward the alliance. On 10 December 2001, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford publicly indicated that the United States would be willing to defend the Senkaku Islands in the event of foreign aggression.³⁶ These disputed islands northeast of Taiwan are important national claims of Japan and the US sent a “costly signal”³⁷ to China when Ford made this statement. Similarly, the United States agreed to keep bringing up the resolution of the abductee issue during North Korean dialogues in the spring of 2003. Recognition by the United States of the visceral importance of this issue in Japanese domestic opinion strongly indicates to the Japanese that the US is willing to accommodate their interests.

Furthermore, the United States, in close consultation with the government of Japan, should take proactive steps to address the primary irritants within the alliance. In this regard, a comprehensive, bilateral study of basing and training area requirements is needed. Okinawa (where 60% of the forces and 75% of the land leased by the US military in Japan is situated) will continue to be a major distraction to the alliance without some proactive and sincere study and reductions. A review of the need for all of the USMC force structure in Okinawa is important now.³⁸ Reversing the traditional character of the alliance and offering base and force reductions in exchange for increased Japanese roles and missions within the context of the alliance may

be fruitful. Likewise, a bilateral study of the Status of Forces Agreement (especially the legal jurisdiction issues) as called for in early 2003 by the governors of fourteen prefectures, may not result in changes but could show the Japanese people that the United States respects their culture and laws. Tactical irritants such as these have the capacity to hinder the public appreciation of the alliance, and thus may retard efforts by both governments to deepen the relationship.

The United States also must have the fortitude to ignore some of the political machinations of China and Korea on the history issue. As Sam Jameson notes, for domestic reasons China and both Koreas use the “history card” on occasion in order to poke at Japan.³⁹ The United States, as a steadfast partner of Japan, should not overreact to such statements from Beijing, Seoul, or Pyongyang; at the same time, however, the US should gently urge Japan to avoid unnecessary provocations.

If and when Japan takes the step of “legalizing” the existence of its army, navy, and air forces through constitutional revision or a new basic law on national defense, the United States must immediately endorse the legitimacy of such a change. As former Mansfield Fellow Mark Staples notes, the United States will need to make a high level symbolic gesture to the region to recognize the transformation of the SDF from a *de facto* to a *de jure* military.⁴⁰

Finally, as the United States undertakes these alliance measures, it also must look to widening and deepening the multilateral institutions necessary to mitigate the resultant fears of China and Korea. Current forums such as ARF and APEC may be insufficient to secure the peace but provide a baseline to advance cooperative security. Although the US-Japan Alliance will be the true shield and sword of deterrence to maintain the peace in the region, these other international forums will be necessary to build confidence, appeal to the popular affinity for multilateral endeavors, continue the process of deepening interdependencies, and prevent an escalation of tensions and security fears. They also will help to show China a way forward into superpower status in the next several decades that encourages peaceful integration and accommodation rather than paranoia and revisionism. A superb recent example is the Proliferation Security Initiative recently exercised in the Coral Sea by the Australians, Japanese, and American naval and special forces. Paradoxically, perhaps, the US-Japan alliance is served well by encouraging multinational regimes and institutions in the region.

The Japanese way forward in the alliance

Discussed previously in detail are a number of likely security policy changes in Japan that will have an impact on the alliance. Because the alliance with the United States will increasingly be a partnership, not all of the accommodation can be expected from Washington. Japan must be willing and able to do their share to maintain alliance vitality. Just as Victor Cha noted about the US alliance with South Korea, the American public (and thus Congress) is increasingly ready to reduce force presence in areas where the American commitment is not seen to be appreciated.⁴¹ As the United States offers them greater voice and power in the relationship, and works to reduce irritants in the basing of troops, the Japanese will need to find ways to channel changes in security policy, equipment procurement, and procedures so as to fully embrace this new expanded role as a true partner. Japanese leaders will require both political and moral courage, and the ability to skillfully develop and mobilize public and elite opinion in order to promote domestic acceptance of a deeper alliance with the United States.

Tokyo must continue to realize that the multi-dimensional costs of the war on terrorism and technological breakthroughs in armed conflict waged by the United States puts pressure on Japan to share burdens and risks to avoid American troop withdrawal from the region. *Operation Iraqi Freedom* demonstrated that devastatingly effective precision bombing can be launched from bases afloat or even from the continental United States. A fundamental debate about power projection versus forward positioning is gaining prominence in American policy circles. The defense transformation package that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sent to Congress in April 2003 should make decision makers in Japan and South Korea understand that the forward basing of 76,000 troops in Northeast Asia cannot be taken for granted. In the fall of 2003, the US Defense Department announced that all military units (notably 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division in Germany and 2nd Infantry Division in Korea) were available for worldwide deployment in the war on terror. This should be a strong wake-up call to those assuming the American force posture in Asia will remain for the long term. Technological breakthroughs in the conduct of warfare reinforce the notion that American security guarantees in the region need not be equated with “trip-wire” or significant conventional forces based in Japan or Korea. There is likely to be less of a premium on bases and more on “places” from which to store materials and project force when needed.⁴² Such a concept resonates well with the American public and thus with Congress. Recognition by Japan that burden-sharing is not simply a financial obligation will likely be important to continued American public support for the alliance.

For the time being, combat roles for Japanese troops outside of the defense of Japan proper are likely to remain highly restricted for political, constitutional, and regulatory reasons. Therefore, the Japanese must find ways to increase substantive contributions to the alliance in other ways, while increasing public debate on the acceptance of international responsibility and military risk.

The first of these ways falls under the realm of increased internal crisis effectiveness and have either recently passed through the Diet or are currently under policy review within the ruling LDP. Continued development of crisis management capabilities, intelligence collection means and analysis procedures, increased protection of classified information, domestic anti-terrorism measures, and consequence management capabilities will be needed. For example, the SDF Law must be amended to allow for immediate engagement of hostile missiles entering Japanese airspace instead of the current need to obtain Prime Minister authorization for the mobilization of SDF forces.⁴³ These internal measures, especially when hardware and equipment must be procured, should be designed to dovetail with American assets likely to provide information or to assist in the crisis. Intelligence and communications hardware and software connectivity is one example of this required foresight and procurement.⁴⁴

Next, the Japanese should initially concentrate on increasing its ability to provide logistical and non-combat arms support to American forces operating within alliance missions. Transport, logistics, medical support, refugee relief, search and rescue, and military theater of operations construction are prime missions in which the Japanese SDF and other ministries could take the lead and reduce the burden of the Americans. As the *2003 Defense White Paper* noted, Japan must move beyond the “beginner stage” of peacekeeping operations.⁴⁵ This is very slowly coming to pass. By May 2003, the MSDF had supplied nearly 79 million gallons of fuel to primarily American naval vessels supporting the counter-terror operation near the Persian Gulf.⁴⁶ Likewise, in September 2003 the Japanese announced both a two-year renewal of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act (which allows the refueling operation) as well as the plan to deploy Ground Self Defense Force engineers and service support troops into Iraq as early as December 2003.

Similarly, the harnessing of Japanese technological prowess could result in new generations of mine detection, non-lethal weaponry, unmanned surveillance, and other military equipment that would increase the alliance's effectiveness, while still providing an outlet for more peaceful Japanese desires. For example, Japan already has spent nearly ¥10 billion (\$83 million) on the worldwide counter-landmine effort and is currently working on advanced mine detection systems.⁴⁷ Facilitating such technology transfers, however, would require a bureaucratic loosening of the 1976 technology export policy mechanisms guarded closely by METI and the Joint Military Technology Commission.⁴⁸ Contributions in these areas could prove increasingly fruitful for Japanese industry and still advance alliance interests.

The Japanese government also will need to work domestically to broaden and deepen support for the alliance and to condition the public about the risks inherent in a larger international role. The decline in the power of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decreases its ability to dampen local political or public opposition to assorted facets of the American military presence.⁴⁹ During slow news days, these minor irritants make nationwide showings in the press and lower public sentiment toward the alliance. Politicians must continue to be proactive in promoting the values enhanced by a strong alliance with the United States. Additionally, the Japanese government will need to hold the line on host nation support and continue to make a strong case to various audiences that maintaining such expenditures, currently covering about 70% of the cost of American presence, is a necessary burden. The negotiations starting in 2004 for renewal of the agreements governing host nation support will be an important test of this resolve.⁵⁰ Faced with a public particularly averse to the human cost of conflict, Tokyo will need to proactively condition the people to accept that long-term peace and prosperity of Japan may not be risk free to those committed to its security.⁵¹ As an emerging global participant in peace resolution, Japan cannot afford to be seen as unwilling to shoulder risk. Tokyo's withdrawal of its five-person medical team from a Syrian border hospital on 31 March 2003 due to "tensions and security considerations in the region" cannot continue to be a normal government reaction to danger overseas.⁵² Changing these attitudes will require a public relations effort that is coordinated, extensive, and long-term.

Finally, as the partnership deepens, Tokyo's influence in Asia could further the common interests of the alliance. Japan is in a better position to mitigate the fears of its neighbors--through its leadership in multilateral institutions, continued transparency about its increased military role, and thoughtful recognition of historical emotions. By not intentionally inflaming passions in Korea and China, through acts of nationalist pride aimed at domestic audiences, and by leading East Asia in a number of multilateral forums, Japan could gain influence where the United States might not be so welcomed.

Former U.N. diplomat, Yasushi Akashi, recently stated that Japan can be an important bridge for the United States into Asia. "There is a gap spreading between the United States and other countries. Japan, as a US ally, can fill that gap. If Japan takes action in areas out of reach for the United States, Washington will count highly on Japan."⁵³ Having built a reputation for nuance, flexibility, and pragmatism through its ODA program and postwar interaction with Asian countries, Japan may be in a position to soften the more ideological tone of American foreign policy toward the region for the benefit of the two partners.⁵⁴ For example, Japan could help extend the joint shaping capabilities of the alliance into ASEAN. A potential example is future negotiations over non-proliferation with Iran, with which Japan still maintains diplomatic relations and Washington does not.⁵⁵ In that manner, Japan and the United States could act as a coordinated team and be successful in molding the future security environment of Asia.

Using the alliance to shape the future of East Asia

This paper began by making the assertion that the alliance can and must become more than simply a narrow defense pact if both the United States and Japan want to be successful in shaping the security future of East Asia in ways that support peace, prosperity, and the growth of democratic and human values. In the next several decades, East Asia in particular will need the stability and positive character of Japan and the United States working in close concert. There is a distinct need for positive complementarities in the relationship. This power sharing could result in an alliance well suited to handle, in a positive manner, the most important challenge of the first half of the twenty-first century—the character of the rise of China to superpower status. Tight coordination of policy and increased military capability will vastly increase the deterrence credibility of the alliance. As Diet Representative Eisei Ito noted, “The best way to deal with China is for Japan and the US to be partners in the truest sense and consult closely and frankly over policy toward that country.”⁵⁶ Working together with one voice may be the best means of engaging China in the coming decades, preventing the opening of an exploitable rift, precluding the forceful reunification of Taiwan and the mainland, and creating a path that both facilitates Chinese national interests and the peace and prosperity of the entire region.⁵⁷

North Korea and its quest for nuclear weapons represent a salient opportunity for the alliance to act in concert for the stability of Northeast Asia. No resolution of the current crisis on the Peninsula will be possible without both Japan and the United States working together within an agreed strategic framework.

In addition, the powerful American and Japanese navies can help to guarantee the maintenance of the vital sea lines of communication (SLOC) running through Southeast and East Asia.⁵⁸ About 52% of all commercial sea cargo (59% of supertankers) transit this region amid thorny and unresolved issues of territorial boundaries, intrastate governance problems, and piracy.⁵⁹ For Japan, the routes are even more important—over 85% of the oil Japan imports sails through these sea lanes.⁶⁰ Piracy in South and Southeast Asian shipping lanes remains a major hazard, especially in Indonesian waters and the Straits of Malacca.⁶¹ At present, Japan is committed to protect only SLOCs out to 1,000 miles from Osaka and Tokyo.⁶² This arc of committed sea lane protection does not even extend all the way through the vital Bashi Channel to the southern end of Taiwan and the northern entrance to the South China Sea. Increasing this Japanese maritime reach through port calls, freedom of navigation cruises into the Indian Ocean, and combined exercises should be encouraged.⁶³ Aiding in the provision of unfettered SLOCs, which benefit most of Southeast and East Asia, also may reassure Asia about the future role of the Japanese military, thus increasing Japan’s ability to comprehensively engage ASEAN.

Working in concert, the two alliance partners could expand their tight cooperation into associated security realms within the region. WMD and ballistic missile non-proliferation, cyber-terrorism, and counternarcotics are just three examples of potentially fruitful venues for increased cooperation. Ideally, the alliance would continue to deepen into a multi-dimensional force for peace and prosperity in East Asia. The Proliferation Security Initiative is hopefully a harbinger of further expansion beyond the original scope of the alliance.

Finally, the alliance can provide the continuity of peace and trust necessary for the growth of liberalism throughout the region. Success for the United States and Japan will increasingly be measured in terms of an increased community of vibrant, pacific, free-market democracies in Asia. Making the two publics aware of the idealistic benefits of the alliance will make more headway toward acceptance of a deepening partnership than simply focusing on the alliance’s

role in power politics in the region. Creating the conditions for that liberal development and tamping down the anticipated frictions that will arise along the way can best be accomplished in tandem. In the long run, it is this liberalism backed by the concerted power of the United States and Japan that will bring lasting stability to the region.

Conclusion

The United States and Japan face a tremendously important, strategic decision in the coming ten years about the security future in Northeast Asia and the changing role of the alliance. Should the alliance substantively strengthen into a more outward looking alliance, or maintain the status quo and muddle on and thus become simply one of several strategies each nation uses to ensure its security interests are met?

Several critical subordinate decisions on the part of both the United States and Japan are coming within the next decade that will indicate the direction the alliance will take. First, the Japanese must decide whether or not to accept the stationing of the nuclear powered *USS Carl Vinson* as the replacement for the *USS Kittyhawk* at Yokosuka Naval Base in the next couple of years. If the Japanese play the “nuclear card” and balk at the *Carl Vinson*, then the Seventh Fleet will be forced to find an alternative anchorage for that carrier battle group—a move that will have dramatically negative affects on the alliance. Second, the Japanese will need to decide if they will field an integrated or stand alone BMD capability. Since a ballistic missile strike on Hawaii from either North Korea or China would pass over Japan, the decision not to pursue collective defense and thus allow passage of the missile by the Japanese would end the alliance. Third, the status of basing in Okinawa, the renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement, and the renegotiation of host nation support arrangements will strongly indicate the future centrality of the alliance for both countries. Although I argue that some USMC presence in Okinawa should be withdrawn for symbolic reasons, a demand for full withdrawal of the Marines on the island would force an alternative grand Asian security plan on the United States. These future decisions are good windvanes for determining the future path of the alliance.

Although the initiative for acceptance of a larger role in the alliance lies largely with Japan, the United States has a considerable number of policy options that can enhance the alliance, allay Japanese fears, and carefully push this critical ally toward a more active role in international security—a strategy that if adroitly managed will decrease American requirements for security action in the region. Some important policy recommendations are:

- 1) Push combined ballistic missile development and fielding in a manner that requires Japan to resolve its political dilemma on collective defense without overtly practicing *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure.)
- 2) Mirror Japanese emergency legislation and increase in SDF roles with substantively increased bilateral command, control, and consultation mechanisms in Japan, US Pacific Command (PACOM) headquarters, and in the Pentagon.
- 3) Understand that Japan is in the midst of a fundamental debate on the role of the JDA in its own security and Japan’s role in the larger global stage and continue to appoint top officials and enact policies that are cognizant of the delicate nature of this debate.
- 4) Avoid perceptions of blatant security unilateralism that will markedly increase the Japanese fear of entanglement in a potential conflict outside their interests.

- 5) Continue the Bush Administration practice of frequent high level consultations with Japan so as to emphasize to both Japanese and Asian audiences the importance the United States places on the relationship.
- 6) Earnestly address Japanese concerns with the Status of Forces Agreement and make a substantive, though largely symbolic, withdrawal of some portion of the USMC presence in Okinawa. Move two infantry battalions to alternative basing sites in Asia.
- 7) If and when Japan “legalizes” its armed forces, make a highly public recognition of the legitimacy of that act for Asian audiences.
- 8) Work through or create a fabric of multilateral institutions to enhance security transparency in Asia and create opportunities for collective action on regional issues.
- 9) Hedge against a divergent path future and seek alternative basing and military access arrangements in East and Southeast Asia.

Regardless of tactical irritants that come with close contact between states on myriad levels, the long-term strategic future of both nations is best served by a vital and responsive alliance. As Secretary of State Colin Powell said at the 50th Anniversary of the signing of the alliance in September 2001, “I am firmly convinced that the US-Japan Security Treaty and our alliance will be just as critical to peace and prosperity in Asia for the next 50 years as it has been in the last 50. The diplomats who crafted both the Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty left us a lasting and valuable legacy. It is up to us to build on that legacy and work hard to keep the peace.”⁶⁴

The alliance between the United States and Japan is vital to the future interests of both nations and to the peace, prosperity, and human progress in East Asia. It can and must be more than it is at present. The failure of either country to recognize and act upon this need for change in order to avoid the divergence of strategic paths will have a significant future impact on the peace and stability of Northeast Asia.

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Notes:

¹ John Tkacik, "Taiwan's Presidential Countdown: What Does It Mean for the United States?" *China Brief*, III-9, (6 May 2003) 1-4, The Jamestown Foundation. For a more benign discussion of the impact of a KMT victory and reunification, see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?" *The Washington Quarterly*, 25-3 (Summer 2002) 15-28. A KMT victory leading to confederation is possible but not highly likely given that majority opinion in Taiwan supports the status quo with China, not the two extremes of independence or reunification.

² Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, "Russia and US Optimistic on Defense Issues," *New York Times*, (19 October 2001), A1, B4.

³ Some have gone so far as to say bluntly that the alliance is "dead" due to Korean domestic opinion and the chasm between the respective strategic approaches toward North Korea. See Dr. Robyn Lim, "US-ROK Alliance in Crisis," *Japan Times*, (29 March 2003.)

⁴ Combined, the US and Japan account for over 46% of the total global GDP. The top five most productive nations of the world in 2001 were the US (\$10.2 trillion), Japan (\$4.25 trillion), Germany (\$1.87 trillion), Britain (\$1.41 trillion), and France (\$1.30 trillion) out of a global total GDP of \$31.28 trillion. World Bank statistics, August 2002.

⁵ External national objectives for the twenty-first century are best outlined by the Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, chaired by Yukio Okamoto, Special Advisor to the Cabinet Secretariat. The report, published 28 November 2002, is entitled, "Basic Strategies for Japan's Foreign Policy in the twenty-first century: New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy." Internal national objectives are outlined in "The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millennium," the report of a blue-ribbon panel commissioned by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and published in Tokyo in January 2000.

⁶ The term "humanely" comes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and echoes a sentiment about "wa" (harmony) very dear to most Japanese. "To secure Japan's safety and prosperity, we must advance a proactive and action-oriented foreign policy with the strength to say what must be said and to do what must be done within the international community. Our diplomatic efforts must also be caring and humane." Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, p. iii, *2002 Diplomatic Bluebook*, published by MoFA, Government of Japan, 2002.

⁷ The term was popularized by Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan*, (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994), although its use, because of the connection with the controversial Ozawa, is laden with much baggage. Ozawa defines a "normal nation" as 1) a nation that willingly shoulders those responsibilities regarded as natural in the international community; and 2) a nation that fully cooperates with other nations in their efforts to build prosperous and stable lives for their people. (p. 94-95)

⁸ MoFA, however, continues to try to repackage Official Development Assistance (ODA) to be more visible and effective in international peacebuilding. In January 2003, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi announced a new strategy for ODA by offering aid to Sri Lanka before peace has been established. In the past, such aid was provided by Japan only after the peace was firmly established. In reference to this new, more proactive use of ODA funds, Kawaguchi stated, "Official development assistance is indispensable to consolidating the peace process here [in Tamil.]" *Asahi Shimbun*, 9 January 2003.

⁹ The Mutual Security Treaty was amended in 1960. It is this latter treaty that is currently in effect.

¹⁰ Howard Baker, US Ambassador to Japan, letter published in the *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 January 2003.

¹¹ Quoted in *The Daily Yomiuri*, 27 January 03.

¹² Paraphrased in *The Japan Times*, 4 March 2003. Ishiba noted that the most Japan could currently do was to notify its citizens and dispatch the SDF to help with consequence management of the missile impact sites.

¹³ Interview with author, Tokyo, 7 March 2003.

¹⁴ Kakehiko Kambayashi, "Japanese wary of China," *The Washington Times*, 27 September 2002. This sentiment was echoed by most Diet members interviewed by the author.

¹⁵ Ichita Yamamoto, Member, Japanese House of Councilors, interview with author, Tokyo, 3 March 2003.

¹⁶ Speech given at the Japan Foundation conference on US-Japan Alliance, Tokyo, 5 March 2003.

¹⁷ Interview with author, Tokyo, 19 March 03. Shiozaki is a member of the Japanese House of Representatives from the Liberal Democratic Party and is the former director of the LDP's Policy Research Council on Foreign Affairs.

¹⁸ Toshiyuki Shikata, "Japan's Response to the Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan," Paper presented in Washington, DC, in October 1997, as part of the *Korea Project* of the Okazaki Institute. Shikata, a former JGSDF Lieutenant General, lists four events as shocking the Japanese toward more security consciousness. Undoubtedly, one could add more, such as the spy ship sinking or abduction cases, to this list.

¹⁹ "Defense White paper calls for 'Country capable of meeting threats,'" Japan Foreign Press Center release, (14 August 2003.)

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ The JMSDF has created a 60-man special warfare unit, founded in March 2001, specifically for boarding and seizing suspected spy ships. It exercised publicly for the first time in February 2003 in the Sea of Japan. Japan is also in the process of standing up 300-600 man Ground SDF special operating forces.

²² Reported in "Japan plays down North Korean missile provocation," *Japan Times*, (26 February 2003.)

²³ US Pacific Command and the SDF hold an annual command post exercise called *Yama Sukura* (*Fuji-Yama Sakura* for the air portion) that does set up and practice bilateral command and control of forces in the defense of Japan. The air and ground bilateral operations coordination centers manned during this air and ground exercise are becoming more professional and effective, though are still largely *ad hoc* entities.

²⁴ A Senior Defense Agency official told an LDP panel on 18 December 2002: "It would take about 10 minutes before a missile launched from North Korea hit a target in Japan. The chances of intercepting the missile are high immediately after its launch as its velocity would be relatively slow. However, it's very hard to confirm which country it targeted in the initial stages of the launch of the first missile. So the nation's action to cope with such missile attacks would be [constitutionally] permissible only after the first strike at this country." Quoted in the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 7 January 2003.

²⁵ It is important to note that the Revised Guidelines of 1997 are agreements on how to improve security cooperation between the two countries, but they are not treaties requiring Senate ratification like the 1960 MST.

²⁶ Quoted in Reiji Yoshida, "War-contingency bills a wobbly first step," *Japan Times* (22 May 2003).

²⁷ Michael J. Green. *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2001).

²⁸ Japanese opinion poll published in the *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 March 1997. Given the left leaning stance of that newspaper and the many ways of asking questions in polls, one must exercise caution in the findings but such numbers, over the thousands of people polled, are still quite telling about the strength of Japanese pacifism.

²⁹ Pyle, Kenneth B. and Eric Heginbotham, "Japan", in *Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, eds., Strategic Asia 2001-02: Power and Purpose*, (Seattle: National Bureau for Asian Research, 2002), p. 73.

³⁰ Unlike in the first chapter of the National Security Strategy of the United States or similar documents in other countries, it is more difficult to find clear exposition of the most basic Japanese foreign policy goals. While the *Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the twenty-first century* (published in January 2000) focused nearly entirely inward, other documents like the Preface to the *2002 Diplomatic Bluebook* from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs outline the basic goals listed here.

³¹ Kawaguchi, *2002 Diplomatic Bluebook*, p. iii. Japanese ODA officially began in 1954.

³² This \$13 billion was 20% more than the total ODA Japan dispersed worldwide in that same year (\$10.95 billion in 1991) and still did not earn Japan notice on the highly visible Kuwaiti thank you. See also the polling data on the shift in public opinion toward active maintenance of international peace in note 41 below.

³³ Yoichi Funabashi, ed. "Why Alliances Now?" in *Alliance Tomorrow: Security Arrangements After the Cold War*, (Tokyo: The Tokyo Foundation, 2001): 24.

³⁴ Fiscal year 2002 saw the fourth straight year of declining ODA budgets for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). Reinhard Drifte, in a symposium at the Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation in London on 20 November 2002, pointed out that the disintegration of Indonesia and economic growth of China

have both led to a decreasing utility of ODA on the part of Japan to modify policies and attitudes in those countries.

³⁵ Interview with Diet member Koji Kakizawa, Tokyo, 7 March 2003.

³⁶ Japan is, however, trying to find new ways to use ODA. Instead of the mercantile approach of past decades, economic support for nation-building, as in Afghanistan, is offering new hope for economic diplomacy.

³⁷ Keizo Nabeshima, "Japan's nation-building role," *The Japan Times*, 11 March 2003.

³⁸ Keizo Nabeshima, "Peacemaker for Sri Lanka," *The Japan Times*, 21 April 2003. These newly authorized yen loans bring the total Japanese ODA support to Sri Lanka to \$5.2 billion.

³⁹ Kakizawa made this point directly to the author. Other Diet members expressed similar frustration with the body in interviews with the author in February-April 2003.

⁴⁰ UN assessments for year 2003 are 22% of the US, 19.5% for Japan, 6.5% for France, 5.5% for Britain, and 1.2% for Russia. Germany, also without a permanent voice in the UNSC, is assessed at 9.8% in 2003.

⁴¹ Seizaburo Sato, "Why the shift from *kokubo* to *anzen hoshō*? A study of the basic issues surrounding Japan's security," *Asia-Pacific Review* 7, no. 2 (November 2000): 29.

⁴² The "Road Map" plan for resolution of the Palestinian issue was developed by the US, Russia, U.N., and European Union. Japan has subsequently tried to interject itself in this issue by high level visits to the region and even the sponsoring of a conference in Tokyo on 19-20 May 2003 to get dialogue going between Israeli and Palestinian politicians. On this conference, see "Tokyo to sponsor Mideast talks," *Asahi* (14 May 2003).

⁴³ "Countries turn to China- Japan marginalized as APEC focuses on terror," *The Japan Times*, (22 October 2003).

⁴⁴ Green, 2001, pp. 210-215.

⁴⁵ See the State of the Union Address by President G.W. Bush on 29 January 2002 and his speech at the occasion of the graduation ceremonies at West Point on 1 June 2002.

⁴⁶ *Daily Yomiuri*, "Money no longer buys security," 4 May 2002.

⁴⁷ See Green, 2001, Chapter 4, on Japan-China relations in the mid-1990s.

⁴⁸ Interview with LDP Diet member Katsuei Hirasawa, 26 February 2003.

⁴⁹ Japanese public desire for a permanent seat on the UNSC continues to remain high (68% in favor, 10% opposed in 1999- up from 56% in favor in 1993: *Shin Joho Center* surveys.) However, the current economic recession has thwarted its apparent meteoric rise as a world power and subdued the calls for its inclusion in that prestigious group. Regardless, given the size of Japan's dues assessment to the UN, second only to the United States, cries of "taxation without representation" are bound to grow stronger. As quoted in the *NY Times* on 21 January 2003, Hatsuhsa Takashima, a spokesman for MoFA recently said: "We should get a seat on the Security Council and the abolition of the enemy clause in the UN Charter. No taxation without representation is a basic idea."

⁵⁰ Remarks given at an international symposium in Tokyo, 17 March 2003, sponsored by *The Yomiuri Shimbun*, MoFA, and the United Nations University.

⁵¹ Remarks given at the Japan Foundation conference, "New Developments of the US-Japan Alliance," Ark Mori Building, Tokyo, 5 March 2003.

⁵² Thomas U. Berger, in Michael Green and Patrick Cronin, *The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*, (NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999): 192. A knowledgeable American official noted in April 2003 to the author that the highly restrictive Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) is a perfect example of how obsessive the Japanese are about maintaining civilian control of the military. Unlike the general ACSAs that US has with many nations around the world, the ACSA signed in 1998 with Japan does not delegate decision authority on many basic supply matters to uniformed officers.

⁵³ Poll taken by *Asahi Shimbun*, 26 April 1997.

⁵⁴ 1998 ranking of the top 100 newspapers in the world by circulation listed at Infoplease.com. The more conservative *Yomiuri Shimbun* held the #1 position with over 14 million copies per day.

⁵⁵ See Yasuhiro Nakasone, *The Making of the New Japan*, (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999) and Ichiro Ozawa, *Blueprint for a New Japan*, (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994).

⁵⁶ Yutaka Kawashima, "Japan's Security Environment," Brookings Institution- Center for Northeast Asia Policy Studies, 1 March 2002, p. 2.

⁵⁷ All of the Japanese major newspapers gave extensive coverage of the final compromise agreements between the ruling coalition and *Minshuto* from 13-15 May 2003. The 12 May 2003 editorial in *Asahi Shimbun* reflects the concerns of the pacifist left about the contingency legislation.

⁵⁸ An editorial in the *Asahi Shimbun* on 16 May 2003 clearly made this point. "People are distrustful, fearing enactment of military emergency legislation would give the government and Self-Defense Forces unfettered freedom of action."

⁵⁹ Not all Japanese feel this obligation as made clear in Shintaro Ishihara's book, *The Japan That Can Say No*, (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1989). The far right in Japanese politics, especially, deigns this obligation.

⁶⁰ Definitional discussions of *filial piety* and Confucianism can be found on a teacher's resource website-www.globaled.org/spot_co.

⁶¹ Author's discussions in Tokyo, September 2002 – May 2003.

⁶² Isaiah Ben-Dasan, *The Japanese and the Jews*, (Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1972): 13-14.

⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 14.

⁶⁴ Interview with LDP Diet member Katsuei Hirasawa, 26 February 2003.

⁶⁵ Sato, 2000, pp. 12-32.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*. Discussion of the various forms of security within Japan are described by Sato on p. 15.

⁶⁷ Reported in *The Japan Times* (24 February 2003).

⁶⁸ USIA survey, 18-25 May 1993 and *Yomiuri Shimbun* survey, 17-18 July 1999.

⁶⁹ Authors like Gerald Curtis, *The Logic of Japanese Politics*, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1999) have gone to great lengths to systematically explain Japanese incrementalism and decision-making to western readers confounded by the apparent irrationality of the Japanese political system.

⁷⁰ Although somewhat dated, Chie Nakane, *Japanese Society*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970): 143-145, provides an insightful exposition of the concepts of community and democracy in Japan. These ideas are echoed in Ben-Dasan, *The Japanese and the Jews*, 98.

⁷¹ Discussion with noted journalist Sam Jameson, 4 February 2003.

⁷² It is important to note that the *Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law* passed through the Diet in October-November 2001, following the attacks of 9/11, in an extraordinarily speedy manner, thus indicating that given the right public and elite mood, substantive change can occur rapidly in Japan. This is not the norm, however.

⁷³ Gerald Curtis (1999) and W. Lee Howell, "The Alliance and Post-Cold War Realignment in Japan," in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., *The US-Japan Alliance*, (NY: CFR Press, 1999): 208-227.

⁷⁴ Interview with Professor Taizo Yakushiji, 29 January 2003.

⁷⁵ Mark Manyin, in Richard Cronin, ed., "Japan-US Relations: Issues for Congress," IB97004, (Washington: Congressional Research Service, February 2003): 13.

⁷⁶ Interview with author, 2003. This is obviously not a mainstream political comment but demonstrates the frustration many in the Diet feel about elite and public inertia resisting what they see as very fundamental policy changes needed to protect Japan.

⁷⁷ Ministry of Finance estimates for 2004-2007 show declining tax revenues likely to cause a 48% dependence on government issued bonds to cover the budget requirements. MOF estimates released 1 February 2003.

⁷⁸ Japan Defense Agency, "The Outline of Defense Budget Request (FY2003)," online at www.jda.go.jp

⁷⁹ The JDA is requesting ¥142.3 billion (\$1.206 billion) for missile defense, ¥116.4 billion (\$986.4 million) for the first "16DDH" aircraft carrier, and ¥14.86 billion (\$127 million) for BMD radars as part of the FY2004 budget. See "Japan's Recent Step-up in Missile Defense," Center for Defense Information, (10 October 2003) and "Japan's New Carrier," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, (11 September 2003.)

⁸⁰ JDA, Defense Budget Request, FY 2003. Over ¥800 billion (\$6.8 billion) goes each year for pensions.

⁸¹ *Mainichi Shimbun* (17 March 95): 3 and Japan Economic Institute Report no. 10, (14 March 97): 1.

⁸² General Accounting Office, *Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the US Military Presence on Okinawa: Report to the Honorable Duncan Hunter, House of Representatives*, March, 1998.

⁸³ Thomas Wilburn, "Japan's Self Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia," Monograph published by the Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 1994.

⁸⁴ Pyle and Hegenbotham (2002): 115. In the US, the President appoints over 3,000 to the bureaucracies.

⁸⁵ Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism*, pp. 63-64.

⁸⁶ Reinhard Drifte, Daiwa Anglo-Japanese Foundation symposium, 20 November 2002.

⁸⁷ Koji Murata, "Japan's Security Policy," in Self and Thompson, eds., *An Alliance for Enlargement*, (Aanta Monica: Rand, 2001): 137.

⁸⁸ Pyle and Hegenbotham, (2002): 121, footnote #21.

⁸⁹ Kimberley Marten Zisk, "Japan's United Nations Peacekeeping Dilemma," *Asia-Pacific Review* 8, no. 1 (May 2001): 30-32.

⁹⁰ Ben Dasan, (1971): 100-103.

⁹¹ Jameson- conversation with author, 2 February 2003.

⁹² Sam Jameson, "Can Japan Emerge from a Half-Century of One-Nation Pacifism?" an unpublished paper from the Japan Defense Research Institute (2001): 1, 8.

⁹³ The Cabinet Legislative Bureau's interpretation of the Constitution guides security policy, especially the prohibition against collective defense. See Ted Osius, *The US-Japan Security Alliance*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002): 67. This interpretation is clearly laid out by the Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1996: Response to a New Era*, (Tokyo: JDA, 1996).

⁹⁴ See comments by the Director General of the CLB, Osamu Akiyama, in *The Daily Yomiuri*, 27 January 03, and in *The Japan Times* (31 January 03). On 18 March 1970, the CLB Director General told the Budget Committee of the Diet Lower House that retaliatory strikes could be made in self-defense only when "an armed attack has started."

⁹⁵ Although he himself is 60, Prime Minister Koizumi's appearance and energy make him often characterized as "youthful." The average age of the ministers of his Cabinet is 61 years old (in December 2002.)

⁹⁶ Michael J. Green and Kazuya Sakamoto, "The US-Japan Alliance After the Cold War," in Funabashi (2001): 54.

⁹⁷ Kurt Campbell et al, "Generational Change in Japan: Its Implications for US-Japan Relations," (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2002): 3-4.

⁹⁸ Cabinet Office survey conducted in February 2003. Reported in *Japan Times* (30 March 03).

⁹⁹ Interview with *Asahi Shimbun* published 5 February 2003.

¹⁰⁰ As an example, a panel commissioned by Prime Minister Koizumi and headed by former United Nations Under-Secretary General Yasushi Akashi published their findings in mid-December 2002 on the future of Japanese participation in peacekeeping efforts. In sum, the panel found that the Japanese were not prepared both legally nor in terms of properly trained and resourced personnel to effectively play a role in PKO and that the current legal conceptions about peacekeeping were insufficient to deal with the new security environment. See also Toshiyuki Shikata, "The New Cabinet Crisis Management Center and the Leadership of the Prime Minister," *Asia-Pacific Review* 9, no. 2 (November 2002): 88-90, for details on Japan's crisis shortfalls.

¹⁰¹ Keizo Nabeshima, "Strengthen Japan's Deterrent," *Japan Times* (19 May 2003).

¹⁰² The Okamoto Report, entitled "Basic Strategies for Japan's Foreign Policy in the twenty-first century: New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy," was presented to Prime Minister Koizumi on 28 November 2002.

¹⁰³ In a poll taken in February 2002, respondents were asked to select which two roles should Japan play in international society. 50.3% chose "Contribution to the maintenance of international peace, such as efforts toward the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts (includes military personnel assistance)" while only 13.3% thought that Japan should prioritize contributions to the economic development of poor countries. Opinion Survey on Foreign Affairs, Public Relations Office, posted on the MoFA web page.

¹⁰⁴ This data is taken from numerous public sources including the Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plans, Defense White Papers, military-industrial trade publications, and official budget details from the Japanese Government.

¹⁰⁵The ASDF had been pushing hard for the anti-missile capabilities of the PAC-3, but only after the demonstrated success of the system by the US during the second Gulf War was the political decision made to leap over the PAC-2 Plus and produce under license the PAC-3 as a terminal phase missile defense. See “Moving too fast on missile defense”, editorial in *Japan Times*, (8 September 2003.)

¹⁰⁶The new radar, designated the FPS-XX, is likely to be requested in the 2006 JDA budget at a cost of 15 billion yen. It is designed to acquire ballistic missile launches from North Korea at a range of several hundred kilometers and feed targeting data to the mid-course BMD defenses based on Aegis destroyers as well as the terminal defenses based on batteries of PAC-3 missiles. See “Defense Agency wants new radar as part of missile defense system,” *Japan Times*, (15 September 2003.)

¹⁰⁷The F-2 is a salient example of Japan’s recognition of the changing threat environment it faces. Basically a heavily modified F-16, the F-2 has 25% larger wings giving it increased fuel capacity and two additional hardpoints for weapons. In this configuration, it is designed as a strike aircraft with the potential range to reach North Korean missile sites and to protect maritime interests. See Lockheed Martin press release (10 November 1998) and the fact sheet at www.airforce-technology.com/projects/f2. Japan has made the decision to procure Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits from the United States in fiscal year 2004 to enable the F-2 to conduct precision strike attacks against DPRK missile sites if required. The JDAM kits attach to existing MK-82 bombs and give the bomb satellite guidance, extreme precision, and twenty extra kilometers of standoff range. See “ASDF to acquire JDAM bomb kits,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, (18 September 2003.)

¹⁰⁸The 16DDH design calls for a 195m long, 13,500 ton (empty) aircraft carrier. Funding for the first is requested in the FY2004 JDA budget for delivery in 2008. Although it is ostensibly designed for helicopter operations, its size and deck and elevator design will make it capable of carrying the AV-8 Harrier V/STOL aircraft or, more likely, some version of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The designation as a “helicopter destroyer- DDH” is typical of recent Japanese defense semantics. See Yoshitaka Sasaki, “Does Japan need a light aircraft carrier?” *Asahi Shimbun*, (3 October 2003) and Richard Halloran, “Japan rethinks issue of self-defense,” *Honolulu Advertiser*, (13 July 2003).

¹⁰⁹Thomas A. Drohan, “The US-Japan Defense Guidelines,” IIPS Policy Paper 238E (November 1999): 16. Under political pressure from *New Komeito*, the Diet modified the language of the bills in three significant ways: 1) “situations in areas surrounding Japan” became “situation in which the peace and safety of Japan are gravely threatened;” 2) the ship inspection clause was removed; 3) a new clause was added to require Diet approval before SDF support operations in non-combat zones and search and rescue operations could be carried out.

¹¹⁰Quoted in *The Daily Yomiuri* (19 March 2003). Taro Aso, policy chief of the LDP, also advocated Japanese support to the US in the war on Iraq because, “In terms of priorities, we have to weigh heavily on the Japan-US security treaty concerning the security of Japan...as the United Nations will not protect us.” Quoted in *The Japan Times* (3 March 2003).

¹¹¹Yasuhiro Nakasone, *The Making of the New Japan*, (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999): 219.

¹¹²*Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 US 184, 197, 84 S. Ct. 1676, 12 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).

¹¹³Hayao Kawai, chair of the Prime Minister’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the twenty-first century, published in 2000, listed the following as Japan’s interests, though they could be seen more accurately as means toward some larger objectives: 1) Become a global civilian power and resolve conflicts peacefully, 2) Build a comprehensive, multi-layered security framework, 3) Strengthen cooperative relations with East Asia.

¹¹⁴This list was prepared with the assistance of a colleague at IIPS, Tomoyuki Nakagawa. For comparison, Yukio Okamoto, chair of the *2002 Task Force on Foreign Relations* defined Japan’s national interests as: 1) Actively maintain peace and security, 2) Support the free trade system, 3) Protect freedom, democracy, and human rights, 4) Promote people to people exchange and human resource development.

¹¹⁵In 2002, the Japanese Government added “Fostering Love of Country” as a curriculum goal for 6th graders. However, fewer than 200 of the 24,000 public elementary schools are complying with this cultural education program, due to concerns about the evils of teaching “patriotism.” *Japan Times*, 13 May 2003.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Professor Taizo Yakushiji, 19 May 2003. Yakushiji was seconded to the Cabinet during the spring of 2003 for the purpose of writing associated legislation. Interestingly, the US would prefer not to be included in specific legislation like *yuji hosei* for fear of losing the legal ambiguity under which it currently operates within Japan.

¹¹⁷ “Japan eyes permanent law for more SDF roles overseas,” Kyodo News, (10 July 2003). The new legislation will designate peacekeeping operations as a basic duty of the SDF and thus end the need for specific legislation authorizing each and every deployment of troops to such missions.

¹¹⁸ SDF Director General Shigeru Ishiba made this announcement in a speech in Beijing on SDF reorganization in September 2003. He also announced plans to integrate the logistical support for all three services of the SDF- a step that will bring both short term turmoil and potential long term efficiencies. See Tetsuo Hidaka, “Defense Agency proposes logistics branch for SDF,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, (6 September 2003.)

¹¹⁹ Japan has the weapons grade plutonium, technology for weaponization, and delivery means in the M-V-5 rocket (indigenous, solid fueled, 1800kg payload capacity) to go nuclear very rapidly should it choose. This dramatic step, however, would require a complete loss of faith in the American nuclear umbrella and an imminence of threat so dire as to overcome close to universal Japanese opinion against such weapons.

¹²⁰ *Wichita Business Journal* (14 December 2001). Japan has contracted with Boeing to buy one aircraft per year for \$218 million each. Inability to satisfy *Komeito* concerns led to the postponement in April 2002 of the first year’s purchase. Both the F-15 and F-2 aircraft are equipped to receive fuel in flight. Additionally, Japan has decided to design and build the PX (replacement for the P-3C maritime patrol aircraft) and CX (replacement for the C-1 transport aircraft) in house. Kawasaki Heavy Industries leads this industry group effort which hopes to also create domestic commercial airliners from these two basic designs.

¹²¹ The *Osumi* class ship displaces 14,700 tons fully loaded and is 591 feet long with a substantial flight deck for helicopter operations. It also carries two large air cushion landing craft (LCAC) designed to amphibiously land personnel and armor on a beach. The *Osumi* and *Shimokita* joined the fleet in 1998 and 2002 respectively. LCACs from the *Osumi* were used to land portions of the Japanese contingent to the East Timor PKO while the *Shimokita* brought the Thai engineer contingent to Afghanistan. Its designation as a “Landing Ship Tank,” a common transport and landing craft, was a political decision to mitigate domestic and international protests about the construction of aircraft carriers by Japan- even though the *Osumi* class is over four times the displacement of the largest Japanese LSTs. Currently, Japan has no fixed wing aircraft capable of using this class of ships- thus reducing its offensive character. However, in July 1989, Marubeni Trading Corporation was selected as the *AV-8B Plus Harrier* aircraft sales agent in Japan, thus indicating the JMSDF desire for such vertical takeoff and landing combat aircraft. See JMSDF homepage and Hazegray “World Navies” website at hazegray.com. AV-8B information from the US Naval Institute.

¹²² “Govt preparing plans for missile defense,” *The Daily Yomiuri* (14 March 2003). PAC-2 GEM and PAC-3 are genuine interceptors designed for terminal phase intercept of short range ballistic missiles such as the Scud. Their capability against Iraqi missiles in 2003 is well documented, however their capability against missiles that enter the terminal phase flying faster and steeper like the *Nodong* is not yet proven.

¹²³ This desire to procure independent strike capability against DPRK was shared by Koji Kakizawa (LDP) and Yoshinori Suematsu (DPJ) in separate interviews in March 2003. This desire for debate on developing offensive capability was also broached on 27 March 03 by JDA Director Shigeru Ishiba, though immediately refuted by Prime Minister Koizumi a day later. Interestingly, Ishiba was not publicly condemned for his statement.

¹²⁴ For example, in the final part of a series of articles on international security in the *Daily Yomiuri* in January 2003, Masanobu Takagi, called for Japan to “shed the passive partner role” and find ways to further Japanese interests through the alliance. *Daily Yomiuri* (17 January 2003).

¹²⁵ See Article VI, *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America*, signed 19 January 1960.

¹²⁶ The ACSA, first signed in 1996 and then amended in 1998 to include the geographical expansion of the 1997 Revised Guidelines in “the areas surrounding Japan” is a critical step in operationalizing the

alliance. It codifies the reciprocal provision of logistical support, supplies, and services between Japan and the US in the event of a conflict invoking the alliance guarantees.

¹²⁷ Drohan, p. 16.

¹²⁸ Interview with senior State Department official in November 2002. This plan was due to be publicized during the December 2002 “2+2” ministerial meetings in Washington, but was not released for various reasons.

¹²⁹ This intel protection is getting better in Japan. Recently Memorandums of Understanding were signed by MOFA and CIRO so that their personnel with access to military classified information would be subject to the sanctions outlined in the “defense secrets” portion of the October 2001 Amended Self-Defense Forces Act.

¹³⁰ Interview with a US Embassy intelligence staffer, April 2003. This is a legacy of the Cold War dependence on the US. A tank heavy army in Hokkaido, built to face a very low probability invasion by Soviet forces, is not used to asking for, nor receiving, real time operational intelligence. It is thus not second nature for the intelligence community to think about what operational assets may need a certain piece of intelligence.

¹³¹ The US military remains somewhat reluctant to give intelligence as freely to Japan as they do to other allies, like the British or Australians, who are seen to be more willing to accept operational risk with its use.

¹³² My thanks to my colleague, Hajime Kitaoka, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for explaining the Japanese intelligence community and challenges. Such intelligence professionals in Japan are working diligently to overcome these structural and attitudinal challenges and have made impressive strides since 11 September 2001.

¹³³ Masuhiro Matsumura, “The G.W. Bush Administration and Northeast Asian Security: A Japanese Perspective,” (Berkeley: The Nautilus Institute, 2001): 4. See also “Theater Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region,” the report of the Henry L. Stimson Center working group, June 2000, p. xiii.

¹³⁴ Interview with the author, Tokyo, 6 March 2003.

¹³⁵ For an academic’s recognition of this ill-comfort, see Makato Iokibe, “Japan’s Best Weapon is its Voice of Reason,” interview published by *Asahi Shimbun* (27 January 03).

¹³⁶ *Asahi Shimbun*, “Opinion closing in on Koizumi’s options,” (26 February 2003).

¹³⁷ Interview with the author, Tokyo, 26 February 2003.

¹³⁸ Poll taken 22-23 March 03 with 1000 respondents and published by *Asahi Shimbun* (24 March 03).

¹³⁹ Interview with the author, 17 February 2003. Ambassador Okawara stated that “sole focus on US interests” is not going to be good enough for the Japanese in the future. He offered that the US must pay closer attention to the impacts of policy decisions on Japanese interests and problems.

¹⁴⁰ Quoted in *Far Eastern Economic Review* (3 April 2003): 9.

¹⁴¹ Cabinet Office poll in 1997 showed the United States second to North Korea as the country most likely to embroil Japan in a war. Following the American attack on Iraq in March 2003 against overwhelming Japanese opinion, this perception has been solidified among the Japanese public.

¹⁴² *Kyodo News* poll of 1008 citizens cited in *The Japan Times* (14 April 2003). This poll also found that 78.6% think that the UN should lead the interim government in Iraq versus only 16.7% who believe that the US should lead that rebuilding effort.

¹⁴³ Interview with *Asahi Shimbun*, published 5 February 2003.

¹⁴⁴ Although the US and Japan consulted after Koizumi’s declaration of the visit, prior consultation did not occur in late August 2002, when the visit to Pyongyang was announced. Distinguished journalist and former Tokyo Bureau Chief for the *Los Angeles Times*, Sam Jameson, made this point to the author.

¹⁴⁵ Quoted in *The Japan Times* (21 April 2003). Ishihara was reelected as Tokyo Governor in April 2003 with over 70% of the popular vote and, although probably not trusted enough to become Prime Minister, is still respected for his plain talk on nationalist issues.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with the author, 26 February 2003. Ichita Yamamoto made the same points to the author on 6 March 2003.

¹⁴⁷ Tetsu Hidaka, “Spy satellites to watch North Korea,” *Daily Yomiuri* (4 March 2003).

¹⁴⁸ Peter Ennis, in the NBR US-Japan Discussion Forum on 27 March 03, argues that the US did provide timely passage of the Taepodong test information to the JDA, who failed to pass it along to the Government. Ennis argues that Mitsubishi Denki Company used the incident to press forward with an indigenous satellite program it had already been planning and from which it would profit greatly. A senior MOFA intelligence specialist confided that US intelligence was quickly passed to the Prime Minister in this incident, but that the Japanese Government failed to offer counterarguments to the popular “intel failure” conception when pressing for an indigenous satellite program.

¹⁴⁹ Conversation with a ranking MoFA official, November 2002. See also *Japan Times* (30 December 2002).

¹⁵⁰ Quoted in James Webb, “Is American Neglecting a Good Friend,” *Parade Magazine* (12 January 2003).

¹⁵¹ Evidence of an increasing Japanese desire to chart its own course in foreign policy and not blindly follow the American lead can be seen in a decrease in voting with the US in the United Nations General Assembly from 82% in 1994 to 48% in 2001. (US Department of State statistics for Congress on voting practices in the United Nations.)

¹⁵² Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2001*, (Washington DC: GPO, 2001): 11-14. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James A. Kelly, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 26 March 2003, gave the following list of US interests in the region: 1) promoting and deepening democracy, 2) improving sustainable economic development, 3) countering proliferation and WMD, 4) countering international crime, and 5) promoting open markets.

¹⁵³ Remarks given in Tokyo, 5 March 2003, at the Japan Foundation.

¹⁵⁴ Philip Zelikow, “The Transformation of National Security,” *National Interest*, 71, (Spring 2003) 24. Stephen M. Walt, “Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy,” *International Security* 26-3, (Winter 2001/2002) 63.

¹⁵⁵ For example, see Anne M. Dixon, “Can Eagles and Cranes Flock Together? US and Japanese Approaches to Multilateral Security After the Cold War,” in Green and Cronin (1999): 139-169. Ralph Cossa, “Multilateralism, Regional Security, and the Prospects for Track II in East Asia,” *NBR Analysis* 8, no. 2 (May 1997): 1-18, similarly offers confidence that multilateralism is a growth industry in Asia.

¹⁵⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1994): 826.

¹⁵⁷ Jay M. Parker, “Japan’s Changing Role and the Future of US Forward Presence in Northeast Asia,” paper presented at the Institute for National Security Studies, Washington DC, 6 March 2002.

¹⁵⁸ Amitav Acharya, “Multilateralism: Is There an Asia-Pacific Way?,” *NBR Analysis* 8, no. 2 (May 1997): 6,11.

¹⁵⁹ Armacost (1996): 243.

¹⁶⁰ Only the Japanese names for these islands are given here. The Northern Territories are made of up the Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorufu island groups. This point is made well by Richard Samuels and Christopher Toomey, “American Foreign Policy Options in East Asia After the Cold War,” in Green and Cronin (1999): 10.

¹⁶¹ Eric Teo Chu Cheow, entrepreneur and former Singapore diplomat, in remarks at the ANA Hotel, Tokyo, 13 November 2002. He described the “ASEAN way” as having four tenets: 1) do not dabble in another’s domestic affairs, 2) don’t discuss negative issues- focus on the positive, 3) move forward where you can, 4) build consensus without resorting to binding, legalistic means.

¹⁶² Samuels and Toomey, p. 11.

¹⁶³ A good discussion on international security as a public good is found in Ruben P. Mendez, “Peace as a Public Good,” in Inge Kaul et al, eds., *Global Public Goods*, (NY: Oxford University Press, 1999): 382-416.

¹⁶⁴ The *Korea Herald* (26 April 2003) quoted a senior American military officer who stated that US forces in Korea would begin to relocate south to two base clusters centering around Osan-Pyeongtaek and Busan-Daegu and potentially decreased in overall strength on the Korean Peninsula. In late summer 2003, the decision was made public that the US would move its headquarters and family support facilities out of Yongsan in Seoul and thus reduce its strategic vulnerability.

¹⁶⁵ Statistics from GOJ, Ministry of Finance, January 2003. Reported also in *Associated Press* (18 February 2003).

¹⁶⁶ For example, see Jay M. Parker, “Japan at Century’s End: Climbing on China’s Bandwagon?” Paper presented at *Pacific Focus* (March 2000).

¹⁶⁷ Although the JDA study in 1995 concluded that nuclear weapons were not in Japan’s best interests, the reliance on US nuclear protection is central to the finding. See articles in *Asahi Shimbun*, *Japan Times*, and by the Associated Press all on 20 February 2003.

¹⁶⁸ Robyn Lim, *The Geopolitics of East Asia*, (London: Routledge, 2003).

¹⁶⁹ For a good coverage of Chinese concerns, see Banning Garret and Bonnie Glaser, “Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalizing of the US-Japan Alliance,” *Asian Survey* 37, no. 4 (April 1997): 383-402.

¹⁷⁰ Benevolent trends that could bring China into the modern era as a status quo, liberal power could be submerged in sea of nationalism and *realpolitik* if an enhanced alliance with Japan is seen as primarily focused on containing China. A good discussion of this point is found in Zalmay M. Khalilzad et al, *The United States and a Rising China*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1999): Chapter 1, 10-16, and Chapter 4.

¹⁷¹ Reported by Takehiko Kambayashi, “Japanese wary of China,” *The Washington Times* (27 September 2002).

¹⁷² James J. Pryztup, “Bridges to the Future, Reflections on the Past,” *3rd Quarter 2003 Japan-China Relations, Comparative Connections*, Pacific Forum CSIS, (October 2003).

¹⁷³ See also the Op-Ed piece by Condoleeza Rice, National Security Advisor, “Our Asia Strategy,” *Wall Street Journal*, (24 October 2003).

¹⁷⁴ This policy is known as *Sadae Gyorin* and refers to the tributary practice granting of partial sovereignty to its most powerful neighbor in return for protection.

¹⁷⁵ These statistics come from *Agence France Presse*, Taipei (8 March 2002) and *NYTimes* (20 March 2002). Actual Chinese military expenditures are thought to be 3-7 times higher than published budgets.

¹⁷⁶ “ROK Defense Budget,” *globalsecurity.org*. Budget figures in adjusted for constant 1998 won values.

¹⁷⁷ “ROK Long Term Military Plan,” NAPSNet Daily Report (8 May 03). On 6 May 2003, ROK Defense Minister Cho Young-kil presented President Roh Moo-hyun with a report detailing the requirements needed for South Korea to take over US military roles on the Peninsula. The report noted that 2003’s defense budget, currently set at 2.8 percent of the gross domestic product, should be increased at least to 3 percent of the GDP. The 2003 defense budget is currently 17.4 trillion *won* (\$14.5 billion).

¹⁷⁸ See “Russia: Battling Irrelevance in East Asia,” *Stratfor Analysis*, (10 June 2003). Russia also has a large fleet of rusting nuclear capable subs and ships in its Far East and has made a nexus with Japan over the decommissioning of these hulks.

¹⁷⁹ An editorial from the *Daily Yomiuri* on 26 February 2003 made the case that Germany, France, and China must come on board with the United States and Britain on the Iraq compliance question to prevent the complete breakdown of the Security Council and the possible “disintegration of the United Nations.” Japan’s Ambassador to the UN, Koichi Haraguchi, made a similar argument to the UNSC in support of the second US resolution on Iraq on 12 March 2003.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with senior researcher Joseph Flanz, US Embassy, Tokyo, December 2002.

¹⁸¹ I am indebted to COL Mike Bosack of US Army Japan for making this suggestion.

¹⁸² Reported in *Kyodo* and *Japan Today* (1 March 2003).

¹⁸³ Secretary Colin Powell pointedly recognized this need when he visited Tokyo in July 2001. He said, “I very much wanted to make sure that I visited Japan before I went anywhere else in Asia, as a symbol of the importance of the relationship of the US-Japanese security arrangement as well as our economic ties, but the shared history that we have over the last 50 odd years of friends committed to peace and security, committed to a strong relationship between our two peoples.” State Department Transcript, 24 July 2001.

¹⁸⁴ Former Ambassador to the US Yoshio Okawara makes this point in “US-Japan Relations- A Reminiscence,” Policy Paper 239E (Tokyo: Institute for International Policy Studies, November 1999): 6.

¹⁸⁵ Richard Armitage, US Senate testimony, 15 March 2001. Quoted in Osius, p. 75.

¹⁸⁶ Finding ways to expand policy coordination is one of the key recommendations of Mike Mochizuki et al, *Toward a True Alliance*, (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1997): 194.

¹⁸⁷ “Japan: New Security Challenges, Same Economic Problems,” in John Chipman et al, *Strategic Survey 2001-2002*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 201.

¹⁸⁸ “Costly signals” refer to actions or statements a government makes in a crisis that have significant domestic political cost attached and thus are more credible signals of a nation’s resolve. See James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” *American Political Science Review*, 88 (September 1994) 577-92. It could be argued that Japan must accept “costly burdens” to reciprocate.

¹⁸⁹ Michael Hanlon, in Mike Mochizuki, ed., *Toward a True Alliance*, Chapter 6, (Washington: Brookings, 1997) makes such a case for reductions in USMC presence in Okinawa.

¹⁹⁰ Conversation with author, Tokyo, 19 March 2003.

¹⁹¹ Mark T. Staples, “Legal Reform of the Self-Defense Forces: Alliance Recommendations,” published as part of the “New US- Japan Alliance Project” by the Okazaki Institute, Tokyo, 2001, p. 3.

¹⁹² Victor D. Cha, Testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12 March 03.

¹⁹³ This point is made by Brad Glosserman (Director of Research at Pacific Forum CSIS), in “Donald Rumsfeld making big waves,” *Japan Times*, (22 May 2003).

¹⁹⁴ *The Daily Yomiuri* reported on 14 March 2003 that the Japanese Government was preparing legislation to change Article 84 (measures against violation of airspace) and Article 76 (conditions for mobilizing SDF personnel for defensive action) to allow for the fielding of ballistic missile defense systems. This is different for the ASDF conducting air patrols over Japan. These aircraft are allowed to engage other hostile aircraft after receiving permission from regional military commanders. (Conversation with a ranking GSDF officer, October 2003.)

¹⁹⁵ However, the US government must coordinate release of information on what are those exact C4I and connectivity system requirements. For example, the American liaison officer teaching at the Japanese Command and General Staff College cannot share C4I system specifics with his students because Training and Doctrine Command has them currently classified as NOFORN- (No Foreign dissemination.) At the same time, however, the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and Global Command and Control System (GCCS) products necessary to achieve this common intelligence picture are a key part of the foreign military sales program of the US Defense Information Systems Agency.

¹⁹⁶ “Defense White Paper Calls for ‘Country Capable of Meeting Threats,’” Foreign Press Center—Japan, press release, (14 August 2003.)

¹⁹⁷ Fuel distribution figures from *The Japan Times* (7 May 2003). In decisions in early 2003, the Japanese Government expanded the number of nations that could receive this fuel to eight- although they withheld fuel privileges from navies (like Australia) who were taking part only in the search for Iraqi oil runners and not the prevention of *Al Queda* movements. The total value of this fuel distributed by 1 May 2003 was over \$92.5 million.

¹⁹⁸ Nao Shimoyachi, “Japan says goodbye to last land mine,” *Japan Times* (8 February 2003).

¹⁹⁹ Discussion with an official in the US Embassy in Tokyo, April 2003. Although military technology transfers are granted an exception under Japanese policy, the process for American requests and Japanese acquiescence of such transfers is laborious and focused on promoting Japanese defense industry. For example, in 1995, the US sought transfer of dual-seeker counter-mine technology but was denied. Two years later, the Japanese firm began to sell the completed mine detectors abroad.

²⁰⁰ Interview with a senior US State Department official, November 2002.

²⁰¹ The Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was first adopted in 1987 and covers host nation costs such as salaries of Japanese nationals, on-base utility costs, lost rents, and training relocation. The most recent SMA, signed on 11 September 2000, will expire on 31 March 2006. Given the state of the Japanese economy, considerable pressure could be brought to bear on reducing the SMA commitment to the United States. See the description and background of SMA at www.csis.org/japan/japanwatch/jw0400.html

²⁰² Interview with Joseph Flanz at the US Embassy in Tokyo, December 2002. For example, Flanz offers the opinion that the Japanese response to the sinking of the DPRK spy boat would not have been so benign if Japanese casualties had been taken during the brief fight.

²⁰³ Statement by Press Secretary Hatsuhisa Takashima, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 April 2003.

²⁰⁴ Quoted in *The Daily Yomiuri* (17 January 2003).

²⁰⁵ Jusuf Wanandi, "Japan-US alliance and the Asia-Pacific region," *Asia-Pacific Review* 3, no. 2, (fall/winter 1996): 115.

²⁰⁶ Yukio Okamoto makes this point about Japan serving as a bridge to Muslim countries in "Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (spring 2002): 70-71.

²⁰⁷ Interview with author, Tokyo, 17 March 2003. Ito is the Democratic Party of Japan's "shadow cabinet" Foreign Minister.

²⁰⁸ Benjamin L. Best makes this point succinctly in Chapter 7 of his edited volume, *An Alliance for Engagement: Building Cooperation in Security Relations with China*, (Washington: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2002).

²⁰⁹ Okamoto, (2002): 69.

²¹⁰ John H. Noer, "Southeast Asian Chokepoints," National Defense University Strategic Forum, INSS, no. 98, (Washington: NDU, December 1996): 2.

²¹¹ Osius, (2002): 45.

²¹² International Chamber of Commerce report on piracy 2001, 2002. Found at www.iccwbo.org. Although dropping from a peak of 469 incidents in 2000, the shipping lanes are still heavily infested with pirates seeking both cargo and hostages for ransom. This number is low since, for insurance purposes, piracy attacks are highly underreported. Three Japanese freighters and tankers have been seized since 1998 by pirates in South and SE Asian waters.

²¹³ In May 1981, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki declared that Japan would take responsibility for defending sea-lanes up to 1000 nautical miles from Japan. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, while on a visit to the United States in 1983, articulated the notion of these sea-lanes as lying "between Guam and Tokyo and between the Strait of Taiwan and Osaka."

²¹⁴ Distrust about Japanese naval motives still abounds in the region as witnessed by the severe criticism of the Japanese plan to extend sea lane protection to the Straits of Malacca announced in February 2000. However, the MSDF is participating more regularly in SE Asian naval exercises in an attempt to dampen this residual suspicion. See Vijay Sakhuja, "How Far Will the Samurai Swim?," at www.dsig.org.tw/peaceforum. In November 2001, a Japanese Coast Guard patrol ship conducted anti-piracy exercises with Malaysia and Indian vessels. MoFA Report, December 2001.

²¹⁵ Secretary Colin Powell, Remarks at Ceremony Commemorating the Signing of the US-Japan Security Treaty, The Golden Gate Club at the Presidio, San Francisco, CA, 8 September 2001.

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