On January 26, 2026, Nakasone Peace Institute held the Open Webinar on "The Second Trump Administration in Its Second Year and the Indo-Pacific Region─Assessment and Outlook." The Japan-U.S. Alliance Study Group analyzed and discussed how the policies of the second Trump administration have affected the Indo-Pacific region amid rapidly shifting conditions around the world.

Moderator

Panelists

　Watanabe Shino, Professor, Sophia University; Visiting Researcher, NPI
　Kuwahara Kyoko, Research Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs; Visiting Researcher, NPI
　Takahashi Kazuhiro, Professor, Hosei University; Visiting Researcher, NPI
　Koga Kei, Associate Professor, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; Visiting Researcher, NPI
　Teraoka Ayumi, Assistant Professor, Brandeis University; Visiting Associate Researcher, NPI
　Ishida Tomonori, Senior Researcher, National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense; Visiting Associate Researcher, NPI
　Kato Tomohiro, Visiting Assistant Researcher, NPI

The main points discussed were as follows:

At the beginning of the session, the moderator pointed out several possible outcomes of upcoming events: 1) Europe, which is becoming increasingly distrustful of the United States, may move closer to China; 2) the possibility that President Trump's visit to China scheduled for April 2026 could, through, among others, the conclusion of large-scale commercial deals, foster an atmosphere of a "G2"; and 3) the possibility that, as the Russia-Ukraine war continues, Russia's dependence on China may further deepen. It was noted that if a trend were to emerge in which the United States, Europe, and Russia each moved closer to China, the risk could increase that China would escalate its coercive behavior toward neighboring countries and others. Against this background, the moderator expressed an intention to discuss U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and the implications for Japan.

First, with regard to the Trump administration's engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, the speakers made the following points.

• The announcement of reciprocal tariffs on April 2, 2025 was a historic event comparable to the Nixon Shock, and the international economic order has been significantly shaken. While the Trump administration has not withdrawn from the WTO, it has put forward reform proposals such as a review of the most-favored-nation principle and security exceptions. Thus, rather than having collapsed, the international economic system should be seen as undergoing a transformation into a form more aligned with current realities. However, the view that free trade does not serve U.S. national interests has become a bipartisan issue.
• With regard to U.S.-China relations, neither side can afford a further deterioration, and a leaders' summit planned for April is therefore likely to take place. From China's perspective, expected outcomes include projecting the image of a "G2" relationship and securing some U.S. commitments regarding Taiwan. There are also concerns that large-scale economic deals could dilute attention to issues such as the South China Sea and Taiwan.
• U.S.-Taiwan relations have seen improvement since around November 2025, due to such factors as the Lai administration's decision to increase defense spending, amounting to the largest arms sale in history, and the U.S.-Taiwan tariff agreement reached in January 2026. However, challenges that remain include whether the defense spending increase can be approved by the Parliament in Taiwan and, amid growing suspicion of the U.S. among Taiwanese people, how to reassure them beyond President Trump's April 2026 visit to China. The fact that Taiwan was not mentioned in the National Defense Strategy will also have an impact on China's propaganda for public opinion in Taiwan.
• With regard to U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) relations, similar to Japan, the Lee Jae Myung administration has pledged massive investment in the United States and has also committed to a gradual increase in defense spending to 3.5% of GDP, thereby emphasizing a cooperative stance toward the United States. In its 2026 National Defense Strategy, the Trump administration indicated a policy of prioritizing and favoring relations with "model allies" that do not shirk self-help efforts, and ROK can be regarded as one such ally. The National Defense Strategy also states that the primary responsibility for deterrence against North Korea should be borne by the ROK armed forces, and that the U.S.-ROK alliance should be positioned as meaningful from the perspective of deterring China in line with U.S. strategic interests. The strategic flexibility of United States Forces Korea, particularly in the context of a Taiwan contingency, will remain a key issue in U.S.-ROK relations.
• The perspective of Southeast Asian countries is that the United States is distancing itself from multilateral diplomacy, that it shows little interest in small and medium-sized states, and that it is using tariffs in ways that, depending on negotiations, work to weaken ASEAN unity.
• Although it is difficult to see immediate improvements in U.S.-India relations, India remains important to the U.S. Tariff negotiations are stalled. One variable to watch is the rapprochement between Pakistan and the US.
• The U.S. has undergone a major reversal in its countermeasures against disinformation, including dismantling relevant government agencies and specialized teams, forcing social media companies and expert communities to significantly scale back related efforts and research activities, and halting the functioning of the countermeasure ecosystem. The absence of US involvement internationally has also affected the activities of other countries, potentially reducing their relative deterrent effect against disinformation and information manipulation. This creates a favorable situation for Russia and other countries.



The speakers also pointed out the following implications for Japan stemming from various regional developments.

• There is no choice but to recognize the reality that high tariffs are the new normal in the U.S. market.
• Prime Minister Takaichi should visit the United States prior to President Trump's visit to China in April 2026. For this visit, a narrative that resonates with President Trump together with short-term, visibly tangible outcomes would be necessary.
• It is necessary to for Prime Minister Takaichi to convince the United States that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are vital, and that forfeiting them would run counter to U.S. interests. Successfully navigating the situation without retracting prior statements regarding a so-called "Taiwan contingency" would be encouraging for Taiwan. Japan will need to take the initiative in raising Taiwan's presence in the international community.
• Compared with the Biden administration, the Trump administration has shown significantly less interest in trilateral security cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and ROK. However, it has not yet gone so far as to dismiss the significance of Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation, and if the framework could function without U.S. leadership, Washington would likely be willing to go along with it. From the perspectives of Japan and ROK, in the uncertain Trump era, the usefulness of the Japan-US-ROK cooperation framework has actually increased in terms of ensuring U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. In order to draw the U.S. more deeply into the Indo-Pacific, the time has come for Japan and ROK to take the lead in trilateral cooperation.
• The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which advocates an international order based on the rule of law, does not align well with the Trump administration; nevertheless, pragmatic cooperation in the field of economic security should still be pursued.
• As India accelerates diversification, Foreign Minister Motegi's visit to India led to the establishment of a dialogue network on AI and economic security. A key challenge, however, is whether the two countries can generate tangible successes, including in the area of defense equipment. Another question is whether Japan and Australia can together support the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue).
• Japan is strengthening its countermeasures against information warfare, including the spread of disinformation. While the formal Japan-U.S. cooperation framework in this area has disappeared, this does not mean that the U.S. has withdrawn from all related countermeasures. Japan needs to confirm areas that the Trump administration has identified as targets for countermeasures (such as "countering propaganda") and actively engage the U.S. to draw it into international cooperation.
• In conclusion, the moderator noted that the role of the United States in international politics has gone from being a "constant" to a "variable." Further, it is necessary for Japan to analyze U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy documents, and if gaps emerge between Japan's national interests and the actions of the U.S., it will be necessary to pursue cooperation with like-minded countries. However, because the Indo-Pacific is an important region for the United States, there is no need to view Japan's position as being in parallel with that of Europe. Rather, it is necessary for Japan to reach mutual understandings with the United States on each individual issue.